A New Cold War in a Changing World

Published in Oriental Daily
(Malaysia) on 31 August 2024
by Soon Hoh Sing (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew McKay. Edited by Patricia Simoni.

 

 

The term “Cold War” was first put forward in 1945 by renowned British writer George Orwell, in an article entitled “You and the Atom Bomb.” The author believed that the terrifying power of the atomic bomb meant the world’s most powerful countries would avoid a hot war and enter a phase of a “peace that is no peace.” In a scenario such as this, the great powers would make use of a variety of ways with which to compete.

In the period from the end of World War II to the transformations in Eastern Europe and the former USSR in 1989, the Cold War manifested primarily between the so-called free world led by the United States and the actual, Soviet-led socialist countries, dubbed the “Iron Curtain” by the Western media. Essentially, it was an ideological struggle, while the vast majority of developing countries adopted a stance of neutrality or so-called nonalignment.

It is generally recognized that the Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, and Western liberal democracies and market economies proved victorious over totalitarian communist regimes. In other words, the Western model, led by the U.S., became the natural choice of all mankind: the so-called “end of history.”

In the 1990s, the U.S. — already considering itself a victor — became the sole, invincible, and overbearing superpower in the “one superpower, many powers” world setup. But the 9/11 attacks also put a damper on U.S. arrogance, prompting it to focus more on counterterrorism while neglecting other issues, such as the peaceful rise of China.

In 2011, President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy set off a new Cold War directed at China. One of the aims of this new Cold War was to try to shore up support to contain China’s rise. To isolate China economically, Obama even went so far as to propose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, only for the agreement to be canceled immediately by Donald Trump after he assumed office in 2017. For his part, Trump adopted a foreign policy of favoring the U.S. at the expense of its allies, along with attempts at deglobalization; and after Joe Biden was elected president in 2020, he reversed some of Trump’s policies such as climate change.

For many countries, these changes created a crisis of confidence in the U.S, and even though the U.S. continues with its Obama-inspired new Cold War on China, the global situation has shifted dramatically, making this new Cold War different from the old one.

For one, China has become fully internationalized, not just in terms of the global support it has garnered from many developing countries, such as those in the United Nations, but also in terms of overtaking the U.S. as the world’s largest consumer market (such as, for automobiles and mobile phones). At the same time, China has become most countries’ largest trading partner, likewise surpassing the U.S., a situation quite different from the isolation of the Soviet Union in its day. Today, more and more countries depend on China economically, and China’s economic performance in turn greatly affects these countries. This is what has frustrated U.S. efforts to fence China in.

Second, cracks have appeared within the Western bloc, led by the English-speaking countries. For example, although the European Union also sees China as a systemic rival, it has certain reservations about starting a new Cold War with China, and it is attaching increasing importance to its own strategic autonomy, instead of unconditionally following the U.S.

US Hypocrisy and Multiple Standards

Third, owing to the sharp rise in China’s comprehensive national power, the U.S. is not looking for a large-scale head-on conflict; in fact, U.S. policy toward China is one of controlled strategic competition, precisely to avoid full-blown conflict. The reason for this is that U.S. supremacy is not as stable as it once was — not to mention the fact that the U.S. national debt has exceeded 130% of its GDP.

Fourth, the slogans advanced by the U.S. of defending democracy and human rights no longer meet with the same acceptance, as many countries have come to see the hypocrisy and multiple standards of the U.S. For example, although the U.S. is big on its democratic catchphrases, U.S. politics itself resembles a plutocracy more than a democracy. Many U.S. policies are influenced by big donors and big money — the so-called deep state — and especially by the military-industrial complex, as the U.S. has intentionally weaponized the global economy in furtherance of its arms sales. There is also an obvious duality to U.S. mantras about democracy and human rights. For example, when selling weapons to Saudi Arabia or Egypt, the U.S. promotes neither of these values; worse still, it condones Israel’s invasion of Palestine, something that even many Americans and their allies find unacceptable.

Broadly speaking, slogans pitting Western democracies against non-Western authoritarian states have lost their luster.

Fifth, the U.S. trade war with China has called into question the free trade and market economy that the U.S. prides itself on being, making it clear that the U.S. is in fact a pragmatic country that follows only its interests. To a considerable extent, this trade war has undermined the global economic growth rate, and this is a view that has been repeatedly expressed by the International Monetary Fund.

Since World War II, trade protectionism has shifted from tariffs to non-tariff protectionism, but in moves that can be considered as retrograde as they are blatant, the U.S. has reversed this trend. Furthermore, U.S. weaponization of the dollar and imposition of embargoes and sanctions on other nations at the drop of a hat have driven many countries to a state of increased wariness.

Sixth, the growing divisiveness and polarization within the U.S. has called into question the desirability of the U.S. model. In theory, democracy should emphasize seeking common ground while putting differences aside, and majority rule while respecting the minority. But the polarized politics of the U.S. has made people worry whether it has gone too far and can no longer serve as a role model.

Seventh, overall, countries around the world are becoming increasingly pragmatic and realistic, no longer as easily moved by ideological struggles. Developing countries in particular are more concerned with national development and improving their citizens’ living standards than they are in engaging in any cold war. In reality, the Cold War is no longer a battle of values but an undisguised battle of national interests, and whether a country chooses a side depends more on considerations of practical benefits than it does on some abstract ideological struggle. If it hopes to garner more support, the U.S. will need to come up with more benefits it can offer other countries.


