Kremlin on the U.S. Side
Published in Nezavisimaya gazeta
(Russia) on 24 September 2009
by Stanislav Minin (link to original)
Will Moscow support the sanctions against Iran?
Sanctions are rarely effective, but they are sometimes necessary. This is how Dmitry Medvedev described Russia’s position on the Iranian problem. In his opinion, Iran needs help making the right decision. The American press hastened to announce that Barack Obama has the Kremlin on his side. In Washington, however, the deal was considered hasty and vague. After all, Medvedev didn’t say exactly which of Tehran’s decisions Moscow would find “correct.” Neither did he characterize the consequences of that “sometimes” when sanctions become necessary.
On October 1, the U.S., China, France, Russia, Great Britain and Germany will meet in Geneva with the Iranian delegation. There is the possibility that Washington and London will decide to impose sanctions, and that Moscow will counter with “Iran does not reject compromise and dialogue”. But the American press and policymakers are optimistic about Moscow’s role in these talks, since they are expected to reciprocate Obama’s refusal to deploy ABM missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. Every action by the Kremlin is set in the context of “do ut des”, or “I give that you may give” - the principle of reciprocity. The Americans don’t want the Russians to violate this kind of secret agreement.
The media imposed on Russia this “exchange of services” model. The Russian leadership, though, does not feel comfortable “being expected to do something,” although it’s partially their fault. The problem of missile defense was so propagandized by the Russian leadership, that it became equal to the Iranian nuclear threat. Where is the symmetry here?
Washington considers the Kremlin’s concerns about missiles exaggerated and ungrounded. It’s very likely that Moscow was pointlessly alarmed. Nevertheless, at some point, Washington’s leadership decided to “understand the Kremlin’s concerns,” to play according to its rules and to renounce the deployment of the interceptor missiles and radars.
Moscow believes that the White House’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are exaggerated and ungrounded as well. It is possible that Ahmadinejad isn’t going to develop nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. He does, however, recognize Washington’s fears and instead of disabusing them, he uses these fears to his advantage. The West hasn’t figured out yet whether he’s a fanatic or a clever populist. While there is no assurance, Washington is waiting for Moscow to understand its concerns, to act according to its rules and to support the sanctions against Iran.
In other words, while Washington does not share Russian concerns about the ABM missiles, it’s ready to “play along.” Moscow, in turn, while not sharing American concerns about Iranian nuclear enrichment, should also be ready to play along. This is a positive process, a good game of diplomacy, even though the Americans are the only group making concessions.
Is this game worth it for the Russians? How should we (Russian leadership) react to American concerns?
All of Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric is likely addressed to its “internal consumers”, and is mostly connected with Tehran’s ambitions to become a leader in the Muslim world. It’s also possible that all the threats against Israel, particularly the ones referring to “another Holocaust,” are aimed at maintaining a tense atmosphere in which leaders like Ahmadinejad feel as comfortable as fish in water. It’s even possible that there is no real threat from Iran.
Let’s imagine this scenario: you come home late and see a group of teenagers near your place, drinking and cursing. You pass by and one of them asks you if you have any cash. He is ready to attack you and the rest are cheering in anticipation of what may happen.
It’s very likely that this guy is not going to attack you; he may just be trying to assert himself among his friends or show off in front of the girls. However, these are only assumptions, and since you aren’t sure, you act based on the worst-case scenario. You can walk faster, call for help or get ready to defend yourself. Although we aren’t sure, it is possible that Ahmadinejad is just trying to assert himself. Should we then take the American concerns seriously?
Sanctions are rarely effective, but they are sometimes necessary. This is how Dmitry Medvedev described Russia’s position on the Iranian problem. In his opinion, Iran needs help making the right decision. The American press hastened to announce that Barack Obama has the Kremlin on his side. In Washington, however, the deal was considered hasty and vague. After all, Medvedev didn’t say exactly which of Tehran’s decisions Moscow would find “correct.” Neither did he characterize the consequences of that “sometimes” when sanctions become necessary.
On October 1, the U.S., China, France, Russia, Great Britain and Germany will meet in Geneva with the Iranian delegation. There is the possibility that Washington and London will decide to impose sanctions, and that Moscow will counter with “Iran does not reject compromise and dialogue”. But the American press and policymakers are optimistic about Moscow’s role in these talks, since they are expected to reciprocate Obama’s refusal to deploy ABM missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. Every action by the Kremlin is set in the context of “do ut des”, or “I give that you may give” - the principle of reciprocity. The Americans don’t want the Russians to violate this kind of secret agreement.
The media imposed on Russia this “exchange of services” model. The Russian leadership, though, does not feel comfortable “being expected to do something,” although it’s partially their fault. The problem of missile defense was so propagandized by the Russian leadership, that it became equal to the Iranian nuclear threat. Where is the symmetry here?
Washington considers the Kremlin’s concerns about missiles exaggerated and ungrounded. It’s very likely that Moscow was pointlessly alarmed. Nevertheless, at some point, Washington’s leadership decided to “understand the Kremlin’s concerns,” to play according to its rules and to renounce the deployment of the interceptor missiles and radars.
Moscow believes that the White House’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are exaggerated and ungrounded as well. It is possible that Ahmadinejad isn’t going to develop nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. He does, however, recognize Washington’s fears and instead of disabusing them, he uses these fears to his advantage. The West hasn’t figured out yet whether he’s a fanatic or a clever populist. While there is no assurance, Washington is waiting for Moscow to understand its concerns, to act according to its rules and to support the sanctions against Iran.
In other words, while Washington does not share Russian concerns about the ABM missiles, it’s ready to “play along.” Moscow, in turn, while not sharing American concerns about Iranian nuclear enrichment, should also be ready to play along. This is a positive process, a good game of diplomacy, even though the Americans are the only group making concessions.
Is this game worth it for the Russians? How should we (Russian leadership) react to American concerns?
All of Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric is likely addressed to its “internal consumers”, and is mostly connected with Tehran’s ambitions to become a leader in the Muslim world. It’s also possible that all the threats against Israel, particularly the ones referring to “another Holocaust,” are aimed at maintaining a tense atmosphere in which leaders like Ahmadinejad feel as comfortable as fish in water. It’s even possible that there is no real threat from Iran.
Let’s imagine this scenario: you come home late and see a group of teenagers near your place, drinking and cursing. You pass by and one of them asks you if you have any cash. He is ready to attack you and the rest are cheering in anticipation of what may happen.
It’s very likely that this guy is not going to attack you; he may just be trying to assert himself among his friends or show off in front of the girls. However, these are only assumptions, and since you aren’t sure, you act based on the worst-case scenario. You can walk faster, call for help or get ready to defend yourself. Although we aren’t sure, it is possible that Ahmadinejad is just trying to assert himself. Should we then take the American concerns seriously?
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