The Painful, 23-Year Lesson of the US Invasion of Iraq
Following a meeting on Aug. 12 with U.S. Central Command commander Admiral Brad Cooper, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi announced that U.S. troops would completely withdraw from Iraq by Sept. 30, a decision that was “irreversible.” He further stated that, as of Oct. 1, there would no longer be any foreign troops stationed in Iraq.
Over the past 23 years, the United States has incurred approximately $1.7 trillion in direct costs in Iraq, including those associated with eradicating the Islamic State group. If future care costs for veterans are included, that number could approach $2.9 trillion. The loss of life has been equally devastating: roughly 4,500 American soldiers have died, and another 32,000 have been wounded. Some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 50,000 military and security personnel have died, and millions more have been displaced as refugees. From the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces ahead, it is clearly time to take stock of the costs and benefits of these 23 years’ worth of military operations, and the Trump administration should use the opportunity to undertake a frank reassessment of its military policy abroad.
The United States will always find some reason or pretext for its overseas military actions. It based this year’s war against Iran on the assertion that Tehran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, just as the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was predicated on Hussein’s regime possessing “weapons of mass destruction.” Yet in both instances, the United States’ cases lacked concrete evidence, and these baseless claims have severely damaged its international credibility.
In 2003, the United States used its overwhelming military might to overthrow Saddam’s Iraqi regime, swiftly achieving its initial military objectives. But the problem is that overthrowing a militarily weak regime is relatively easy, whereas building a stable new nation is extremely difficult. The United States had originally hoped to establish a democratic, pro-American, stable Iraq that could serve as a model of democracy in the Middle East, but the transplantation of American-style democracy into the Arab countries of the Middle East has clearly failed to take root.
The reality is that Iraqi politics remain highly fragmented. Even though a central government exists, state power is dispersed, leaving the government able to maintain only the appearance of national unity. Political tensions between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, along with the territorial control exercised by the armed groups of various factions, have left Iraq a fragile nation to this day.
The United States’ previous phased withdrawal of its forces created a power vacuum that directly led to the rise of the extremist Islamic State group. In 2014, the Islamic State group seized one-third of Iraq’s territory, forcing the U.S. military to return with troops. At the height of its campaign, the U.S. deployed 170,000 troops in counterterrorism operations that lasted until the end of 2021.
At present, while the Islamic State group has indeed lost the territory it once controlled, it has not disappeared completely; rather, it has gone underground to continue its terrorist activities. Iraqi government forces, long trained and funded by the United States, have been unable to truly control non-state armed groups such as the Islamic State group. Now, with the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, it is highly likely that extremist groups will seize on the opportunity to make a resurgence, thus creating major security problems. The United States’ greatest strategic miscalculation was none other than overthrowing the Hussein regime, thereby inadvertently removing a bulwark against its principal adversary, Iran, and producing a severe strategic backlash.
Hussein had been the main force preventing Iranian expansion, but after the United States eliminated him in 2003, the political power of Iraq’s Shiites expanded, enabling Iran to establish a deep-rooted religious, political, economic, and military influence in Iraq; recent visits by several senior Iranian officials to Iraq to discuss bilateral cooperation are evidence of this. Twenty-three years’ worth of manpower and resources invested by the United States have therefore ultimately served to strengthen its main adversary, Iran, resulting in a classic case of “tactical victory” but “strategic overcommitment.”
For now, Iraq is hoping to balance its relations with both the United States and Iran, avoid being forced into a war between the two, and keep the various armed groups within the country under control. Given its limited state capacity and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, whether Iraq can achieve these objectives will have implications for the geopolitics of the Middle East and warrants close attention. Military force can destroy a hostile regime, but it cannot create a stable political order; winning a war is absolutely no guarantee of attaining ideal peace.
The Trump administration should draw on the lessons of the U.S. military’s experience in Iraq: It must acknowledge that military force alone cannot transform a country from top to bottom and that attempting to turn an Arab country into an American-style democracy in particular is an even more unrealistic fantasy (the outcome in Afghanistan being a case in point). The proper management of U.S.-Iran relations cannot be based solely on threats of force, let alone on threats to seize the Strait of Hormuz; in the long term, these are not viable strategies. Benny Johnson, a conservative political commentator and longtime Trump supporter, recently stated, “Foreign wars with no end in sight are always unpopular. They will always be political cancer.”
He urged Trump to end the war: “Be done. Refocus on America. Gas, grocery, home prices and immigration. That's how we win.” A look at the economic hardship, unemployment, political infighting, refugee crisis, and other problems facing Iraq today shows that Johnson’s words apply not only to the United States; they are also the most revealing footnote to this 23-year military intervention.
In the run-up to the 2024 U.S. election, Trump made opposing endless overseas wars one of his key campaign promises, but he has now reversed course on the Iran issue, embroiling the United States in yet another conflict. Support for him among the American public has fallen to a new low.
His term is not yet over, but some simple conclusions can already be drawn about his foreign and military policies: not walking the talk, blind faith in military might, wars without end, strategy without focus, putting America above all else, and failure to achieve peace.
