America's Deep-Seated Motives behind Arms Sales to Taiwan
Published in People.com.cn
(China) on 3 October 2011
by Zhang Shirong (link to original)
The U.S. government announced on Sept. 21, 2011, a total of $5.8 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. This is the second arms sale to Taiwan by the Obama administration. These actions seriously violate three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, especially the principles outlined in the August 17th communiqué. The U.S. arms sale to Taiwan seriously interferes with China’s internal affairs, undermines China’s national security and threatens to derail China’s peaceful reunification (with Taiwan); it also damages Sino-U.S. relations. China has expressed its strong indignation and resolute opposition to such transgressions.
Beginning with May 2008, the Taiwan situation entered into a new era of peaceful development and amicable cross-strait exchanges. Particularly after implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, economic ties have been steadily deepening between mainland China and Taiwan. At the same time, as the U.S. and European debt crisis deepens, Sino-U.S. interdependence has gradually deepened. Comparing the current situation with the period where the Democratic Progressive Party carried out rampant “Taiwan Independence” activities — when there were tense cross-strait relations and the U.S. military, on the grounds of trying to balance the military capabilities on either side of the straight, frequently pushed for arms sales to Taiwan. These past two instances of arms sales come after Obama has taken office, when cross-strait relations have become markedly more peaceful; it is difficult to find a sensible interpretation for these recent arms sales. Thus we must look beyond the surface and examine the U.S.’s deep seated motivation for selling arms to Taiwan.
U.S. Core National Interests
In the U.S. administration, intermittent arms sales to Taiwan are taken as customary practice. In fact, using Taiwan to control China’s peaceful rise is America’s primary tactic in its efforts to deter China. Conservative U.S. forces have always viewed China as a major strategic competitor, not a major strategic partner. Even though the U.S. has recently been focusing more on internal affairs, the U.S. still uses the Taiwan issue to interfere with China’s peaceful ascension.
During the Cold War, Taiwan played a crucial role in the U.S.’s military expansion into Asia. In the 1950s and 1960s Taiwan was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the U.S.’s attempts to contain socialist China. Taiwan has invaluable geostrategic value for the U.S. Meanwhile, Taiwan has largely accepted the American political model and American values. Conversely, the U.S. views Taiwan as being anti-Chinese and anti-Communist. Scholars point out, “In the global game of chess, Taiwan is a very significant piece, especially its ideology and values… and, in recent years, its democratization. These aspects are all fully consistent with U.S. interests.”* Zbigniew Brzezinski noted that Taiwan is “a democratic success story…it is an example of what the blending of Chinese culture and democracy would look like; its example shows what the evolution of China may lead to. Taiwan’s example has important and long-term significance.”*
In the 1970s, China adjusted its foreign policy so that it could coordinate with the U.S. policy of concentrating forces against Soviet military expansion. The U.S. and China formed a united front against the Soviet Union and, according to U.S. pragmatism, adjusted policy towards Taiwan to make concessions for mainland Chinese interests. The signing of three joint Sino-U.S. communiqués — the Shanghai communiqué, the Diplomatic Communiqué and the August 17th communiqué — established that the Taiwan problem would temporarily be set aside. The U.S. would aid China in opposing the Soviet Union.
In the early 90’s, the Cold War ended, but the American Cold War mentality of dominating the world did not. After the Cold War, Taiwan’s position in the U.S.’s global strategy rose significantly; the reason lies in America’s wanting to use Taiwan to control the global ideological field and wield some control over a rapidly developing China.
In reality, the U.S. selling arms to Taiwan has always been a “the tail leads the dog” problem in the Sino-U.S. relationship. On May 5, 1982, Deng Xiaoping met with Vice President George H.W. Bush and, using his usual forthright matter, told Bush that the central problem in Sino-U.S. relations is American arms sales to Taiwan. The selling of arms to Taiwan tests the stability of Sino-U.S. relations and established relationship guidelines. Only after this problem is resolved, can the two sides begin to establish mutual trust. Deng pointed out that if the U.S. sold arms to Taiwan for an indefinite period of time, the U.S. is actually providing Taiwan with an umbrella.
