Who Is Hurt by U.S.Arm Sales to Taiwan?
Published in Zaobao
(Singapore) on 28 September 2011
by Chen Jimin (link to original)
On Sept. 21, despite China’s repeated stern warnings, the U.S. government announced its sale of modern weapons to Taiwan. The U.S. would refit Taiwan’s F16 A/B fighter jets, sell military aircraft parts and offer training programs for a total price of $5.852 billion. This is the second weapons sale that has occurred since Obama became president. Presently, the Obama administration’s total arms sales to Taiwan is 80 percent of the previous administration’s sales. In terms of frequency and intensity, this current transaction to Taiwan seems to have exacerbated this trend.
Since the establishment of Sino-U.S. relations, the problem of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has always been a major obstacle in the development of the relationship. Nowadays, even though China’s national power has clearly strengthened and the degree of dependence between China and the U.S. increases day by day, the fact of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan still remains the same. The pros and cons of these arms sales should be carefully studied. Actually, we can clearly see in the multiple times the U.S. has sold weapons to Taiwan that even though there are various international political considerations, U.S. domestic factors are still the main driving force behind these sales. The impact that major U.S. military industrial interest groups have on U.S. national politics should not be underestimated. Obviously the people who have the most to gain from this arms sale to Taiwan are the U.S. military industrial groups and their representatives in government.
Compared with the pros of the Taiwan arms deal, the cons vastly outweigh the pros. In particular, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan harms America’s national image and international reputation, hurts the overall situation of Sino-U.S. relations and specifically damages the fundamental interests of all Chinese people, including the Taiwanese.
First of all, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan mocks America’s image and its international reputation. As we all know, the U.S. government clearly states in the 1982 “August 17 Communique” that “it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution .”
However, the fact of the matter is that this U.S. government’s promise is merely a blank check. In this sense, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is a test for its international reputation; which they failed in this instance. As the saying goes “a man without faith cannot stand,” in this case, “a country lacking in its people’s faith will decay.” Basically, U.S. arms sale to Taiwan interferes with China’s internal affairs and is a violent attack on China’s core national interests. The multiple times that the U.S. sold weapons to Taiwan has repeatedly portrayed America as a “troublemaker” interfering with world peace and stability. The arms sale is purely a political action, which has had an even worse influence on America’s national image than the Abu Ghraib incident. It is also a flagrant violation of international laws, rules and conventions by the U.S. government.
From a global superpower’s point of view, a blow to its international reputation will shake the foundation of its superpower legitimacy. From this perspective, selling weapons to Taiwan is not the best way to help America’s national interests; it is nothing more than a means to satisfy the interests of some domestic U.S. interest groups. It can be seen that these interest groups, especially ones in the military industry, have a huge influence on U.S. domestic politics; and to a degree, even have influence over U.S. government decision making, once again proving the concern Eisenhower foresaw with the “military-industrial complex.”
Additionally, this shows that the free, open and transparent political principles that the U.S. advertises are merely fig leaves used by interest groups. In this sense, Uncle Sam should be paying attention to the poor development and increasingly chaotic economic situation and narrow political culture in the U.S., instead of the actions of a peacefully developing China in the Far East.
Secondly, the arms sale to Taiwan harms the overall situation of Sino-U.S. relations. Not long ago, during talks with the U.S. Atlantic Council delegation, I heard an American scholar complain that with China’s increase in economic strength, it has become more arrogant in approaching international affairs, thus complicating U.S.-Sino relations and making interactions between the U.S. and China, its creditor, more difficult. From America’s point of view, this uneasiness is reflected on a psychological level, and will only increase as China’s power continues to increase. This strongly impacts the deep-rooted sense of superiority that the U.S. has.
The notion of “the U.S. as teacher” and “China as student” has begun to falter, and to some extent has already been dislocated. Basically, the U.S. has lost a psychological satisfaction as opposed to suffering actual damage to its interests. However, from China’s perspective, this uneasiness is reflected in the loss of actual interests. From an economic perspective, China has a lot of U.S. bonds; the U.S. dollar assets have always faced the danger of shrinking. From a security point of view, each time the U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, it is a serious violation of China’s core national interests, which does not take into consideration the overall development of Sino-U.S. relations or the personal feelings of the Chinese.
It has been proven that the current main disrupting factor in Sino-U.S. relations is the arms sale to Taiwan. Obviously this type of action does not help establish mutual strategic trust between China and the U.S., nor does it help stabilize the development of bilateral relations.
