Breaking the Ice in Moscow

Published in El País
(Spain) on 8 July, 2009
by (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Sarah Vaughn. Edited by Alex Zhao.
The preliminary agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce around a third of their strategic nuclear arsenals over a seven year span by means of a treaty, which will replace the treaty from 1991 and should be ready in December, is an encouraging indication that relations are thawing between the two superpowers beyond that of the previous doctrine. The conclusion from the first summit between Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvédev has left a handful of important questions up in the air between the two countries. They should match up to the previous expectations of a meeting where both new Presidents proposed to move forward, leaving the mentality of the Cold War behind.

Washington has managed to set a high bar for the reduction of nuclear warheads and carrier vehicles, something that Moscow was reluctant to do. From the summit the Kremlin gains explicit consideration as a superpower by Obama, who not only proclaimed that the relationship between both countries should be based on equality, but also stated that Russian cooperation is imperative for confronting challenges as crucial as Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan, the latter of which Obama has obtained permission to supply American forces using Russian airspace. Obama’s anti-proliferation agenda, especially relevant when it comes to the situations in Tehran and Pyongyang, has been reinforced by the summit. With difficulty, Washington and Moscow can aim to be examples of self-control if they do not try to find a way to rationalize their own arsenals.

Even though it has not been discussed formally, the agreement from Moscow is going to depend on the final decision that Obama takes over the anti-missile shield that the United States expects to install in Poland and the Czech Republic, and that Russia considers as unacceptable. The discussion over this matter that could have derailed the summit has been left up in the air, but the Kremlin will not sign a strategic treaty if Washington ignores their point of view regarding the anti-missile shield.

Obama had not gone to Russia to give lessons on governance, although in his message yesterday to students he envisioned a more open and law-abiding Russian society, but to move beyond being historic rivals and try to undertake common objectives instead. Beyond these words, the Russians continue to perceive the expansion of NATO as a threat, and the position of Washington on issues like Georgia or Ukraine as an open interference in their affairs. Neither the United States or Russia can allow themselves to return to something like the Cold War, but Moscow needs a nuclear treaty more than Washington. They need this treaty not only because their strategic arsenal is older, but because the recession makes it especially difficult for the Kremlin to enter into another arms race with the United States, despite however spirited Vladímir Putin shows himself to be. As the first step on a long path, the Muscovite agreement is welcome.


El recorte de armas pactado por EE UU y Rusia supone un paso adelante, pese a sus limitaciones
08/07/2009

El acuerdo preliminar entre Estados Unidos y Rusia para reducir en siete años alrededor de un tercio sus arsenales nucleares estratégicos, mediante un tratado que reemplace al de 1991 y que debería estar listo en diciembre, es un alentador indicio de deshielo, más allá de lo doctrinal, entre las superpotencias. Los resultados de la primera cumbre de Barack Obama con Dmitri Medvédev, que han dejado en el aire un puñado de temas importantes en las relaciones bilaterales, deben calibrarse aceptando previamente las expectativas limitadas de un encuentro en el que ambos nuevos presidentes se habían propuesto avanzar dejando atrás la mentalidad de guerra fría.

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Washington ha conseguido fijar un techo aritmético a la reducción tanto de cabezas atómicas como de vehículos portadores, algo a lo que Moscú era renuente. El Kremlin obtiene de la cumbre su explícita consideración como superpotencia por parte de un Obama que no sólo proclama que la asociación entre ambos países debe estar basada en la igualdad, sino que necesita imperativamente de la cooperación rusa para afrontar desafíos tan cruciales como Irán, Corea del Norte o Afganistán, guerra ésta en la que ha obtenido permiso para abastecer a sus combatientes cruzando el cielo ruso. La agenda antiproliferación de Obama, especialmente relevante en los casos de Teherán y Pyongyang, sale reforzada de la cumbre. Difícilmente Washington y Moscú pueden proponerse como ejemplo de contención si no tratan de manera más racional sus propios arsenales.

Aunque no se haya hablado de ello formalmente, el compromiso de Moscú va a depender de la decisión final que Obama adopte sobre el escudo antimisiles que EE UU pretende instalar en Polonia y la República Checa, y que Rusia considera inaceptable. La discusión sobre este tema, que podía descarrilar la cumbre, se ha dejado de lado, pero el Kremlin no firmará un tratado estratégico si Washington ignora sus puntos de vista sobre el manto anticohetes.

Obama no ha ido a Rusia a dar lecciones magistrales, aunque en su mensaje de ayer a los estudiantes propusiera una sociedad más abierta y respetuosa con la ley, sino a pasar página e intentar que su rival histórico se comprometa ahora con objetivos comunes. Más allá de las grandes palabras, los rusos siguen percibiendo como una amenaza la expansión de la OTAN y como una abierta injerencia la toma de partido por Washington en temas como Georgia o Ucrania. Ni Estados Unidos ni Rusia pueden permitirse volver a algo parecido a la guerra fría, pero Moscú necesita más que Washington un nuevo tratado nuclear. No sólo porque su arsenal estratégico es más viejo, sino porque la recesión hace especialmente penoso para el Kremlin, por fogoso que se muestre Vladímir Putin, meterse en otra carrera armamentista con EE UU. Como primer paso de un largo camino, el compromiso moscovita es bienvenido.

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