In the early 1980s, America’s arms sales to Taiwan became a major obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations. In order to overcome this obstacle, both sides engaged in arduous negotiations and on Aug. 15, 1982, reached an agreement. On August 17th they announced the Sino-U.S. Cooperation Communiqué (the “8-17 communique”). Within the document, both sides reiterated the original principles contained in the Shanghai Communiqué and Diplomatic Communiqué.
The U.S. gave its word not to pursue a policy of long-term arms sales to Taiwan; it also promised that the capabilities and number of the arms sold to Taiwan would not surpass those of the arms sold after the Diplomatic Communiqué. The U.S. also agreed to prepare to enter a phase of gradual reduction in arms sales to Taiwan; after a period of time both sides would seek a final resolution. Since then, throughout the 1980s, the U.S. complied with its alliance where China saw the need to control arms sales to Taiwan.
In recent years, especially after the start of the 21st century and the successful implementation China’s regional policy of being a “good, peaceful and prosperous neighbor,” only Japan and the Taiwanese province have been unstable factors in an overall peaceful environment. After the redefinition of the Japanese-U.S. alliance, Taiwan became the U.S.’s most powerful piece in its efforts to contain China.
In considering U.S. strategic interests, if China does not achieve unification, the U.S. has reason to intervene in cross-strait relations and provide the Taiwan province with arms. This allows China no choice but to maintain a comparable military force and thus it cannot completely focus its energy on modernization. At the same time, the U.S. is inclined to exaggerate the possibility of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan in order to cause other Western nations to doubt the soundness of investing in China. These exaggerations also cause China’s neighbors unease and cancel out the positive contributions China has made to the region as the center of economic activity, as well as the success of its regional and economic policies.
In terms of geopolitical strategy, America hopes to rely on contentious cross-strait relations so that it can use Taiwan as a natural barrier to China’s military power expanding into the Pacific. This way, American forces would not be exposed to the threat of a direct Chinese offensive.
U.S. Arms Sales Driven by Economic Interests
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. came up with excuses that it needed to maintain a balance in cross-strait military prowess. As arms sales to Taiwan gradually escalated, it has given Taiwan independence supporters the illusion that their cause has the full backing of American power. This became a source of tension in the Sino-U.S. relationship.
Taiwan is currently America’s most important arms market. According to incomplete statistics, in the last 30 years, the U.S. has sold arms to Taiwan over 80 times. The total value of these past sales amounts to more than $40 billion. Some in the U.S. say that selling arms to Taiwan will help expand exports and raise employment. In 2010, due to the U.S. selling $6.4 billion in arms to Taiwan and President Obama meeting with the Dalai Lama, Sino-U.S. relations hit rock bottom. Exchange between Sino-U.S. military forces and high-level officials ceased.
In 2011, a new round of arms sales to Taiwan pushes the Obama administration’s total arms sales to $12 billion; this figure surpasses the total sold to Taiwan after the breaking of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations. America possesses the world’s most advanced arms industry and is the world’s largest arms exporter.
According to U.S. national interests, selling large amounts of military armaments to Taiwan can increase the instability of the cross-strait situation and prolong the sustainability of pro-independence forces. This is a threat to American national security. Yet the U.S. military-industrial complex wields a significant influence over American politics, and they continue to use various lobby groups to influence the U.S. government to gradually lift the restrictions on arms sales to Taiwan.
The current U.S. military industry faces competition from Europe and Russia. Thus, although the American government and several high-ranking officials have categorically said that they would not sell enough offensive weapons to Taiwan to “change the status quo,” the military industrial complex continues to exert pressure on American authorities to sign large arms deals to ensure they maintain a sufficient profit margin.
