Who Will Fill the Vacuum Once the US Leaves?
Published in Trouw
(Netherlands) on 3 July 2009
by Rob de Wijk (link to original)
In 2003, flags were raised in Baghdad when the liberator America released Iraq from dictator Saddam Hussein. Last Wednesday, the flags were raised again. America withdrew from the cities and premier al-Maliki saw Iraqi sovereignty as being re-won from the foreign occupier.
It is paradoxical rhetoric because the same al-Maliki could only climb up to becoming a government leader thanks to that occupation. He is a product of it and not, as he passes himself off to be, the proud leader who has led his country to independence - and must fear for his political future and maybe his life.
I do not think that the approximately 600,000 Iraqi security troops (police and army) are of sufficient quality to determine order and calm. The recently issued Iraq Index from the American Brookings Institute shows that not more than ten percent of all Iraqi security troops are capable of executing operations against insurgents. The rest is only partly capable of that with support from the Americans, or not at all. Yet more than 70 percent of the Iraqis have confidence in those security troops.
The bad state of the security troops demands an increase of the number of American trainers and educators from 10,000 to possibly 50,000. Add to that a considerable number of soldiers to protect them and it is clear that the number of Americans cannot be significantly reduced any time soon. In Iraq, an American presence until 2015 or 2020 has already been speculated.
However, it is unquestionably true that it is calmer in Iraq than ever before. The number of incidents stands at its lowest point since the beginning of the invasion in 2003. In March, a narrow majority of 52 percent thought that (according to an opinion poll) the security situation had improved. But calm in Iraq is a relative term, because this year an average of more than three hundred civilians fell victim to bomb attacks and other sectarian violence every month. Even more disturbing is that the trend is rising. Witness the attacks in Baghdad last week (76 and 200 dead), in Taza (68 dead) and in Kirkuk on the holiday of the American withdrawal (24 dead).
Calculated according to the ethnic composition of Iraq, 67 percent of the Shiites thinks that the condition of security is good, but 51 percent of the Sunnis opines negatively. That is no miracle: most attacks are aimed against the Sunnis. And that is exactly where the problem is. Of the population, 64 percent wants democracy, but 19 percent wants an Islamic state. Among that last category are the Shiite hardliners, such as the remains of al-Qaeda. However, the majority consists of local extremist warriors such as those of the Islamic army in Fallujah.
I estimate that the tactic of these extremist warriors is to use the transitional phase to test al-Maliki to the max. Will he call for the help of Americans to beat down insurgents? That makes his position politically untenable, especially with the coming elections at the beginning of next year. Political chaos is a goal for this minority, because the seizure of power becomes easier in that situation.
Or will they wait for the big power vacuum that will form once all American troops have officially left in 2011? Who will fill that vacuum with the support of the Shiites? Iran? Al-Qaeda? Or will there be a struggle between Shiites and the Sunni Baathists, the party of Saddam Hussein? Shiite extremists seem to hold the key for the security of the country now and for filling up the power vacuum later. Also, the dismantling of the militias has hardly shown any progress. Therefore, these days might be the best ones in the life of premier al-Maliki.
It is paradoxical rhetoric because the same al-Maliki could only climb up to becoming a government leader thanks to that occupation. He is a product of it and not, as he passes himself off to be, the proud leader who has led his country to independence - and must fear for his political future and maybe his life.
I do not think that the approximately 600,000 Iraqi security troops (police and army) are of sufficient quality to determine order and calm. The recently issued Iraq Index from the American Brookings Institute shows that not more than ten percent of all Iraqi security troops are capable of executing operations against insurgents. The rest is only partly capable of that with support from the Americans, or not at all. Yet more than 70 percent of the Iraqis have confidence in those security troops.
The bad state of the security troops demands an increase of the number of American trainers and educators from 10,000 to possibly 50,000. Add to that a considerable number of soldiers to protect them and it is clear that the number of Americans cannot be significantly reduced any time soon. In Iraq, an American presence until 2015 or 2020 has already been speculated.
However, it is unquestionably true that it is calmer in Iraq than ever before. The number of incidents stands at its lowest point since the beginning of the invasion in 2003. In March, a narrow majority of 52 percent thought that (according to an opinion poll) the security situation had improved. But calm in Iraq is a relative term, because this year an average of more than three hundred civilians fell victim to bomb attacks and other sectarian violence every month. Even more disturbing is that the trend is rising. Witness the attacks in Baghdad last week (76 and 200 dead), in Taza (68 dead) and in Kirkuk on the holiday of the American withdrawal (24 dead).
Calculated according to the ethnic composition of Iraq, 67 percent of the Shiites thinks that the condition of security is good, but 51 percent of the Sunnis opines negatively. That is no miracle: most attacks are aimed against the Sunnis. And that is exactly where the problem is. Of the population, 64 percent wants democracy, but 19 percent wants an Islamic state. Among that last category are the Shiite hardliners, such as the remains of al-Qaeda. However, the majority consists of local extremist warriors such as those of the Islamic army in Fallujah.
I estimate that the tactic of these extremist warriors is to use the transitional phase to test al-Maliki to the max. Will he call for the help of Americans to beat down insurgents? That makes his position politically untenable, especially with the coming elections at the beginning of next year. Political chaos is a goal for this minority, because the seizure of power becomes easier in that situation.
Or will they wait for the big power vacuum that will form once all American troops have officially left in 2011? Who will fill that vacuum with the support of the Shiites? Iran? Al-Qaeda? Or will there be a struggle between Shiites and the Sunni Baathists, the party of Saddam Hussein? Shiite extremists seem to hold the key for the security of the country now and for filling up the power vacuum later. Also, the dismantling of the militias has hardly shown any progress. Therefore, these days might be the best ones in the life of premier al-Maliki.
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