China and US Must Persist in Progressive Military Cooperation

Published in Oriental Morning Post
(China) on 26 August 2013
by Shen Ding Li (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Brandon Peterson. Edited by Chris J. deGrazia.
Within the next 20 years, China and the U.S. must persist in positive [military] cooperation, avoid negative competition and ultimately form conscious behaviors that will bilaterally and multilaterally stabilize the Asia-Pacific region.

Last week, when Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan visited the U.S., he spoke with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. In this meeting, Chang proposed the establishment of a bilateral task force. This task force would use dialogue to eliminate three major obstacles that for years have prevented normal relations between these two nations' militaries: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. Congress’ setup of legal barriers that hinder regular military contact between the U.S. and China, and U.S. planes and warships' frequent reconnaissance near China. Chang also indicated that if the U.S. stopped its arms sales to Taiwan, China also would consider adjusting its military deployment.

This being said, the views of the U.S. and China differ. It is reported that the U.S. military actively approves China’s proposal of separately setting up task forces. However, the U.S. military has not yet responded to the Chinese proposal that the U.S. cease arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for an adjustment to Chinese military deployment. According to another report, during the June 2013 Annenberg talks between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state, Chinese leaders made these same proposals to the U.S. leadership, but President Obama did not reply.

The Taiwanese are somewhat uneasy. Taiwanese authorities believe that if this information is true, it will alter [former President Ronald] Reagan's Six Assurances of the 1980s, one of which was that the U.S. would not have prior discussions with mainland China regarding arms sales to Taiwan. The Taiwanese are urgently seeking confirmation from America; all levels of Taiwanese society are nervous.

I think that the time will come when the U.S. will stop arms sales to Taiwan. When? That end will come when the Taiwanese don't need U.S. weapons and America’s continuing arms sales to Taiwan do the U.S. more harm than good. For the Taiwanese not to need U.S. weapons, cross-strait [Chinese-Taiwanese] cooperation is required. For U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to do the U.S. more harm than good, the Chinese mainland needs to carry out retaliatory measures and lessen American influence.

For example, most U.S. arms companies also produce civilian products. Boeing is such a company. Boeing not only sells large quantities of civilian products to China, but also sells military arms to Taiwan. When China is able to manufacture civilian products similar to Boeing's, Boeing will have to earnestly consider curbing arms sales to Taiwan. When mainland China is qualified to develop and produce large commercial aircraft, China will no longer need to import Boeing or Airbus aircraft and Boeing will have to weigh the pros and cons in the interests of its business. At this point, Boeing will be more likely to consciously decline Taiwanese orders for military products. If Boeing makes this kind of choice, in a market-oriented country, the Pentagon can do nothing.

To be frank, that day isn’t near, but it’s not too far off. Last year, the U.S. National Intelligence Council published the “2030 Global Trends” report, which claimed that in 2030, the U.S. would no longer be the only superpower. The report's touting of China is not without objective self-awareness based on growing trends. In any case, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will become difficult after 2030.

Of course, this implies neither that forming a bilateral military task force will be smooth sailing nor that establishing a task force would naturally eliminate the aforementioned three obstacles. It is reported that as early as the Crawford Ranch talks in 2002, U.S. and Chinese leaders brought up ideas that related U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to China’s adjusting its short-range missile deployment, but the U.S. showed no interest and has still not followed up. Even a future bilateral task force would not necessarily overcome the aforementioned three obstacles quickly.

However, the Chinese have always been willing to talk with the U.S. to control conflicting views and lessen differences while increasing win-win cooperation. This [willingness to talk] will not change. As long as both sides adhere to the One China Policy, China's baseline territorial integrity will not be compromised and China will develop cooperation with the U.S. despite competition. In the process of cooperation, China will guide that competition to a peaceful area. And in the wake of China's rapid and continued development, that area will continue to expand. The U.S. Department of Defense's willingness to grow alongside the Chinese military and work within the framework of a task force to progressively eliminate obstacles and achieve more equal military relations and new relationships between the two major powers is not accidental.

