The Man from al-Qaida
Published in Jornal do Brasil
(Brazil) on 5 May 2010
by Marcelo Ambrosio (link to original)
Little by little, the story unfolds. The arrest of Faisal Shahzad at JFK airport, only two days after the young Pakistani left an explosive device in Times Square, is a spectacular victory for the post-9/11 security system — especially from the security service under, let's say, the more humanitarian rules of the Obama era.
From one perspective, it demonstrated that the techniques of investigation have evolved exponentially; from another perspective, one needs to recognize that the agents counted on major training failures on the part of the terrorist, rarely occurring in similar situations. Trying to escape the city after an attempt of this caliber, through the busiest and most secure airport on the East Coast, was an infantile gesture. Worse, Shahzad wanted to flee on a flight bound for Dubai: the logical destination for someone who wanted to return to Pakistan. Furthermore, he personally bought the Pathfinder. If he did not plan on completing a suicide mission, this decision demonstrates inexperience and a lack of training.
In the last post, I commented that the explosive device did not appear so simple, or better yet, rudimentary, as indicated on first analysis. In reality, it was not that simple, but was not of the same lethality as bombs al-Qaida has distributed in the past. The thesis of the explosion by phases seems logical and correct; nevertheless, a detail from the last article was erroneous. The fertilizer found in a gun box was not the type that, when combined with other elements, could transform the Pathfinder into a bomb of great proportions. Given the confirmation by the FBI that the Pakistani had received bomb-making training in his native country, it is evident that he tried to improvise the device without being aware of the alternatives.
Shahzad was trained by al-Qaida in the region of Waziristan, a tribal region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, believed to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden. The area is also the cradle of the Taliban, which confirms, in a sense, the claim of responsibility for the plot by a group linked to the extremist militants of Afghanistan. In the past, I have mentioned Lashkar-e-Taliban or LeT — the greatest concern for America today — considered to be a reconfiguring of al-Qaida, without the primitive ideology and strategy of the latter. The LeT was responsible for the brutal attacks on Mumbai, in which more than 160 people died, including foreign tourists.
The errors in procedure committed by the Pakistani led to his capture, but there was evidence he did not act alone. The preparation, the planning, and execution were not just from a "man of Wall Street," as neighbors in Connecticut believed his profession to be. In reality, this could symbolize a nightmare for American security forces: the so called "sleeper cell," a terrorist trained and prepared to infiltrate a country, adapting to day-to-day routines until being called to action at a determined moment. Shahzad was trained to be seen as a common American, thus, to not arouse suspicion. Regardless, he left so many traces in the process that he was arrested without difficulty.
From one perspective, it demonstrated that the techniques of investigation have evolved exponentially; from another perspective, one needs to recognize that the agents counted on major training failures on the part of the terrorist, rarely occurring in similar situations. Trying to escape the city after an attempt of this caliber, through the busiest and most secure airport on the East Coast, was an infantile gesture. Worse, Shahzad wanted to flee on a flight bound for Dubai: the logical destination for someone who wanted to return to Pakistan. Furthermore, he personally bought the Pathfinder. If he did not plan on completing a suicide mission, this decision demonstrates inexperience and a lack of training.
In the last post, I commented that the explosive device did not appear so simple, or better yet, rudimentary, as indicated on first analysis. In reality, it was not that simple, but was not of the same lethality as bombs al-Qaida has distributed in the past. The thesis of the explosion by phases seems logical and correct; nevertheless, a detail from the last article was erroneous. The fertilizer found in a gun box was not the type that, when combined with other elements, could transform the Pathfinder into a bomb of great proportions. Given the confirmation by the FBI that the Pakistani had received bomb-making training in his native country, it is evident that he tried to improvise the device without being aware of the alternatives.
Shahzad was trained by al-Qaida in the region of Waziristan, a tribal region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, believed to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden. The area is also the cradle of the Taliban, which confirms, in a sense, the claim of responsibility for the plot by a group linked to the extremist militants of Afghanistan. In the past, I have mentioned Lashkar-e-Taliban or LeT — the greatest concern for America today — considered to be a reconfiguring of al-Qaida, without the primitive ideology and strategy of the latter. The LeT was responsible for the brutal attacks on Mumbai, in which more than 160 people died, including foreign tourists.
The errors in procedure committed by the Pakistani led to his capture, but there was evidence he did not act alone. The preparation, the planning, and execution were not just from a "man of Wall Street," as neighbors in Connecticut believed his profession to be. In reality, this could symbolize a nightmare for American security forces: the so called "sleeper cell," a terrorist trained and prepared to infiltrate a country, adapting to day-to-day routines until being called to action at a determined moment. Shahzad was trained to be seen as a common American, thus, to not arouse suspicion. Regardless, he left so many traces in the process that he was arrested without difficulty.
Next article![]( "Shifting American Policies Are Fragmenting Afghanistan")
