What Does Newly Released US National Defense Strategy Reveal?

On Oct. 27, the U.S. Department of Defense released the latest National Defense Strategy, an unclassified version of the one delivered to Congress in March. The previous NDS was published in 2018 while the U.S. military was still engaged in the war in Afghanistan. The 2018 edition stated that the military intended to shift from anti-terrorism and combating extremists to traditional great power competition. The 2022 edition shows that the strategic shift has basically been realized.

Expanding on the 2018 edition and former President Donald Trump’s strategic emphasis, the 2022 NDS centers on how to deal with China, stating, “The PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.” Furthermore, the U.S. wishes to impose its strategy against China on the international community. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated China “is the only competitor out there with both the intent to reshape the international order, and increasingly the power to do so.”

The NDS makes clear that the U.S. military will base its development path on China’s military development, stating it “directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge for the Department.” In 2023, the Pentagon will invest $130 billion of its largest-to-date budget in research and development of high-tech military equipment, including hypersonic systems, cyber, artificial intelligence, and directed-energy weapons. The Pentagon will adjust its strategy and scientific research organizations to attract more private enterprise and civilian technicians. It appears the U.S. wants “total war” with China in the field of advanced military technology.

The space militarization trend is evident in the NDS and the likelihood of a space arms race is growing. China and Russia’s hypersonic missiles have advanced rapidly, possessing an increased ability to shoot down satellites or change their orbit. Therefore, the NDS aims to ensure the reliability of U.S. satellites under attack if the hypothesized space war becomes real. It recommended the establishment of a low-orbit satellite belt to enhance the detection capability of supersonic missiles. Thanks to Starlink and similar companies, the U.S. has already established an absolute monopoly over the low-orbit satellite belt, which has played an immense role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The U.S. low-orbit entrenchment encourages other countries to compete, which means the sky above humanity’s head will become more crowded and dangerous.

Changes of Note in the New NDS

First, Russia’s relative position within U.S. defense strategy is on the decline and has been deprioritized continuously since Trump took office. Although the U.S had raised Russia’s strategic importance, Russia has fallen behind China. After President Joe Biden took office, the U.S. dropped Russia’s strategic importance down a tier, placing it among countries like Iran. The NDS reported that Russia’s operation in Ukraine presents an “acute threat” to the U.S, but, as Austin said, “Unlike China, Russia can’t systemically challenge the United States over the long term.” This indicates that the U.S no longer regards Russia as a strategic adversary.

Second, the NDS emphasized the need for nuclear deterrence and introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence.” Post-Cold War U.S. strategic texts threats have generally associated nuclear threats with terrorist organizations and other non-state actors. The NDS states that Russia’s action against Ukraine “underscores that nuclear dangers persist, and could grow, in an increasingly competitive and volatile geopolitical landscape.” This shows that the U.S sees an increased risk of nuclear conflict.

Subsequently, to deter a potential nuclear conflict, the NDS made clear the Pentagon would take decisive retaliatory measures. For the first time, Washington faces two nuclear-armed major power competitors. In response, the U.S. proposed “integrated deterrence,” which attempts to deter potential strategic opponents through a strong network of allies and extensive military, economic and diplomatic pressure. As with previous security policies, under “integrated deterrence,” nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of U.S. policy.

In summary, NDS reveals that the U.S. military currently does not expect to enter large-scale wars in the near future. Washington sees the threat from Russia as urgent but insignificant and the challenge from China as significant but not urgent. The U.S. strategy strives to avoid direct military conflict with China, while not shunning competition and confrontation. In U.S.-China relations, the bottom line of not seeking military conflict remains. Basic mutual trust has not disappeared.

However, the U.S, has also clarified the goal behind its China strategy goals. The U.S. aims to block China from gaining an advantage in key areas. Since the U.S and China cannot weigh each other in the field of combat, the competition will mainly be economic, which now means focusing on high-tech innovation and industrial chain security. That is why the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stressed rejuvenating our country through science and education.

The author is a professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University.