“Perezagruzka”- a Change in Policy or Just a Change in Rhetoric?
Published in Izvestia
(Russia) on 7/5/09
by Alexei Pushkov (link to original)
What is the “perezagruzka” policy being pursued by Obama – a change in policy or just a change in rhetoric? We are expecting this key question to be answered by the Russia-US Summit in Moscow. The term “perezagruzka” up until today has been more of a frame of mind and a political wish than a realistic political change.
The feeling that “something needs to change” exists in the both Kremlin and the White House. There is a feeling in the White House that more important priorities, such as Iran’s nuclear program, require a reevaluation of its relationship with Russia, and that Iran is much more important to the United States than the transformation of Georgia or South Ossetia, the main issue between Washington and Moscow. Of course, the Obama Administration will recognize neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia, but it clearly does not want to tie its hands in its relationship with Russia over a distant regional issue. Additionally, there is also fatigue in Moscow from the constant tug of war with the United States.
Besides, the politics of the “cold peace” gave America very little. On the contrary, America’s influence in Moscow had significantly decreased under Bush. But does this mean that the Obama administration is ready for a change of direction with regards to Russia? This is a big question. Not so long ago in Foreign Policy magazine, the former speech writer to Condoleezza Rice insisted that the Obama administration will carry out the same policy as the previous administrations simply because there is no better alternative. According to him, Bush during his second term had a sufficiently restrained and adjusted policy that Obama will not get an opportunity to change. This point of view holds that with another president there will be “more of the same,” but in different rhetorical packaging, even though to naked eye it will seem different from George Bush. There also exists a second point of view. It believes that America is deeply rethinking its role in the modern world. And within the framework of this reconsideration its relationship with Russia will occupy center stage.
The clash of these two positions brings to mind the well-known argument about how full the glass is. Is the glass half full or half empty? Some claim that it’s half full, others that it’s half empty. The same can be said - depending on the point of view- when examining the policy of “perezagruzka.” However, with either position we cannot forget a few problems.
Problem number one- Russia and the United States cannot start from scratch. The idea of a “new beginning,” expressed by Dmitry Medvedev in a Washington Post article and shared by Barack Obama, is very appealing. Moreover, it is promising if the ruling elite is willing to support it. But to start with a clean sheet would be very difficult. America will not be able to forget about Georgia and Ukraine; Russia also can not forget about what is happening in Kiev and Tbilisi. In the United States, the issue of NATO expansion to the east is not closed- it has many passionate supporters. It is doubtful that either Russia or the United States will forget about the plans to install an anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. There are political consequences that will need to be dealt with. It cannot be put outside the brackets of the “new” relationship.
Thirty years ago, during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski came up with the “unity and conflict” formula for determining the administration’s approach towards the USSR. From then on, Brzezinski (who was the National Security Advisor to Carter), proclaimed that they would cooperate on the issues in which we have common interests and compete where these interests differ. However, this was a disastrous formula and it’s no surprise that it led to the so-called “second Cold War” under Reagan. Strictly speaking, “unity and conflict” couldn’t really lead to anything different: it was clear that conflict would defeat unity. It had nothing to do with malevolent intent on either side (although it was strongly expressed by Brzezinski): it was more about how negatives always win out in politics. To be positive requires focus and a big effort, but being negative is just a natural manifestation of the clash of interests as well as the adverse memories of the past. The United States and Russia cannot say that they have a positive agenda and expect an improvement in relations when in fact there is a negative agenda. In reality, we cannot expect an improvement in relations unless special effort is made to overcome the negative agenda and political heritage. Now huge hopes are being put on the nuclear disarmament negotiations that started in the second half of May. Perhaps both sides will sign a new agreement. However, Bush and Putin also signed an arms control agreement in May 2002, but did that agreement really have any serious influence on the character of the relationship? Not at all: it was an anomaly and did not influence the general context of the relations between Russia and the United States.
At the same time, the Obama administration has said nothing about its readiness to part with such symbols of the Cold War as the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The problem is not the amendment itself- it is already a laughing stock in Russia. It is tempting to propose keeping it forever as one of the ideological principles of American foreign policy. In America, a Jackson-Vanik amendment monument could even be erected next to the Washington Memorial to celebrate its 35th anniversary.