U.S. Electoral Politics
The American political tradition has always emphasized domestic politics over international politics. In American electoral politics, the military industrial complex has always backed conservative forces. In September 1992, the Bush (senior) administration disregarded persistent objections from China over the sale of 150 advanced F-16 fighters. This sale led to a serious deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the American economy has been listless and the unemployment rate has held at its historic high of nine percent. As the 2012 presidential election approaches, the economy and unemployment are the two key issues that both sides must focus on. With this context, Lockheed Martin and members of Congress have flown up the “raise employment and stir the economy” banner. They have said that increasing arms sales has the potential to add 80,000 jobs. With such rhetoric, it is easy to win the support of the American public — this places a great deal of pressure on the Democratic Party.
A former senior U.S. Department of Defense official recently told a “Global Times” reporter that the current sluggish economy is the largest obstacle to Obama’s re-election; Obama obviously can’t dismiss the arms sales as a possible job creator.
Taiwan Political Forces
Since the signing and implementation of the ECFA, cross-strait exchanges have been growing more intertwined. Both communities on either side of the strait and the international community benefit from this development. Yet the Taiwan side continues to exaggerate the threat posed by mainland Chinese military forces and ignore the overall peaceful development of the mainland China-Taiwan relationship.
Some media commentators on the Taiwanese island point out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are fueled by the U.S.’s interest in preserving its national interests. Therefore, it must continually sell arms to Taiwan in order to make a profit and counter the mainland’s growing power. For some, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan resembles a chain collar. As soon as Taiwan doesn’t listen to its U.S. shareholders, the leash holder tightens its grip.
At the same time, Taiwan independence forces are unable to remain out of the limelight; they even encourage the purchase of high-priced U.S. armaments in order to curry the support of the U.S. military industry and hopefully garner favorable policies from the government. These Taiwan independence forces hope to make the U.S. their tank in the fight for independence.
In reality, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has already seen the transition from “seller’s market” to “buyer’s market.” It used to be that Taiwan was eager to buy; now it is the U.S. is eager to sell. The reasoning is multifaceted. For Taiwan, their internal politics have changed and since the Kuomintang has been in charge of executive power they have been very cautious about buying arms from the U.S. On the other hand, because the Taiwan economy is slowing, they have not had the same funds to buy huge amounts of armaments.
As for the American side, these about-faces in arms sales precisely reflect the strong influence of the military industrial complex on politics. As for how to expel these external factors, a frank and inclusive attitude will aid the most in the construction of a framework for peaceful cross-strait relations. This is a major issue facing Taiwanese authorities.
*Editor’s Note: These quotes, while accurately translated, could not be verified.
Beginning with May 2008, the Taiwan situation entered into a new era of peaceful development and amicable cross-strait exchanges. Particularly after implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, economic ties have been steadily deepening between mainland China and Taiwan. At the same time, as the U.S. and European debt crisis deepens, Sino-U.S. interdependence has gradually deepened. Comparing the current situation with the period where the Democratic Progressive Party carried out rampant “Taiwan Independence” activities — when there were tense cross-strait relations and the U.S. military, on the grounds of trying to balance the military capabilities on either side of the straight, frequently pushed for arms sales to Taiwan. These past two instances of arms sales come after Obama has taken office, when cross-strait relations have become markedly more peaceful; it is difficult to find a sensible interpretation for these recent arms sales. Thus we must look beyond the surface and examine the U.S.’s deep seated motivation for selling arms to Taiwan.
U.S. Core National Interests
In the U.S. administration, intermittent arms sales to Taiwan are taken as customary practice. In fact, using Taiwan to control China’s peaceful rise is America’s primary tactic in its efforts to deter China. Conservative U.S. forces have always viewed China as a major strategic competitor, not a major strategic partner. Even though the U.S. has recently been focusing more on internal affairs, the U.S. still uses the Taiwan issue to interfere with China’s peaceful ascension.
