When Are We Finally Going to Mars?

Pierre Brisson, president of the Swiss Branch of the Mars Society, believes that the goals of space exploration as announced by Barack Obama suffer from serious defects and are too spread out over time.

In a much anticipated speech given on Thursday, April 15 at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the president of the United States finally stated his policy of exploration and addressed the most negative points of the unfortunate “plan” presented by NASA on Feb. 2. Proponents of the new Mars objective are still disappointed.

The Destination

Unsurprisingly, the president agrees with the “flexible path” option proposed by the Augustine Committee. While his predecessors, in 2004, referred to the moon and the construction of a moon base as targets, he clearly abandons those choices. (“We’ve been there before.”)

Though Mars is now known as the destination, it is only achievable after many prerequisite technological or preparatory steps. According to a logical progression in terms of energy requirements and length, these steps will be a stay in lunar orbit, a visit to a Lagrange point,* a visit to a near-Earth asteroid, a stay in orbit around Mars and a landing on Martian soil. This is a far cry from the simplicity of the Mars Direct Plan, even if it leads to a tangible program.

One must question the usefulness of these steps, beginning with sending a crew around the moon. This will accomplish nothing that could not be done by using simple observation instruments. An attempt to demonstrate the feasibility of the trip more than fifty years after Apollo 8 will fall completely flat. The mission to a Lagrange point, meanwhile, appears to be a mission to nowhere. The objective of installing a fuel depot for future missions “to the moon, Mars and other destinations” appears completely extravagant. (What is the interest in going so far for this fuel?)

Moreover, various long-haul round-trip destinations without stopping on Mars poses the problem of longer exposure to radiation (as the planet Mars and its atmosphere may in fact provide some protection during a stay on its surface) and also a greater length of exposure to weightlessness. (All these destinations, unlike Mars, can provide microgravity at best.) The only intermediate step that would be significant in terms of technological expertise and scientific knowledge is the visit to a near-Earth object (NEO), but it does not provide an answer to the problem of exposure to radiation and microgravity. (It is therefore more risky than a trip to Mars, which offers a mid-route break and a refuge in case of trouble.)

Program Content

For heavy lift launch systems, there is nothing to expect from preliminary research. The Americans have all the technologies at hand to develop it; they can be inspired by the Saturn V built in 1967, which was used for the Apollo and Skylab programs. The technological research would be warranted for propulsion in space (meaning after the launch, outside the atmosphere), but no allusion is made to nuclear propulsion or high power electric propulsion.

It is good to try to capitalize on the gains of current developments of the Orion capsule by deriving a simplified version to be used as a prototype for a future interplanetary capsule, while serving as a “lifeboat” to the Space Station. Unfortunately, this capsule, stripped down compared to what was planned, will be the only element preserved from the work of recent years and of the nine billion dollars already spent on the Constellation program. Moreover, its function as a mere “[life] boat” might continue at the expense of other, more interesting uses for it, and there are signs that the Space Station will be maintained at arms’ length at least until 2020, and perhaps even longer. Apart from everything else, this will represent a significant weight on the budget over time, thus preventing the development of any other substantial program.

It also lacks the “toolbox,” the development of which is considered essential (but already studied in theory) for long journeys, including the interplanetary housing module and artificial gravity. The module will be required for any distant mission, starting with the NEO mission. It could certainly be developed from the experience of the Space Station, but the decision has to be made and should be intrinsically linked to the development of a system of artificial gravity by centrifugal force. It will be necessary to get to work seriously on this system if we want the astronauts to arrive in good health and ready to work on Mars.

Generally in most areas, either because of lack of knowledge about the technical realities or to legitimize deadline extensions, the preparations are either poorly targeted or marked with a largely overstated need. Mastering the propulsion for interplanetary flight and long stays in space, as demonstrated by the shuttle and other launch vehicles, interplanetary probes and subsequent space stations, would allow us right now to move forward in a much more relevant and timely way.

Deadlines

The most critical objection of NASA’s Feb. 2 plan was the absence of any mention of deadlines. Deadlines would give substance to an ambition that, without them, especially given the suspicious prominence of a preliminary program for undetermined technological research, could run the risk of turning into mere whim. One might think President Obama understands this because he recapped the stages: heavy launcher starting in 2015, NEO mission in 2025, in-Mars orbit in 2035 and then landing on Mars. At first glance, this appears to prove wrong those who feared that NASA was trapped in a technology program deconstructed by the lack of concrete goals.

However, concerns remain. Indeed, experience shows that the dilution of efforts over time weakens the programs, especially when they also rely on a continuity of political support. This sprawl inevitably makes them more expensive and less productive. A more aggressive program would not require more resources! To the contrary, it would avoid preparatory work that could prove ultimately useless but also reduce the number of intermediate targets, and therefore equipment and associated operations.

The president wanted to show he was sensitive to criticism generated by the casual and very ill-prepared presentation on Feb. 2. Indeed, protests from both parties of Congress reached an extraordinary level. Congress, historical space figures and various associations of supporters for space exploration (including our group) were concerned about the abandonment of American leadership.

He spoke strongly in favor of the enterprise, and we should not doubt his good intentions. (“[T]he space program is not a luxury, but a necessity of the United States.”) It was perhaps premature given the current economic context to display such ambition, which was truly on par with what is at stake. We can always hope. However, as we have seen, the announced policy suffers from unnecessary complications and serious shortcomings. While hoping that the improvement of the framework materializes, our concern for years to come will be to ensure that this program focuses on the essential with tighter deadlines.

*Editor’s Note: Lagrange points are locations in space where gravitational forces and the orbital motion of a body balance each other.