Editorial: Xi Jinping’s Visit aSignificant Date Between Chinaand the US in the New Century
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 13 February 2012
by (link to original)
(China) on 13 February 2012
by (link to original)
Translated from
by Xiaofeng Zhu.
Edited by Tom Proctor.
Abstract: While the previous consensus between China and the U.S. is gradually dismantled, a new one is expected. This will require another round of tough negotiations under new circumstances that is important to oncoming disputes in which both countries will lay their cards on the table.
Xi Jinping, the Chinese vice president, began his visit to the United States today. This is a trip intended to put into effect the consensus made by top leaders of the two countries. More importantly for Xi Jinping’s special role in the approaching Chinese election, it is of special significance in the development of Sino-American relations.
Since the 1990s, relations between the two sides have struck the Chinese diplomatic circle as “not very good and not too bad,” an impression that has guided China’s policies toward the U.S. over the last two decades. But now the world is changing, and we’ve sensed the invalidity of this assumption about bilateral relations.
So when asked “Will China-U.S. relations continue to be 'not very good and not too bad?'", we are less sure than before.
Firstly, a number of variables have shifted between China and the U.S., especially the changes in each country's national strength. Chinese GDP in 2011 accounts for 45 percent of that of the U.S., and its total trade and the total value of its manufacturing industry are even bigger than those of the U.S. China appears to now be the strongest among all the competitors of the United States.
With regard to the frustrations in its economic development, the U.S. needs to put the blame on itself. But concerns over the rise of China have been used as an outlet for Americans’ anxiety about U.S. economy. After all, making troubles for Sino-American relations is surely easier than solving practical problems in internal affairs.
Secondly, changes have occurred in China’s policy-making context, mainly due to the complication of its diplomatic decision-making that used to be dominated by absolute elitism. (Any divergence on strategies toward the U.S. is subject to the top level’s decision, thus creating a relative stable decision-making context.) But now, elitism is being substituted by populism that influences the making of diplomatic policies, hence adding difficulties to the settlement of disputes between the two countries.
Periodic fluctuations in Sino-American relations are appearing more frequently, and frictions between the two sides are not uncommon. It is obvious that a large variety of disputes have marred the review and emphases of the strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington. So, Sino-American relations are usually at a crossroad that benefit neither side.
While the previous consensus between China and the U.S. is gradually dismantled, a new one is expected. This will require another round of tough negotiations under new circumstances that is important to oncoming disputes in which both countries will lay their cards on the table.
However, there is hostility on both sides towards each other, and restricting the hostility is not easy, especially for the U.S. The U.S. Congress and its media have repeatedly produced or exaggerated frictions between the two sides, stirring up American anti-China emotions and provoking anger from Chinese people in turn. This has been the most common generator of Sino-American crises.
The emergence of Chinese public opinion changed the pattern of “Chinese government vs. the U.S. as a nation,” adding more chances for latitude in China’s diplomatic strategies and greater complexity in the bilateral relations. To the U.S., China is getting not only stronger, but also more complicated.
This is an age of globalization, so both sides have to bear in mind the close connections between them, even though one may seem to be a strong rival to the other. For one period of time, the frictions may be exaggerated enough as intolerable as either side appears to be extremely angry, while for another they may be downplayed as opportunities in trade and cooperation reach a height. The gap between China and the U.S. in social systems will be bridged with natural competition rather than any arbitrary measures.
We hope Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States produces an opportunity for careful reflection by the two sides upon the bilateral relations at a strategic level. Both sides have to learn more about each other and themselves, as well as how they will be able to reconstruct their relations. This is a date in the new century and an unpredictable play that tests the endurance of both sides.
Xi Jinping, the Chinese vice president, began his visit to the United States today. This is a trip intended to put into effect the consensus made by top leaders of the two countries. More importantly for Xi Jinping’s special role in the approaching Chinese election, it is of special significance in the development of Sino-American relations.
Since the 1990s, relations between the two sides have struck the Chinese diplomatic circle as “not very good and not too bad,” an impression that has guided China’s policies toward the U.S. over the last two decades. But now the world is changing, and we’ve sensed the invalidity of this assumption about bilateral relations.
So when asked “Will China-U.S. relations continue to be 'not very good and not too bad?'", we are less sure than before.
Firstly, a number of variables have shifted between China and the U.S., especially the changes in each country's national strength. Chinese GDP in 2011 accounts for 45 percent of that of the U.S., and its total trade and the total value of its manufacturing industry are even bigger than those of the U.S. China appears to now be the strongest among all the competitors of the United States.
With regard to the frustrations in its economic development, the U.S. needs to put the blame on itself. But concerns over the rise of China have been used as an outlet for Americans’ anxiety about U.S. economy. After all, making troubles for Sino-American relations is surely easier than solving practical problems in internal affairs.
Secondly, changes have occurred in China’s policy-making context, mainly due to the complication of its diplomatic decision-making that used to be dominated by absolute elitism. (Any divergence on strategies toward the U.S. is subject to the top level’s decision, thus creating a relative stable decision-making context.) But now, elitism is being substituted by populism that influences the making of diplomatic policies, hence adding difficulties to the settlement of disputes between the two countries.
Periodic fluctuations in Sino-American relations are appearing more frequently, and frictions between the two sides are not uncommon. It is obvious that a large variety of disputes have marred the review and emphases of the strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington. So, Sino-American relations are usually at a crossroad that benefit neither side.
While the previous consensus between China and the U.S. is gradually dismantled, a new one is expected. This will require another round of tough negotiations under new circumstances that is important to oncoming disputes in which both countries will lay their cards on the table.
However, there is hostility on both sides towards each other, and restricting the hostility is not easy, especially for the U.S. The U.S. Congress and its media have repeatedly produced or exaggerated frictions between the two sides, stirring up American anti-China emotions and provoking anger from Chinese people in turn. This has been the most common generator of Sino-American crises.
The emergence of Chinese public opinion changed the pattern of “Chinese government vs. the U.S. as a nation,” adding more chances for latitude in China’s diplomatic strategies and greater complexity in the bilateral relations. To the U.S., China is getting not only stronger, but also more complicated.
This is an age of globalization, so both sides have to bear in mind the close connections between them, even though one may seem to be a strong rival to the other. For one period of time, the frictions may be exaggerated enough as intolerable as either side appears to be extremely angry, while for another they may be downplayed as opportunities in trade and cooperation reach a height. The gap between China and the U.S. in social systems will be bridged with natural competition rather than any arbitrary measures.
We hope Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States produces an opportunity for careful reflection by the two sides upon the bilateral relations at a strategic level. Both sides have to learn more about each other and themselves, as well as how they will be able to reconstruct their relations. This is a date in the new century and an unpredictable play that tests the endurance of both sides.