Iran a Key Player in Obama’s Islamic State Strategy

Following the Islamic State’s public executions of two American journalists, political pressure on Obama to act forcefully has increased. During his presidency he has had several opportunities to alter the playing field in the region but has not utilized them, writes political scientist Bjorn Ottosson.

Barack Obama currently finds himself in a political position he certainly never desired. Like most of his predecessors, he did not want foreign policy to dominate the agenda. Obama intended to concentrate on the home front, reduce U.S. presence in the Middle East, and focus on strategically important Asia. Now, a crisis in Europe and a Middle East in flames are at the top of his agenda.

Obama’s opposition to the Iraq War played a decisive role in his election victory in 2008; ending the war was not just an election promise, but also a project of personal prestige. To have to send back forces now cannot be described as anything but a failure, but he does not have much choice.

Combating the Islamic State will be no easy task, and will require several difficult trade-offs. Although Obama recently shocked the rest of the world by openly declaring that he lacked an overall strategy for the Islamic State, he has acted on several fronts. The United States has bombed Islamic State fighters when they moved beyond the territory they already controlled, sent arms to the Kurds, and, with promises of increased aid, tried to get the government in Baghdad to reduce discrimination against Sunni Muslims and the politicization of the Iraqi army.

The problem is that all these actions so far have been so half-hearted. Obama wanted the United States to make a smaller footprint on the world; his foreign policy has come to be characterized by caution, control, and limited commitment. He always seems to hesitate to put his foot down. Bomb the Islamic State — but just a little. Help the Kurds — but don’t give them any heavy weapons.

Rather than dramatically change the situation on the ground, these types of action will result in a stalemate. And a deadlock is a major victory for the Islamic State. Every day that the Islamic State controls a large territory, thousands of radicalized Muslims will come to regard al-Baghdadi as caliph. This means that the Islamic State can collect tax for yet another day, sell oil, train soldiers and instruct its followers with foreign passports to take the battle to their home countries and spread the legend of the Islamic State. It means that the Islamic State can, for yet another day, slaughter its moderate Sunni opponents in Syria.

Reaching out to the moderate Sunnis who prefer order is probably the only way to defeat the Islamic State. In Iraq, this means trying to reach clan and military leaders responsible for the so-called Awakening in Anbar, which played a decisive role in the defeat of al-Qaida in Iraq. In Syria, it means supporting the remnants of the non-radicalized faction of the Syrian opposition; in Lebanon, it means backing up the forces that support people like Hariri. Finally, it is also about working with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stabilize the Sunni world.

At present, Sunnis feel betrayed by Obama. In Syria, he drew a line in the sand, then changed his mind; with his quick exodus from Iraq, he left them abandoned. However, approaching them is doable. The dilemma is that if the United States were to stand fully behind such a strategy, there is a risk of alienating Iran. And if there is something that has been constantly at the top of Obama’s foreign policy agenda, it is the goal to resolve tensions with Iran without a war or the country developing nuclear weapons.

No president since 1979 has done so much as Obama to try to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive geo-political agreement with Iran. His determination in this matter is one of the most remarkable things about his entire presidency. Until now, Obama has prioritized this goal above relations with America’s traditional allies in the region. Over the years, he has used both carrots and sticks. To the sticks belong expansive sanctions, and to the carrots, among other things, his silence when the mass demonstrations of 2009, the so-called Green Revolution, was crushed, and various concessions on the sanctions. Obama’s Iran strategy is as much about acting in ways that strengthen the cooperative forces within Iran as it is about hard instruments of power to force Iran to the negotiating table. So far, it has not led to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons, let alone to a comprehensive agreement, but it has allowed the continuation of negotiations. The cost of this prioritization, so far, has been enormous, and has led to the decline of America’s influence in the Middle East.

The advance of the Islamic State increases the foreign policy cost of this approach further. Islamic State executions have angered the American public, and thus the domestic political cost has also increased. The question now is whether Obama will reprioritize or stay the course.

Last night, Obama tried to explain to the American people how he intends to deal with the Islamic State. However, the gap between Obama’s rhetoric and his tangible actions has, in many cases, been miles wide; it is always best to look at it later before drawing any conclusions.

During his presidency, Obama has had several opportunities to alter the game plan in the region, but he has not used them. Had he cooperated more with the Sunnis in Iraq at an early stage, all the blame for the war could have been attributed to George W. Bush, while he would have been able to take credit for the country’s stability. Had he acted forcefully against Assad early, Iran would have been under enormous pressure to reach a compromise with the United States, as the country’s regional position had been on the brink of ruin. During the summer, he was given a new opportunity as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have shown a willingness to move closer to Israel. The question is whether Obama will get any more similar opportunities.

Successfully combating the Islamic State requires that Obama dares to take steps that might alienate Iran, but there is much to suggest that he will not take them. Within the administration, there are many who conclude that the Islamic State represents as great a threat to Iran as to the West. Furthermore, they think that the common threat strengthens the collaborative factions within Iran. The Islamic State’s advances thus increase the chance for a diplomatic breakthrough and the stronger the conception is that a breakthrough is imminent, the more they will try to convince Obama to stay the appointed course. This is good news for the Islamic State. Moreover, it is quite likely that the regime in Iran is less interested in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement with the U.S. than making maximal use of Obama’s desire for transformative and retaliative diplomatic success to its own advantage.