Behind the Scenes of a “No” Vote

Before the nuclear sanction on Iran was put to vote in New York, there was busy traffic between President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu. Davutoglu was supporting “no,” and Erdogan was leaning towards rejection, too, until the telephone conversation with Obama. After the telephone interview, his answer was confirmed upon consideration of the question “how would it be viewed by others if we abstained instead of making a firm stand?” As for Gul, he was still hesitant to make a decision and continued to consider both voting “no” and abstaining from the vote. Meanwhile, the question of “If we vote no, will it spoil the relationship with the U.S. like the crisis of March 1st 2003?” was also considered comprehensively.

The last assessment before the polling was: there isn’t any similarity between these two issues. On March 1, 2003, the U.S. was about to attack Iraq. However, the situation now is that the U.S. is trying to legitimize a move to engineer a closure of nuclear facilities in Turkey. The emergence of slight problems in the relationship, however, will not lead to crisis. Turkey is not willing to either enter a war or tolerate nuclear weapons in its region. Voting “no” was a way for Turkey to continue pursuing the diplomatic option to influence Iranian nuclear activity, since Turkey had signed a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. By continuing to engage Iran and to fulfill its end of the signed agreement, Turkey would prove that it is a trustworthy country.

While the acceptance of the sanction was already determined before the poll, Lebanon moved to abstain, and Bosnia Herzegovina, who is on the way to NATO membership, was motivated to vote “yes.”

After the poll, American President Obama’s and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s comments on how the diplomatic efforts of Turkey and Brazil could serve as confidence-building measures toward a solution to the problem justified the foresight of the Turkish government.

When Will Turkey Arrive at Brussels?

The Turks have been moving towards the West from their position in Central Asia. Somehow they have been unable to arrive at Brussels, even though they set out a thousand years ago. They could not, in spite of the “partnership” application in 1959, the “full membership” application in 1987, the “customs union” protocol in 1996 and the “membership negotiations” in 2004.

In the end, American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates found the offender and, supported by Italy, criticized EU’s hindering of Ankara. We will see whether the EU will do what it should do and speed up the process.

Not a Shift in Axis, Standing With Spine!

In the past, Turkey was accused of ‘Turanism’ whenever it dealt with Turkic republics, where its roots are, and ‘Post-Ottomonism’ whenever it moved closer to the Middle East and the Balkans.

When it utilized the 2001 economic recession and started to affect world balances as a regional power, the shape of the comments altered and converted into “shift in Axis.” In fact, Turkey only started to do what it should do in accordance with its historical and cultural acquisition and geography that it has been neglecting within its natural region.

This is the reason behind Turkey being responsive to Palestine’s, Kosova’s and Bosnia Herzegovina’s interests and voting “no” for sanction against Iran at the UN Security Council