Is Tragedy the Only Path When It Comes to Politics among Great Powers?

Published in Southern Views
(China) on 13 May 2016
by Li Zhefu (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Calvin Blackburn. Edited by Melanie Rehfuss.
John Mearsheimer is an international relations theorist whom I hold in high regard. He is excellent because he confronts a country’s political essence, and casts off the hypocritical veil worn by some capitalist politicians. He believes that a nation’s interests are the basic starting point for a nation’s actions, and that winning the most possible international power is the fundamental existence for the game among great powers. From this logic he examined 200 years of American history, and claimed that occasionally, the logical guiding points of liberal and realist ideology by chance pointed toward the same policy. In these circumstances, America found it quite simple to obey the commands of power politics, while also allowing it to dress up its actions in a cloak of liberalism. Nevertheless, when these two kinds of logic were at odds, America’s leaders had no other choice than to place realism above liberal ideals.

Mearsheimer belongs to the school of offensive realism in international relations. In his view, the international system has an innate structural defect, being that sovereign states have no higher authority to impress a system of international order or arbitrate international disputes. As a result, the international system is at its essence anarchic; thus it is necessarily a dangerous and cruel arena. States must think about how to survive and develop amidst it all, for there is no other choice, acting only to compete among one another and develop their power. It does not matter if you are willing or not − the international stage does not trust tears, nor does it trust pretty-sounding words and speeches. In this system, one needs to think about how to become more prosperous, more secure, with the ideal outcome being that your state becomes the system’s hegemon. Only states that possess a power advantage can ensure their existence. On the other hand, weak states invite trouble; as they fall behind they naturally fall into a state of standing passively by as they are beaten up.

Thus, if there is no fundamental change to the international structure, small or weak states must pursue good relations with certain powerful states, so as to procure their protection and support. Or should they present themselves as a neutral state, they seek out room for survival through smooth and slick actions. As the powerful states must invariably pursue the greatest possible amount of international power, then the games played between great powers will lead to war in the end. This is the tragedy of great powers − the unavoidable “Thucydides Trap.”

According to this logic, Mearsheimer expresses doubt as to China’s peaceful rise. His reasoning is that the realist hegemon of the United States will do everything possible to halt China’s rise. A hegemon in power will never allow a great power to rise that has the potential to challenge its position. Historically, America has prevented Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, and also stopped Japan from dominating Asia. The United States will certainly seek to prevent China’s rise in Asia. This is utterly illogical. If you develop into a powerful nation, then this is harmful and serves as an impediment to me. I will thus look for an opportunity, a reason and an excuse to contain you, to suppress you, and to weaken you. Additionally, Mearsheimer believes that following China’s unceasing economic development, they will necessarily seek to establish great military power, and so to ultimately assume regional hegemony. Because a position of superiority is the best assurance of one’s existence, China cannot go against this logic. This way, the disputes and conflicts between the two powers are unavoidable. Mearsheimer has even envisioned the path that China will tread on its way to hegemony, a path that follows in the footsteps of Uncle Sam. In this way, China will use some of the same methods to realize its hegemony over Asia that the United States employed to gain hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. He imagines that as the first step, China will try to widen the difference in power between it and its neighboring states, especially between the big neighbors of India, Japan, and Russia, so as to make sure that no nation in Asia has the ability to threaten China. Following this, “China will attempt to force America out of the Asia-Pacific region,” carrying out a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine. How could a powerful China accept the American military carrying out activities in its backyard? This is exactly like the United States refusing to allow any great powers to dispatch troops to the Western Hemisphere. After resolving its security issues, China will still need to find solutions to its territorial disputes with its neighbors over the land and sea. In this matter, once a state has established itself as powerful, then it holds the upper hand. Following this is the maintenance of strategic interests outside of Asia, for how could a great power not have overseas interests to protect? Actions such as these were the direction America took; it is unavoidable that China will act the same way.

To this end, Uncle Sam must inevitably face off against the Chinese Dragon. According to Mearsheimer’s analysis, America will either employ containment or non-containment as its means of dealing with China’s rise. The best way, or the best strategy is still containment, meaning planning to establish a counterbalancing coalition, which in all likelihood will mean getting the participation of China’s neighboring states. Being well practiced at offshore balancing, America ought to do its best to remain behind the scenes, making China’s neighbors assume most of the responsibility for containing China’s rise. But I am afraid that this will be very difficult to achieve, as the power of China’s neighbors may not be enough to balance it, thus forcing America to become personally involved. And just what is non-containment? Mearsheimer believes that China’s population is massive, its economy will continue to develop at a clip, and its latent power is great, making it difficult to contain it in the future. Adding on the fact that America is separated from China by a grand ocean, its ability to apply military power is greatly hampered, making the use of the force of arms a poor choice. Consequently, the use of containment or other methods to make the Chinese economy suffer a massive slowdown is in the best interest of the United States. “Although this outcome may not be the best for American prosperity, and will be even worse for global prosperity, it will be beneficial to the security of the United States, and this is the most important element.” Looking back throughout the past few years, America’s response to China’s every action from its ruling elites has been almost entirely based on the strategies put forth by Mearsheimer.