变化世界中的新冷战

发布于 2024年08月31日 07时50分

孙和声
时事评论人

冷战这个专有名词,最早在1945年由英国著名作家奥威尔(George Orwell)在一篇题为《你和原子弹》(You and the Atom Bomb)文中提出。作者认为,由于原子弹威力骇人,大国之间会避开热战,而进入一个“非和平的和平”阶段。在这种状态中,大国会利用各种各样方式进行竞争。

在二次战后到1989年东欧与前苏联变天时,冷战主要表现在以美国为首的所谓自由世界与被西方媒体称为铁幕的苏联领导的现实中的社会主义国家之间。基本上,这是一场意识形态的斗争。至于广大的发展中国家则多持中立态度或组成所谓的不结盟路线。

随著前苏联解体与东欧剧变一般认为,冷战已告一段落。西方的自由民主体制与市场经济已证明战胜了共产主义的极权政体。伸言之,以美国为首的西方模式已成了全人类的当然选择,是所谓的“历史终结”。

在1990年代,以胜利者姿态自居的美国成了不可一世的一超多强世界格局中唯一的超级强国,天下无敌。只是2001年的911事件也挫了美国的傲气与促使美国更专注于反恐,而忽略了其他,如中国的和平崛起。

2011年,美国总统奥巴马提出重返亚洲政策后,则启动了对中发动新冷战。这个新冷战的目的之一是试图拉帮结伙遏制中国的崛起;奥巴马甚至不惜提出跨太平洋协议,以在经济上孤立中国;只是,2016年特朗普当选总统后,便立即取消这个协议。特朗普也进一步提出顾好美国而不惜牺牲盟友的外交政策和意图逆转全球化。拜登在2020年当选总统后,又逆转特朗普的一些政策如气候变迁。

这个变化使许多国家对美国产生了信心危机。尽管,美国依然延续了奥巴马启动的对中发动新冷战;可世界形势已出现了重大变化,使得这个新冷战与旧冷战出现差异。

首先,中国已充份国际化,不但在全球范围内获得许多发展中国家的支持,如在联合国;此外,中国已超越美国成为全球最大的消费市场,如中国已是全球最大的汽车市场与手机市场。与此同时,中国也成了最多的国家的最大贸易伙伴,即超越了美国。这与当年苏联的孤立情况完全不同。今天已有越来越多国家在经济上靠中国,中国经济的好坏也大大影响了这些国家。这就使美国意图围堵中国的势力受挫。

其次是,以英语系为首的西方集团内部也出现了裂痕,如欧盟虽然也把中国视为系统性对手,可对中国发动新冷战则持有一定保留态度,欧盟已日益重视本身的战略自主,而不再任意跟著美国走。

美国虚伪与多重标准

其三,由于中国综合国力已大升,美国也不想与中国发生大规模正面冲突。实则,美国的对中政策是个避免发生全面冲突的管制性战略竞争。之所以,在于美国的霸权已不再那么稳固,更何况美国国债已超过国内生产总值(GDP)的130%之高。

其四,美国所提出的护卫民主与人权的口号,已不再受落。许多国家已看清美国的虚伪性与多重标准,如美国虽高喊民主口号,可美国政治本身更像是财主政体(plutocracy)更不是民主政体。美国的许多政策均受到大财主、大金主的影响,是所谓的深层国家。特别是军工业复合体。美国甚至有意把世界经济武器化,以便推销其军火。美国的民主与人权口号也有明显的双重性,如为了卖武器给沙地阿拉伯或埃及,便不在这些国家推销民主与人权,更甚的是,竟然放纵以色列入侵巴勒斯坦;连许多美国人及其盟友也看不过眼。

伸言之,把西方民主与非西方威权国家对立起来的口号,已失去光环。

其五,美国对中国发动贸易战也使人对美国所标榜的自由贸易与市场经济产生质疑;更让人看清楚,美国其实是个唯利益是从的现实主义国家,而不是如其所标榜的自由市场经济,这个贸易战在很大程度上也削弱了全球的经济增长率。国际货币基金便多次表明这个观点。

本来自二战以来,贸易保护主义已从关税转向非关税型保护主义,可美国具逆转这个趋势,可说是一倒退。这个手段也太过露骨了。进而言之,美国动不动就把美元武器化与对他国发动禁运与制裁也引起许多国家的戒心。

其六,美国内部日趋分裂与两极化,更使人怀疑美国模式的可欲性,按理说,民主应强调求同存异,服从多数、尊重少数,可美国的极化政治却让人担心美国是否已走火入魔,不再成为典范。

其七,整体上言,世界各国己日益务实与更现实主义,不再轻易为意识形态斗争所动,特别是发展中国家更注重国家发展与提高人民的生活水平,而不是搞什么冷战。实则,冷战也不再是个价值观之战而是赤裸裸的国家利益之战。国家会否选边站,考虑更多的是实利实惠,而不是什么抽象的意识形态斗争。美国需要拿出更多利益给他国才可能吸引到更多的支持。
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Topics

Poland: Meloni in the White House. Has Trump Forgotten Poland?*

Germany: US Companies in Tariff Crisis: Planning Impossible, Price Increases Necessary

Japan: US Administration Losing Credibility 3 Months into Policy of Threats

Mauritius: Could Trump Be Leading the World into Recession?

India: World in Flux: India Must See Bigger Trade Picture

Palestine: US vs. Ansarallah: Will Trump Launch a Ground War in Yemen for Israel?

Ukraine: Trump Faces Uneasy Choices on Russia’s War as His ‘Compromise Strategy’ Is Failing

Related Articles

Germany: US Companies in Tariff Crisis: Planning Impossible, Price Increases Necessary

Hong Kong: Can US Tariffs Targeting Hong Kong’s ‘Very Survival’ Really Choke the Life out of It?

Cuba: Trump, Panama and the Canal

China: White House Peddling Snake Oil as Medicine

China: Prime Take: How Do Americans View US Tariff Hikes?