During the Cold War, Taiwan played a crucial role in the U.S.’s military expansion into Asia. In the 1950s and 1960s Taiwan was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the U.S.’s attempts to contain socialist China. Taiwan has invaluable geostrategic value for the U.S. Meanwhile, Taiwan has largely accepted the American political model and American values. Conversely, the U.S. views Taiwan as being anti-Chinese and anti-Communist. Scholars point out, “In the global game of chess, Taiwan is a very significant piece, especially its ideology and values… and, in recent years, its democratization. These aspects are all fully consistent with U.S. interests.”* Zbigniew Brzezinski noted that Taiwan is “a democratic success story…it is an example of what the blending of Chinese culture and democracy would look like; its example shows what the evolution of China may lead to. Taiwan’s example has important and long-term significance.”*
In the 1970s, China adjusted its foreign policy so that it could coordinate with the U.S. policy of concentrating forces against Soviet military expansion. The U.S. and China formed a united front against the Soviet Union and, according to U.S. pragmatism, adjusted policy towards Taiwan to make concessions for mainland Chinese interests. The signing of three joint Sino-U.S. communiqués — the Shanghai communiqué, the Diplomatic Communiqué and the August 17th communiqué — established that the Taiwan problem would temporarily be set aside. The U.S. would aid China in opposing the Soviet Union.
In the early 90’s, the Cold War ended, but the American Cold War mentality of dominating the world did not. After the Cold War, Taiwan’s position in the U.S.’s global strategy rose significantly; the reason lies in America’s wanting to use Taiwan to control the global ideological field and wield some control over a rapidly developing China.
In reality, the U.S. selling arms to Taiwan has always been a “the tail leads the dog” problem in the Sino-U.S. relationship. On May 5, 1982, Deng Xiaoping met with Vice President George H.W. Bush and, using his usual forthright matter, told Bush that the central problem in Sino-U.S. relations is American arms sales to Taiwan. The selling of arms to Taiwan tests the stability of Sino-U.S. relations and established relationship guidelines. Only after this problem is resolved, can the two sides begin to establish mutual trust. Deng pointed out that if the U.S. sold arms to Taiwan for an indefinite period of time, the U.S. is actually providing Taiwan with an umbrella.
In the early 1980s, America’s arms sales to Taiwan became a major obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations. In order to overcome this obstacle, both sides engaged in arduous negotiations and on Aug. 15, 1982, reached an agreement. On August 17th they announced the Sino-U.S. Cooperation Communiqué (the “8-17 communique”). Within the document, both sides reiterated the original principles contained in the Shanghai Communiqué and Diplomatic Communiqué.
The U.S. gave its word not to pursue a policy of long-term arms sales to Taiwan; it also promised that the capabilities and number of the arms sold to Taiwan would not surpass those of the arms sold after the Diplomatic Communiqué. The U.S. also agreed to prepare to enter a phase of gradual reduction in arms sales to Taiwan; after a period of time both sides would seek a final resolution. Since then, throughout the 1980s, the U.S. complied with its alliance where China saw the need to control arms sales to Taiwan.
In recent years, especially after the start of the 21st century and the successful implementation China’s regional policy of being a “good, peaceful and prosperous neighbor,” only Japan and the Taiwanese province have been unstable factors in an overall peaceful environment. After the redefinition of the Japanese-U.S. alliance, Taiwan became the U.S.’s most powerful piece in its efforts to contain China.
In considering U.S. strategic interests, if China does not achieve unification, the U.S. has reason to intervene in cross-strait relations and provide the Taiwan province with arms. This allows China no choice but to maintain a comparable military force and thus it cannot completely focus its energy on modernization. At the same time, the U.S. is inclined to exaggerate the possibility of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan in order to cause other Western nations to doubt the soundness of investing in China. These exaggerations also cause China’s neighbors unease and cancel out the positive contributions China has made to the region as the center of economic activity, as well as the success of its regional and economic policies.
In terms of geopolitical strategy, America hopes to rely on contentious cross-strait relations so that it can use Taiwan as a natural barrier to China’s military power expanding into the Pacific. This way, American forces would not be exposed to the threat of a direct Chinese offensive.
U.S. Arms Sales Driven by Economic Interests
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. came up with excuses that it needed to maintain a balance in cross-strait military prowess. As arms sales to Taiwan gradually escalated, it has given Taiwan independence supporters the illusion that their cause has the full backing of American power. This became a source of tension in the Sino-U.S. relationship.