It’s a fact that a presidential decree that suspends the amendment for a year is renewed annually because the amendment inhibits trade with Russia. No matter how many times Bush promised to Putin that he would abolish this amendment, it is still in effect to this day. Now the question is whether the Obama administration will decide to keep it.
Whenever the United States needed Russia’s support on an important issue, i.e. Iran, Washington promises to abolish the Jackson-Vanik amendment in exchange for Russia’s support. However, Russia never expressed interest in the amendment’s abolition, and rightly so. Today, few people are expecting its abolition both in Russia and the United States. It looks like everyone has gotten used to it. And this is a very significant part of the political “heritage” of the past that the American political elites refuse to part with.
So starting from a clean sheet will be impossible. We should not pretend that it’s possible. On May 15th, in an interview with Chinese journalists, Dmitry Medvedev stated that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is final and is not up for discussion.
However, it is clear that the Obama administration does not agree with us on this subject- Vice-President Biden has said that the United States does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It’s clear that the United States will continue to support and arm Georgia, maybe not as actively as it did under Bush, but it definitely will- and is already doing so. This is another point where the two sides will most likely not find common ground.
The reasonable minimum that is necessary is the demonstration of restraint when it comes to these issues. The mood in Moscow will not improve if America reminds Russia that it will never recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the United States gets nothing other than shaking up the atmosphere. It would be reasonable for both sides to avoid this issue for the sake of improving constructive dialogue. This is the first problem.
Second: maybe we should try to understand our American counterparts and not wait for immediate shifts in policy from the Obama administration. It’s harder for America to make policy changes than for us. Russia’s politics in the 90s were of the “reactionary type”. In most situations Moscow’s actions were a reaction to those of the United States. It is only recently that our own major initiatives have been developed: the development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the idea of a collective agreement security in Europe, and the development and strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, until recently, Russia only reacted- to Western aggression in Yugoslavia, NATO expansion, plans to install anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe, the American occupation of Iraq and American pressure on Iran.
That is why we cannot say that the situation depends 50 percent on Russia and 50 percent on the United States as, say, during the first détente between Moscow and Washington in the 70s. Today, a lot more depends on the United States. It was America that initiated the major strategic actions- from bombing Belgrade to occupying Iraq; from NATO expansion to installing the ABM systems in Eastern Europe; from the creation of military bases in Central Asia to the war in Afghanistan. Thus we cannot talk about parity when it comes to the foreign policy sphere of the United States. Having a more meaningful dialogue first and foremost depends on changes in American foreign policy.
If the Obama administration will not be able– or willing - to change the stances which have been affirmed in America’s foreign policy under Bush, then the dialogue will be more limited, and Russian foreign policy will be confronted with the old established approaches that are in Washington.
Take the idea of collective security in Europe. This is an idea that was proposed for everyone to discuss. It appears to be unresolved and therefore causes Russian dissatisfaction with the current system of European defense. The current European defense system is “NATO-centric.” Naturally, the states that are not in NATO do not benefit and therefore cannot be fully satisfied with this system. However, the system itself is unsatisfactory since it does not include important parts of Eastern Europe- Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Caucasian countries. And since Russia is unlikely to join NATO in the near future, the system will be faulty for quite a while.
In this situation, how should the United States approach Russia’s initiative in the spirit of “perezagruzka”? They should approach it positively. This idea is both good common sense and geopolitical sense since it addresses the inadequacies of the current collective security system. But the American side says the opposite is true. Recently, during a public debate in Kiev with the American Ambassador to Ukraine, Mr. Taylor, I was told that the whole of Europe is satisfied with the security system built around NATO. And why change it if it works so well?
The inadequacy of the situation seems painfully obvious. However, we are told that the situation is good. Maybe it is the force of inertia - to reject everything that is proposed by Russia. Perhaps Washington does not completely get Moscow’s idea. It is precisely things like this that will limit the potential of “perezagruzka.” If the Obama administration is serious, it needs to pay more attention to initiatives proposed by Russia.