The author is a former Taiwanese deputy minister of national defense, the director of the Bridge Across the Strait Foundation, and a former Taiwanese representative to Israel.
Over the past 23 years, the United States has incurred approximately $1.7 trillion in direct costs in Iraq, including those associated with eradicating the Islamic State group. If future care costs for veterans are included, that number could approach $2.9 trillion. The loss of life has been equally devastating: roughly 4,500 American soldiers have died, and another 32,000 have been wounded. Some 200,000 Iraqi civilians and 50,000 military and security personnel have died, and millions more have been displaced as refugees. From the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces ahead, it is clearly time to take stock of the costs and benefits of these 23 years’ worth of military operations, and the Trump administration should use the opportunity to undertake a frank reassessment of its military policy abroad.
The United States will always find some reason or pretext for its overseas military actions. It based this year’s war against Iran on the assertion that Tehran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons, just as the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was predicated on Hussein’s regime possessing “weapons of mass destruction.” Yet in both instances, the United States’ cases lacked concrete evidence, and these baseless claims have severely damaged its international credibility.
In 2003, the United States used its overwhelming military might to overthrow Saddam’s Iraqi regime, swiftly achieving its initial military objectives. But the problem is that overthrowing a militarily weak regime is relatively easy, whereas building a stable new nation is extremely difficult. The United States had originally hoped to establish a democratic, pro-American, stable Iraq that could serve as a model of democracy in the Middle East, but the transplantation of American-style democracy into the Arab countries of the Middle East has clearly failed to take root.
The reality is that Iraqi politics remain highly fragmented. Even though a central government exists, state power is dispersed, leaving the government able to maintain only the appearance of national unity. Political tensions between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, along with the territorial control exercised by the armed groups of various factions, have left Iraq a fragile nation to this day.
The United States’ previous phased withdrawal of its forces created a power vacuum that directly led to the rise of the extremist Islamic State group. In 2014, the Islamic State group seized one-third of Iraq’s territory, forcing the U.S. military to return with troops. At the height of its campaign, the U.S. deployed 170,000 troops in counterterrorism operations that lasted until the end of 2021.
At present, while the Islamic State group has indeed lost the territory it once controlled, it has not disappeared completely; rather, it has gone underground to continue its terrorist activities. Iraqi government forces, long trained and funded by the United States, have been unable to truly control non-state armed groups such as the Islamic State group. Now, with the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, it is highly likely that extremist groups will seize on the opportunity to make a resurgence, thus creating major security problems. The United States’ greatest strategic miscalculation was none other than overthrowing the Hussein regime, thereby inadvertently removing a bulwark against its principal adversary, Iran, and producing a severe strategic backlash.
Hussein had been the main force preventing Iranian expansion, but after the United States eliminated him in 2003, the political power of Iraq’s Shiites expanded, enabling Iran to establish a deep-rooted religious, political, economic, and military influence in Iraq; recent visits by several senior Iranian officials to Iraq to discuss bilateral cooperation are evidence of this. Twenty-three years’ worth of manpower and resources invested by the United States have therefore ultimately served to strengthen its main adversary, Iran, resulting in a classic case of “tactical victory” but “strategic overcommitment.”
For now, Iraq is hoping to balance its relations with both the United States and Iran, avoid being forced into a war between the two, and keep the various armed groups within the country under control. Given its limited state capacity and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, whether Iraq can achieve these objectives will have implications for the geopolitics of the Middle East and warrants close attention. Military force can destroy a hostile regime, but it cannot create a stable political order; winning a war is absolutely no guarantee of attaining ideal peace.
The Trump administration should draw on the lessons of the U.S. military’s experience in Iraq: It must acknowledge that military force alone cannot transform a country from top to bottom and that attempting to turn an Arab country into an American-style democracy in particular is an even more unrealistic fantasy (the outcome in Afghanistan being a case in point). The proper management of U.S.-Iran relations cannot be based solely on threats of force, let alone on threats to seize the Strait of Hormuz; in the long term, these are not viable strategies. Benny Johnson, a conservative political commentator and longtime Trump supporter, recently stated, “Foreign wars with no end in sight are always unpopular. They will always be political cancer.”
He urged Trump to end the war: “Be done. Refocus on America. Gas, grocery, home prices and immigration. That's how we win.” A look at the economic hardship, unemployment, political infighting, refugee crisis, and other problems facing Iraq today shows that Johnson’s words apply not only to the United States; they are also the most revealing footnote to this 23-year military intervention.
In the run-up to the 2024 U.S. election, Trump made opposing endless overseas wars one of his key campaign promises, but he has now reversed course on the Iran issue, embroiling the United States in yet another conflict. Support for him among the American public has fallen to a new low.
His term is not yet over, but some simple conclusions can already be drawn about his foreign and military policies: not walking the talk, blind faith in military might, wars without end, strategy without focus, putting America above all else, and failure to achieve peace.
The author is a former Taiwanese deputy minister of national defense, the director of the Bridge Across the Strait Foundation, and a former Taiwanese representative to Israel.
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