Lastly, the weapons sale has harmed the Chinese people’s basic interests. Whether certain political parties in Taiwan acknowledge it or not, China and Taiwan share the same indelible history, culture and bloodlines. On the surface, only Taiwan benefits from the arms sale. However, in reality, this action greatly harms Taiwan. The most obvious point is that it fuels arrogant pro-independence feelings in Taiwan. They believe that so long as America supplies them with modern weapons, and so long as they cling on tightly to America’s “leg”, they can compete with China and await an opportunity to legally carry out the risky move of “Taiwanese independence.”
However, what needs to be pointed out is that if there is a lack of mutual political trust between China and Taiwan, then the arms sale to Taiwan would cause a “security situation” between China and Taiwan and will inevitably cause China to be suspicious and vigilant against future interactions with Taiwan. This not only affects the first step in cross-strait political reconciliation, but also influences economic ties and cultural exchanges. From Taiwan’s perspective, this is short-sighted and “risky” action. Actually, improved cross-strait relations are consistent with the interests and desires of the Chinese and with the general trend in history.
Looking at recent developments in cross-strait relations, maintaining improved interactions is the best option for Taiwan’s interests. Taiwan’s leader Ma Ying-jeou has put forth the notions of “diplomatic truce” and “flexible diplomacy,” which, to a degree, is a positive response to China’s good-will policies; and it is from here that tensions in cross-strait relations will be alleviated. At the same time, Taiwan has gotten more international wiggle-room, which is a win-win situation.
Another example is China and Taiwan signing its Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which strengthens cross-strait economic ties and integration. In these series of interactions, both China and Taiwan received benefits, though Taiwan is the greater beneficiary. However, the weapons sale to Taiwan has disrupted this effective and beneficial interaction, which does not aid the active development of cross-strait relations and is not beneficial to the Chinese people’s basic interests. From this perspective, U.S. arms sale to Taiwan is not only something that the Chinese government cannot tolerate, but also something that cannot be tolerated by the Chinese people, including Taiwanese.
In response to previous U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese government has used counter-measures, however, to no avail. It is undeniable that, from a power stand point there is a wide gap between China and the U.S. From a superiority stand point, however, China is not helpless. Therefore, whether or not the Chinese government can use its advantages — including economic advantages (like holding U.S. bonds) and security advantages (like the problem with nuclear proliferation) — as counter-measures against the U.S. is a worthwhile discussion topic.
At the same time, why can’t we change our thinking? We could use drastic measures to deal with this dilemma to improve cross-strait relations; from improved economic trade ties and cultural ties to political ties and from mutual economic trust to political trust, to achieve cross-strait political reconciliation, thereby eliminating the market for U.S. arms sales. There is no doubt this path is filled with difficulties and uncertainties, but it is a path is worth researching and discussing. To a large extend, a way to end U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is for China to strengthen its national power, using its national strength and wisdom, which is constrained by the degree and depth of friendly cross-strait relations.
Since the establishment of Sino-U.S. relations, the problem of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has always been a major obstacle in the development of the relationship. Nowadays, even though China’s national power has clearly strengthened and the degree of dependence between China and the U.S. increases day by day, the fact of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan still remains the same. The pros and cons of these arms sales should be carefully studied. Actually, we can clearly see in the multiple times the U.S. has sold weapons to Taiwan that even though there are various international political considerations, U.S. domestic factors are still the main driving force behind these sales. The impact that major U.S. military industrial interest groups have on U.S. national politics should not be underestimated. Obviously the people who have the most to gain from this arms sale to Taiwan are the U.S. military industrial groups and their representatives in government.
Compared with the pros of the Taiwan arms deal, the cons vastly outweigh the pros. In particular, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan harms America’s national image and international reputation, hurts the overall situation of Sino-U.S. relations and specifically damages the fundamental interests of all Chinese people, including the Taiwanese.
First of all, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan mocks America’s image and its international reputation. As we all know, the U.S. government clearly states in the 1982 “August 17 Communique” that “it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution .”
However, the fact of the matter is that this U.S. government’s promise is merely a blank check. In this sense, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is a test for its international reputation; which they failed in this instance. As the saying goes “a man without faith cannot stand,” in this case, “a country lacking in its people’s faith will decay.” Basically, U.S. arms sale to Taiwan interferes with China’s internal affairs and is a violent attack on China’s core national interests. The multiple times that the U.S. sold weapons to Taiwan has repeatedly portrayed America as a “troublemaker” interfering with world peace and stability. The arms sale is purely a political action, which has had an even worse influence on America’s national image than the Abu Ghraib incident. It is also a flagrant violation of international laws, rules and conventions by the U.S. government.
From a global superpower’s point of view, a blow to its international reputation will shake the foundation of its superpower legitimacy. From this perspective, selling weapons to Taiwan is not the best way to help America’s national interests; it is nothing more than a means to satisfy the interests of some domestic U.S. interest groups. It can be seen that these interest groups, especially ones in the military industry, have a huge influence on U.S. domestic politics; and to a degree, even have influence over U.S. government decision making, once again proving the concern Eisenhower foresaw with the “military-industrial complex.”