The situation is complicated by the fact that Obama had barely put forward the idea of “perezagruzka” before it came under attack in the United States. All of Russia’s adversaries, who were joined by the members of Russia’s pro-American liberal opposition, accused Obama of planning to admit defeat, betraying “American ideals,” and appeasing Russia. The idea of “perezagruzka” faces strong internal opposition in the United States, which will not be easily overcome. Hostility towards Russia, which goes back to the “Cold War,” is deeply embedded in the blood of the American politics; it lives in the American political system, and reminds everyone of its existence constantly. Besides this, the “inertia of expansion” is very strong in the United Sates. It consists of the belief America is the strongest country in the world, self-sufficient and capable of anything. The United Nations is seen as a children’s camp, full of malicious, anti-American adolescents, and the United States has no need for it. America, so the belief goes, is strong enough to solve all problems and capable of keeping the peace.
However, this idea is completely disproved by political reality. And now, many Americans including Obama think that the United States cannot be the master of the world. Prominent experts recognize that there used to be a unipolar moment; however, that moment ended, and the United States needs to understand that the world is multipolar now. Nonetheless, the idea of “unipolarity” has tremendous inertia and it still remains part of America’s psyche and politics. Its major rationale: we are still the strongest and the most democratic, and therefore we have a moral right to do what others have no right to do. This deep rooted ideology is the major cause of the negative response to “perezagruzka” among America’s political class.
There is a third fact that is little considered in the United States, and that is the fact that public opinion exists in Russia as well. During the USSR it was easier for us to negotiate: public opinion about Soviet actions was well known. But even then, the Soviet information machine explained to the population why engaging with the United States was the right move. Now, public opinion in Russia is far stronger and more mature. The Russian leadership, just like the Americans, cannot conduct foreign policy without an explanation and without proof of the necessity of its actions. The United States needs to understand that nothing can be gained by simply explaining itself while continuing on the path that is negatively perceived in Russia. It is possible to improve relations only if a number of practical positive gestures are made towards Russia. And the Obama administration- after his predecessor rejected to consider the interests of Russia - must make concrete steps to show that changes are actually occurring in America’s position.
These three issues are important in seeing the glass as half full instead of half empty. Today it seems that Obama is holding a certain vessel with a pleasant drink, with which he wants to fill this glass. But for now, not a drop of this “beverage of promises” has made it into the glass. In practice, nothing has been done yet. During his speech in Cairo on June 11th, Obama also promised a “new beginning” to the Muslim world. In his Middle Eastern policy, he at least outlined basic features. It would be greatly desirable to have the blurry outlines of “perezagruzka” clearly defined in Moscow.
The feeling that “something needs to change” exists in the both Kremlin and the White House. There is a feeling in the White House that more important priorities, such as Iran’s nuclear program, require a reevaluation of its relationship with Russia, and that Iran is much more important to the United States than the transformation of Georgia or South Ossetia, the main issue between Washington and Moscow. Of course, the Obama Administration will recognize neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia, but it clearly does not want to tie its hands in its relationship with Russia over a distant regional issue. Additionally, there is also fatigue in Moscow from the constant tug of war with the United States.
Besides, the politics of the “cold peace” gave America very little. On the contrary, America’s influence in Moscow had significantly decreased under Bush. But does this mean that the Obama administration is ready for a change of direction with regards to Russia? This is a big question. Not so long ago in Foreign Policy magazine, the former speech writer to Condoleezza Rice insisted that the Obama administration will carry out the same policy as the previous administrations simply because there is no better alternative. According to him, Bush during his second term had a sufficiently restrained and adjusted policy that Obama will not get an opportunity to change. This point of view holds that with another president there will be “more of the same,” but in different rhetorical packaging, even though to naked eye it will seem different from George Bush. There also exists a second point of view. It believes that America is deeply rethinking its role in the modern world. And within the framework of this reconsideration its relationship with Russia will occupy center stage.
The clash of these two positions brings to mind the well-known argument about how full the glass is. Is the glass half full or half empty? Some claim that it’s half full, others that it’s half empty. The same can be said - depending on the point of view- when examining the policy of “perezagruzka.” However, with either position we cannot forget a few problems.
Problem number one- Russia and the United States cannot start from scratch. The idea of a “new beginning,” expressed by Dmitry Medvedev in a Washington Post article and shared by Barack Obama, is very appealing. Moreover, it is promising if the ruling elite is willing to support it. But to start with a clean sheet would be very difficult. America will not be able to forget about Georgia and Ukraine; Russia also can not forget about what is happening in Kiev and Tbilisi. In the United States, the issue of NATO expansion to the east is not closed- it has many passionate supporters. It is doubtful that either Russia or the United States will forget about the plans to install an anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. There are political consequences that will need to be dealt with. It cannot be put outside the brackets of the “new” relationship.