Then, do great power politics unavoidably lead to tragedy? We cannot entirely agree with Mearsheimer’s conclusion. In unprecedented historical conditions, America and China have established a cooperative and mutually beneficial new model of great power relations. Although we affirm that this road is one of hardship and setbacks, it still ought to be given a fair shake for it may just achieve success. “Even the green mountains cannot hold back the river, it will flow east after all is said and done.” We believe that the great trends of historical development cannot be controlled by America alone.


大国间的政治只能有悲剧一途?
约翰·米尔斯海默是我很欣赏的一位国际关系理论学者,他好就好在直面国家政治的本质,剥去了一些资本主义政治家的虚伪面纱,认为国家利益是国家行为的根本出发点,获取尽可能多的国际权力是大国博弈的根本所在。由此他考察了美国200多年的历史,认为有时“碰巧”自由主义和现实主义的逻辑都指向了相同的政策。在这种情况下,美国很容易会遵循权力政治的命令,不过会给自己的行为披上自由主义言辞的外衣。但是,当两种逻辑相冲突时,美国领导者不可避免地会将现实主义置于自由主义之上。”
  米尔斯海默属于进攻性现实主义国际关系学派,在他看来,国际体系有着先天性的结构缺陷,这就是在主权国家之上没有一个更高的权威机构来规范国际秩序,仲裁国际矛盾,国际体系本质上仍然处于无政府主义状态,因而它就不能不是一个险恶而残忍的角斗场。国家要想在其中生存和发展,没有别的选择,只能为权力而相互竞争,不管你愿意还是不愿意,国际舞台不相信眼泪,不相信美好的言辞和说教。要想在这一国际体系中过得更好,更安全,理想的结果就是成为体系中的霸权国。只有拥有优势权力的国家,其生存才能得到保证,相反,软弱只能招致麻烦,而落后则必然陷入被动挨打的地步。
  由此,只要这一国际结构没有根本改变,小国弱国要么修好与某些强国大国的关系,以寻求保护和支持,要么以中立的面目出现,在八面玲珑中求得生存空间;而大国则毫无例外地会追求尽可能多的国际权力,于是大国之间的博弈最后必然导致战争,这是大国的悲剧,是绕不过去的“修昔底德陷阱”。
  根据这一逻辑,米尔斯海默对中国的和平崛起表示质疑。其理由是,作为现实霸主的美国,必然要千方百计地阻止中国的崛起。已有霸主是决不会允许一个有可能挑战其地位的大国崛起的,历史上美国曾阻止过威廉德国、纳粹德国及苏联支配欧洲,阻止过日本支配亚洲,它也一定要阻止中国在亚洲崛起。这是没有什么道理可讲的,你发展了,你强大了,你就危害了我,妨碍了我,我就要找机会找理由找借口遏制你、打压你、削弱你。另一方面,他也认为,随着中国在经济上的不断发展,也必然会要求建立一支庞大的军事力量,从而寻求地区霸权,因为优势地位是生存的最好保证,中国也不可能违背这个逻辑。这样,两方的矛盾和冲突就无可避免。米尔斯海默甚至预想了一条中国的称霸之路,一条亦步亦趋地“踏着山姆大叔的足迹”的路,也就是按照美国称霸西半球的办法来使中国实现称霸亚洲。他设想,作为第一步,“中国将设法拉大与邻国的力量差距,特别是印度、日本、俄罗斯一类大邻国”,使得亚洲没有一国有条件威胁自己。接着,“就会尝试把美国赶出亚太地区”,实行中国版本的“门罗主义”。一个强大的中国怎么会接受美军在本国的后院活动?正像美国不能接受任何大国派兵到西半球一样。在解决了安全问题之后,中国还需要解决与邻国的领土和海域的纠纷问题,这在强大以后解决起来将更为有利。再其后则是维护亚洲之外的战略利益,一个大国怎么可能没有海外利益要保护?如此等等,美国就是这么走过来的,中国也不会不这样做。
  为此“山姆大叔”就必然要对阵“中国龙”。按照米尔斯海默的分析,美国会采取遏制和非遏制这样两种手段、两套办法来应对中国的崛起。上策或曰最佳战略仍是遏制,就是策划建立制衡联盟,并尽可能吸收中国的邻国参加。作为离岸平衡的老手,美国应尽量置身幕后,而让中国的邻国背起遏制中国的大部分负担,但这恐怕很难做到,中国邻国的力量恐不足以制衡中国,因此美国将不得不亲自出马。非遏制手段是什么呢?米尔斯海默认为,中国人口众多,经济继续快速发展下去,其潜力之大,终将难以遏制。再加上美国与之远隔重洋,军力投放大受限制,动武也不是一个好的选项。因而,通过遏制或其他办法,让中国经济大大减速最符合美国利益,“这种结果虽然不一定有利于美国的繁荣,更不利于全球繁荣,但会利于美国安全,这可是最重要的。”纵观近些年来,美国对中国的所作所为,其执政精英似乎是全盘照搬了米尔斯海默所提出的上述策略。
  那么,大国间的政治就只能有悲剧一途?我们还是不能完全同意米尔斯海默的结论,在新的历史条件下,中美之间建立起一个合作共赢的新型大国关系,虽然肯定是一条充满艰辛、充满曲折的路,但仍有尝试的必要,仍有成功的可能。“青山遮不住,毕竟东流去”,我们相信,历史发展的大趋势,终究不是美国一家所能左右。
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