Additionally, this shows that the free, open and transparent political principles that the U.S. advertises are merely fig leaves used by interest groups. In this sense, Uncle Sam should be paying attention to the poor development and increasingly chaotic economic situation and narrow political culture in the U.S., instead of the actions of a peacefully developing China in the Far East.
Secondly, the arms sale to Taiwan harms the overall situation of Sino-U.S. relations. Not long ago, during talks with the U.S. Atlantic Council delegation, I heard an American scholar complain that with China’s increase in economic strength, it has become more arrogant in approaching international affairs, thus complicating U.S.-Sino relations and making interactions between the U.S. and China, its creditor, more difficult. From America’s point of view, this uneasiness is reflected on a psychological level, and will only increase as China’s power continues to increase. This strongly impacts the deep-rooted sense of superiority that the U.S. has.
The notion of “the U.S. as teacher” and “China as student” has begun to falter, and to some extent has already been dislocated. Basically, the U.S. has lost a psychological satisfaction as opposed to suffering actual damage to its interests. However, from China’s perspective, this uneasiness is reflected in the loss of actual interests. From an economic perspective, China has a lot of U.S. bonds; the U.S. dollar assets have always faced the danger of shrinking. From a security point of view, each time the U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, it is a serious violation of China’s core national interests, which does not take into consideration the overall development of Sino-U.S. relations or the personal feelings of the Chinese.
It has been proven that the current main disrupting factor in Sino-U.S. relations is the arms sale to Taiwan. Obviously this type of action does not help establish mutual strategic trust between China and the U.S., nor does it help stabilize the development of bilateral relations.
Lastly, the weapons sale has harmed the Chinese people’s basic interests. Whether certain political parties in Taiwan acknowledge it or not, China and Taiwan share the same indelible history, culture and bloodlines. On the surface, only Taiwan benefits from the arms sale. However, in reality, this action greatly harms Taiwan. The most obvious point is that it fuels arrogant pro-independence feelings in Taiwan. They believe that so long as America supplies them with modern weapons, and so long as they cling on tightly to America’s “leg”, they can compete with China and await an opportunity to legally carry out the risky move of “Taiwanese independence.”
However, what needs to be pointed out is that if there is a lack of mutual political trust between China and Taiwan, then the arms sale to Taiwan would cause a “security situation” between China and Taiwan and will inevitably cause China to be suspicious and vigilant against future interactions with Taiwan. This not only affects the first step in cross-strait political reconciliation, but also influences economic ties and cultural exchanges. From Taiwan’s perspective, this is short-sighted and “risky” action. Actually, improved cross-strait relations are consistent with the interests and desires of the Chinese and with the general trend in history.
Looking at recent developments in cross-strait relations, maintaining improved interactions is the best option for Taiwan’s interests. Taiwan’s leader Ma Ying-jeou has put forth the notions of “diplomatic truce” and “flexible diplomacy,” which, to a degree, is a positive response to China’s good-will policies; and it is from here that tensions in cross-strait relations will be alleviated. At the same time, Taiwan has gotten more international wiggle-room, which is a win-win situation.
Another example is China and Taiwan signing its Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which strengthens cross-strait economic ties and integration. In these series of interactions, both China and Taiwan received benefits, though Taiwan is the greater beneficiary. However, the weapons sale to Taiwan has disrupted this effective and beneficial interaction, which does not aid the active development of cross-strait relations and is not beneficial to the Chinese people’s basic interests. From this perspective, U.S. arms sale to Taiwan is not only something that the Chinese government cannot tolerate, but also something that cannot be tolerated by the Chinese people, including Taiwanese.
In response to previous U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese government has used counter-measures, however, to no avail. It is undeniable that, from a power stand point there is a wide gap between China and the U.S. From a superiority stand point, however, China is not helpless. Therefore, whether or not the Chinese government can use its advantages — including economic advantages (like holding U.S. bonds) and security advantages (like the problem with nuclear proliferation) — as counter-measures against the U.S. is a worthwhile discussion topic.
At the same time, why can’t we change our thinking? We could use drastic measures to deal with this dilemma to improve cross-strait relations; from improved economic trade ties and cultural ties to political ties and from mutual economic trust to political trust, to achieve cross-strait political reconciliation, thereby eliminating the market for U.S. arms sales. There is no doubt this path is filled with difficulties and uncertainties, but it is a path is worth researching and discussing. To a large extend, a way to end U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is for China to strengthen its national power, using its national strength and wisdom, which is constrained by the degree and depth of friendly cross-strait relations.