Thirty years ago, during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski came up with the “unity and conflict” formula for determining the administration’s approach towards the USSR. From then on, Brzezinski (who was the National Security Advisor to Carter), proclaimed that they would cooperate on the issues in which we have common interests and compete where these interests differ. However, this was a disastrous formula and it’s no surprise that it led to the so-called “second Cold War” under Reagan. Strictly speaking, “unity and conflict” couldn’t really lead to anything different: it was clear that conflict would defeat unity. It had nothing to do with malevolent intent on either side (although it was strongly expressed by Brzezinski): it was more about how negatives always win out in politics. To be positive requires focus and a big effort, but being negative is just a natural manifestation of the clash of interests as well as the adverse memories of the past. The United States and Russia cannot say that they have a positive agenda and expect an improvement in relations when in fact there is a negative agenda. In reality, we cannot expect an improvement in relations unless special effort is made to overcome the negative agenda and political heritage. Now huge hopes are being put on the nuclear disarmament negotiations that started in the second half of May. Perhaps both sides will sign a new agreement. However, Bush and Putin also signed an arms control agreement in May 2002, but did that agreement really have any serious influence on the character of the relationship? Not at all: it was an anomaly and did not influence the general context of the relations between Russia and the United States.
At the same time, the Obama administration has said nothing about its readiness to part with such symbols of the Cold War as the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The problem is not the amendment itself- it is already a laughing stock in Russia. It is tempting to propose keeping it forever as one of the ideological principles of American foreign policy. In America, a Jackson-Vanik amendment monument could even be erected next to the Washington Memorial to celebrate its 35th anniversary.
It’s a fact that a presidential decree that suspends the amendment for a year is renewed annually because the amendment inhibits trade with Russia. No matter how many times Bush promised to Putin that he would abolish this amendment, it is still in effect to this day. Now the question is whether the Obama administration will decide to keep it.
Whenever the United States needed Russia’s support on an important issue, i.e. Iran, Washington promises to abolish the Jackson-Vanik amendment in exchange for Russia’s support. However, Russia never expressed interest in the amendment’s abolition, and rightly so. Today, few people are expecting its abolition both in Russia and the United States. It looks like everyone has gotten used to it. And this is a very significant part of the political “heritage” of the past that the American political elites refuse to part with.
So starting from a clean sheet will be impossible. We should not pretend that it’s possible. On May 15th, in an interview with Chinese journalists, Dmitry Medvedev stated that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is final and is not up for discussion.
However, it is clear that the Obama administration does not agree with us on this subject- Vice-President Biden has said that the United States does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It’s clear that the United States will continue to support and arm Georgia, maybe not as actively as it did under Bush, but it definitely will- and is already doing so. This is another point where the two sides will most likely not find common ground.
The reasonable minimum that is necessary is the demonstration of restraint when it comes to these issues. The mood in Moscow will not improve if America reminds Russia that it will never recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the United States gets nothing other than shaking up the atmosphere. It would be reasonable for both sides to avoid this issue for the sake of improving constructive dialogue. This is the first problem.
Second: maybe we should try to understand our American counterparts and not wait for immediate shifts in policy from the Obama administration. It’s harder for America to make policy changes than for us. Russia’s politics in the 90s were of the “reactionary type”. In most situations Moscow’s actions were a reaction to those of the United States. It is only recently that our own major initiatives have been developed: the development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the idea of a collective agreement security in Europe, and the development and strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, until recently, Russia only reacted- to Western aggression in Yugoslavia, NATO expansion, plans to install anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe, the American occupation of Iraq and American pressure on Iran.
That is why we cannot say that the situation depends 50 percent on Russia and 50 percent on the United States as, say, during the first détente between Moscow and Washington in the 70s. Today, a lot more depends on the United States. It was America that initiated the major strategic actions- from bombing Belgrade to occupying Iraq; from NATO expansion to installing the ABM systems in Eastern Europe; from the creation of military bases in Central Asia to the war in Afghanistan. Thus we cannot talk about parity when it comes to the foreign policy sphere of the United States. Having a more meaningful dialogue first and foremost depends on changes in American foreign policy.
