First Priority Baghdad, then Kiev

What occurred when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Paris the day before yesterday is anything but self-evident. The Ukraine conflict created a de facto ability for Russia’s subversion through the reinforcement of extreme Muslim fundamentalism in North Caucasus, Chechnya and Dagestan, a strategy which until recently was applied by the U.S through funding Saudi Arabia. In any case, a multitude of political analysis has lately underscored the great importance the Caucasus has been playing in the context of the overall policy of Russian encirclement, during which Azerbaijan is also playing a crucial role.

This therefore raises the question of how it will be possible, while the State Department is currently trying by any means available to avoid EU sanctions being lifted against Russia, for the two countries to adopt a common strategy in the war against the jihadis.

The answer is quite simple. In the Middle East, there are much more important vital interests at stake in Iraq and Syria than in Ukraine. First of all, the U.S. would play the Islamic card in the Caucasus with great difficulty without Turkish cooperation. Turkey has maintained favorable neutrality to a pro-Russia position, throughout the whole Ukraine crisis.

Secondly, it needs Russian cooperation not only for encouraging Tehran to sign an acceptable pro-American agreement, but also as a mediator in the de facto silent alliance with Damascus, an alliance which, at the moment, neither side wants to publicly confirm.

What does this all mean? First and foremost, it means that once again President Barack Obama’s concession of declaring the reinforcement of a moderate anti-Assad opposition is just empty rhetoric, something which even Vice President Joe Biden confirmed by saying that there was no moderate anti-regime organization in Syria. The Assad regime is not only the sole ally in the Middle East that Moscow can maintain relations with, but also the Syrian port of Tartus is the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean.

Another factor that is increasing the importance of a U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Middle East is the deterrence of Turkey’s unilateral interventionist policy in Syria and Iraq. If Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can handle America’s Cold War tactics, the price his country will pay would be a thousand times higher if at the same time he opened up an opposition front with Moscow, which is an important trading and energy partner for Ankara.

Since 1945, the situation in the Middle East has been a direct reflection of the decline or escalation of conflict between the U.S., Russia, Europe and elsewhere. These days we are following reverse dynamics—prioritizing U.S.-Russian common interests in the broader Middle East and switching the U.S.-Russia conflict in Ukraine to a subordinate level.

Washington and Moscow’s convergence on targeting the Middle East was launched a year ago, in September 2013, when Sergei Lavrov mediated so that the Assad regime in Damascus would agree to deliver and destroy the Syrian chemical weapon stockpile, so as to cancel the U.S. plan of impending airstrikes on government forces.

The partnership lasted through the extreme escalation of disputes between the two countries, and was not restricted to Ukraine but led to an atmosphere of extreme tension, with both countries testing each other’s readiness in air defense, just like the good old days during the Cold War.

The above parties favor seeking consensus in Ukraine, while time is the unknown variable.