An Urgent Contract

Joe Biden’s arrival in Washington has begun to break records. After the presidents of the U.S. and Russia confirmed an agreement to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in principle during their first phone call, both chambers of Russia’s Federal Assembly ratified the full extension in a remarkably short period of time. We won’t dwell on analyzing the need for such a rush, or the reasons which would force us to abandon ratification of the extension if it could not be ratified by Feb. 5. Not to mention the fact that ratifying the extension of the Chinese-Russian agreement for notification of ballistic missile and space vehicle launches reached last year, which is part of this program, has yet to be introduced in the Russian State Duma.

During the debates in the Duma, several sensitive issues were raised regarding the counting and withdrawal of individual strategic arms systems, the development and expansion of high-precision and long-range arms in nonnuclear equipment, the condition of the Russian military-industrial complex and promising strategies for delivering nuclear arms. In any case, the discussion was apparently unproductive and did not influence the chances of successful ratification even though nobody questioned the usefulness of the treaty. At the same time, parliament could have asked about the actual quantitative composition of Russia’s strategic nuclear power under the limitations of the treaty (at the moment, only the most general official information is available, information that the U.S. State Department publishes) and about the comparative economic and military-strategic effectiveness of this existing structure.

Yet why did the parties end up extending the START Treaty for five years without preconditions, according to the Russian proposal made at the end of 2019? Apparently, Biden and his team preferred this option at first with American national interests in mind, and more so given the large number of crises and problems that also need to be urgently sorted out. The operative achievement of guaranteed relative stability in strategic arms allows American partners to free up intellectual resources in advance and makes it possible to build political capital; although, factions such as members of the former Donald Trump administration, including current Republican senators, of course, have begun to attack this “gift to Russia.”

After ratifying the extension, it would be appropriate to issue a joint Russia-United States statement about the next steps, specifically with regard to resolving problems in maintaining the treaty, resuming inspections and meetings of a bilateral advisory commission amid the ongoing pandemic, etc., along with terms terms for future resolutions concerning arms control.

It is worth noting that the Open Skies Treaty has suddenly returned to the Russia-America agenda. One can hardly expect the United States to return to this agreement, particularly since Russia declared it would start taking steps to exit the treaty, although that hasn’t been seen publicly yet. But that does not preclude any attempts to rebuild a program of joint operation flights, which, for the most part, would satisfy the priorities of these countries and others outside of Europe and the United States.

One should also remember the classic formula for preventing nuclear war, which posits that there are no true winners in a such a confrontation, an understanding which the top five nuclear powers of Russia, the U.S., Great Britain, France and China have affirmed, providing a clear signal to the global community as to where they stand on the issue.

Speaking of these five powers, it is worth mentioning another relatively simple and “cheap” decision in the realm of arms control. It is probably time to establish a general notification process with respect to the launch of long-range missiles. Russia and the U.S., and Russia and China, already exchange this kind of information, including information that is sent across international networks, from notices to pilots warning of possible flight hazards to the 2002 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

There are many problems, points of tension and mutually exclusive interests in Russian-American relations. Along with this, it appears that in prioritizing military spending, the Biden administration recognizes that arms control is a valuable way to guarantee national security. In Russia, as it currently appears, this understanding also exists.

As such, the conditions for a constructive approach to this area of international relations are being laid, but they should not be considered a détente. Instead, this is solely about preventing armed conflict between Russia and the United States. Of course, one cannot rule out that despite the relative stability which the extension of this treat will secures, possible misalignment of priorities with regard to future arms control programs could disrupt this debate as soon as a few years from now.

On the other hand, the U.S. and Russia may act more efficiently in the next few years, and thus, perhaps we can hope they deliver a rich agenda. After all, the issue of strategic arms is not going anywhere, and Russia and the U.S. are not the only countries that possess these weapons.