If the Obama administration will not be able– or willing - to change the stances which have been affirmed in America’s foreign policy under Bush, then the dialogue will be more limited, and Russian foreign policy will be confronted with the old established approaches that are in Washington.
Take the idea of collective security in Europe. This is an idea that was proposed for everyone to discuss. It appears to be unresolved and therefore causes Russian dissatisfaction with the current system of European defense. The current European defense system is “NATO-centric.” Naturally, the states that are not in NATO do not benefit and therefore cannot be fully satisfied with this system. However, the system itself is unsatisfactory since it does not include important parts of Eastern Europe- Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Caucasian countries. And since Russia is unlikely to join NATO in the near future, the system will be faulty for quite a while.
In this situation, how should the United States approach Russia’s initiative in the spirit of “perezagruzka”? They should approach it positively. This idea is both good common sense and geopolitical sense since it addresses the inadequacies of the current collective security system. But the American side says the opposite is true. Recently, during a public debate in Kiev with the American Ambassador to Ukraine, Mr. Taylor, I was told that the whole of Europe is satisfied with the security system built around NATO. And why change it if it works so well?
The inadequacy of the situation seems painfully obvious. However, we are told that the situation is good. Maybe it is the force of inertia - to reject everything that is proposed by Russia. Perhaps Washington does not completely get Moscow’s idea. It is precisely things like this that will limit the potential of “perezagruzka.” If the Obama administration is serious, it needs to pay more attention to initiatives proposed by Russia.
The situation is complicated by the fact that Obama had barely put forward the idea of “perezagruzka” before it came under attack in the United States. All of Russia’s adversaries, who were joined by the members of Russia’s pro-American liberal opposition, accused Obama of planning to admit defeat, betraying “American ideals,” and appeasing Russia. The idea of “perezagruzka” faces strong internal opposition in the United States, which will not be easily overcome. Hostility towards Russia, which goes back to the “Cold War,” is deeply embedded in the blood of the American politics; it lives in the American political system, and reminds everyone of its existence constantly. Besides this, the “inertia of expansion” is very strong in the United Sates. It consists of the belief America is the strongest country in the world, self-sufficient and capable of anything. The United Nations is seen as a children’s camp, full of malicious, anti-American adolescents, and the United States has no need for it. America, so the belief goes, is strong enough to solve all problems and capable of keeping the peace.
However, this idea is completely disproved by political reality. And now, many Americans including Obama think that the United States cannot be the master of the world. Prominent experts recognize that there used to be a unipolar moment; however, that moment ended, and the United States needs to understand that the world is multipolar now. Nonetheless, the idea of “unipolarity” has tremendous inertia and it still remains part of America’s psyche and politics. Its major rationale: we are still the strongest and the most democratic, and therefore we have a moral right to do what others have no right to do. This deep rooted ideology is the major cause of the negative response to “perezagruzka” among America’s political class.
There is a third fact that is little considered in the United States, and that is the fact that public opinion exists in Russia as well. During the USSR it was easier for us to negotiate: public opinion about Soviet actions was well known. But even then, the Soviet information machine explained to the population why engaging with the United States was the right move. Now, public opinion in Russia is far stronger and more mature. The Russian leadership, just like the Americans, cannot conduct foreign policy without an explanation and without proof of the necessity of its actions. The United States needs to understand that nothing can be gained by simply explaining itself while continuing on the path that is negatively perceived in Russia. It is possible to improve relations only if a number of practical positive gestures are made towards Russia. And the Obama administration- after his predecessor rejected to consider the interests of Russia - must make concrete steps to show that changes are actually occurring in America’s position.
These three issues are important in seeing the glass as half full instead of half empty. Today it seems that Obama is holding a certain vessel with a pleasant drink, with which he wants to fill this glass. But for now, not a drop of this “beverage of promises” has made it into the glass. In practice, nothing has been done yet. During his speech in Cairo on June 11th, Obama also promised a “new beginning” to the Muslim world. In his Middle Eastern policy, he at least outlined basic features. It would be greatly desirable to have the blurry outlines of “perezagruzka” clearly defined in Moscow.