Taiwan is currently America’s most important arms market. According to incomplete statistics, in the last 30 years, the U.S. has sold arms to Taiwan over 80 times. The total value of these past sales amounts to more than $40 billion. Some in the U.S. say that selling arms to Taiwan will help expand exports and raise employment. In 2010, due to the U.S. selling $6.4 billion in arms to Taiwan and President Obama meeting with the Dalai Lama, Sino-U.S. relations hit rock bottom. Exchange between Sino-U.S. military forces and high-level officials ceased.
In 2011, a new round of arms sales to Taiwan pushes the Obama administration’s total arms sales to $12 billion; this figure surpasses the total sold to Taiwan after the breaking of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations. America possesses the world’s most advanced arms industry and is the world’s largest arms exporter.
According to U.S. national interests, selling large amounts of military armaments to Taiwan can increase the instability of the cross-strait situation and prolong the sustainability of pro-independence forces. This is a threat to American national security. Yet the U.S. military-industrial complex wields a significant influence over American politics, and they continue to use various lobby groups to influence the U.S. government to gradually lift the restrictions on arms sales to Taiwan.
The current U.S. military industry faces competition from Europe and Russia. Thus, although the American government and several high-ranking officials have categorically said that they would not sell enough offensive weapons to Taiwan to “change the status quo,” the military industrial complex continues to exert pressure on American authorities to sign large arms deals to ensure they maintain a sufficient profit margin.
U.S. Electoral Politics
The American political tradition has always emphasized domestic politics over international politics. In American electoral politics, the military industrial complex has always backed conservative forces. In September 1992, the Bush (senior) administration disregarded persistent objections from China over the sale of 150 advanced F-16 fighters. This sale led to a serious deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the American economy has been listless and the unemployment rate has held at its historic high of nine percent. As the 2012 presidential election approaches, the economy and unemployment are the two key issues that both sides must focus on. With this context, Lockheed Martin and members of Congress have flown up the “raise employment and stir the economy” banner. They have said that increasing arms sales has the potential to add 80,000 jobs. With such rhetoric, it is easy to win the support of the American public — this places a great deal of pressure on the Democratic Party.
A former senior U.S. Department of Defense official recently told a “Global Times” reporter that the current sluggish economy is the largest obstacle to Obama’s re-election; Obama obviously can’t dismiss the arms sales as a possible job creator.
Taiwan Political Forces
Since the signing and implementation of the ECFA, cross-strait exchanges have been growing more intertwined. Both communities on either side of the strait and the international community benefit from this development. Yet the Taiwan side continues to exaggerate the threat posed by mainland Chinese military forces and ignore the overall peaceful development of the mainland China-Taiwan relationship.
Some media commentators on the Taiwanese island point out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are fueled by the U.S.’s interest in preserving its national interests. Therefore, it must continually sell arms to Taiwan in order to make a profit and counter the mainland’s growing power. For some, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan resembles a chain collar. As soon as Taiwan doesn’t listen to its U.S. shareholders, the leash holder tightens its grip.
At the same time, Taiwan independence forces are unable to remain out of the limelight; they even encourage the purchase of high-priced U.S. armaments in order to curry the support of the U.S. military industry and hopefully garner favorable policies from the government. These Taiwan independence forces hope to make the U.S. their tank in the fight for independence.
In reality, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has already seen the transition from “seller’s market” to “buyer’s market.” It used to be that Taiwan was eager to buy; now it is the U.S. is eager to sell. The reasoning is multifaceted. For Taiwan, their internal politics have changed and since the Kuomintang has been in charge of executive power they have been very cautious about buying arms from the U.S. On the other hand, because the Taiwan economy is slowing, they have not had the same funds to buy huge amounts of armaments.
As for the American side, these about-faces in arms sales precisely reflect the strong influence of the military industrial complex on politics. As for how to expel these external factors, a frank and inclusive attitude will aid the most in the construction of a framework for peaceful cross-strait relations. This is a major issue facing Taiwanese authorities.
*Editor’s Note: These quotes, while accurately translated, could not be verified.
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