I would like to add something about the last of the aforementioned three obstacles. Theoretically, America’s continued close surveillance of China does not limit China's authority to enter the United States’ exclusive economic zone to conduct military activities. According to reports, at this June's Asian Security Conference (the Shangri-La Dialogue), China informed the U.S. of Chinese warships’ entering the United States’ exclusive economic zone. Although the U.S. Pacific Commander [Adm. Samuel J. Locklear] welcomed them, his successors may find this kind of situation troublesome.

The U.S. military’s opening of NORAD and the command center’s nuclear bunker to Minister Chang and inviting the Chinese North Sea Fleet to carry out joint search-and-rescue exercises in the waters near Hawaii and to attend next year's multinational Pacific Rim naval exercises exemplify progress by the U.S. and China in military cooperation, with positive implications. Within the next 20 years, China and the U.S. must persist in such positive cooperation, avoid negative competition and ultimately form conscious behaviors that will bilaterally and multilaterally stabilize the Asia-Pacific region.


中美应坚持渐进性军事合作
沈丁立
复旦大学教授
中美还需在未来20年里坚持这样的良性合作,避免消极竞争,最终将此形成在双边与多边领域稳定亚太地区的自觉的行为习惯。
中国国防部长常万全上周访美,已同美国国防部长哈格尔会谈。中方在这次会晤中提出了建立两国工作组的建议,经由对话来排除常年困扰两军发展正常关系的三大障碍:美国对台售武、美国国会为阻碍中美发展正常军事交往设置法律障碍以及美军机舰频繁对我抵近侦察。中方还表示:若美国停止对台军售,中方亦可考虑调整军事部署。
此言一出,各方表态不一。我军提出对三大障碍分别设立工作组,据报道美军已对此予以积极认可。但对我方提出以美国停止对台军售以交换我方调整军事部署的提议,美军尚未做出反应。另据悉,在今年6月美国加州安纳伯格举行的中美元首庄园会晤时,中方领导人也曾对美国领导人做过同样提议,奥巴马总统当时也未回复。
台方则有些不安。台湾当局认为如果这一消息属实,将改变上世纪80年代美国时任总统里根就美国对台军售所做出的“六项保证”,其中一项是美国对台军售将不事先与中国大陆谘商。台方正急于向美国求证,朝野表现均显紧张。
笔者判断,美国终止对台军售的时刻终将到来。什么时候?当台方不再或较少需要美国武器以及美国继续售台武器对自身得不偿失之时。台湾不再需要美国武器的时机,需要两岸合作来创造。美国对台售武得不偿失,则需要中国大陆对美国售台武器具备实施报复且较少影响自己的能力。
譬如,美国军火公司大多兼产民品,波音公司就是这样的大户。波音公司既向中国大陆出售大批民品,又向台湾地区出售军品。当大陆具备了制造波音同类民品的时候,波音就必须认真考虑自律其对台军售。当中国大陆研制生产的商用大飞机合格投产之后,中国就将获得不再特别需要进口波音或空客民用航机的能力,那时波音为了公司的商业利益也会权衡利弊,将更有可能自觉拒绝来自台湾的军品订单。在一个市场化的国度,如果波音如此选择,五角大楼恐怕也拿它没办法。
坦率地说,这一天的到来,仍需一些时间,但也不会久远。美国国家情报理事会去年发表《2030全球趋势》的报告,声称美国在2030年将不再是唯一超级大国,其中既有吹捧中国之意,也不无基于客观发展趋势的自我警醒。无论如何,美国对台售武是很难超过2030年的。
当然,这也不意味中美两军建立工作组将一帆风顺,更不意味建立了工作组之后上述三大障碍就自然排除。据悉,关于在美国对台军售同中国大陆调整对台短程导弹部署之间建立关联的想法,早在2002年中美元首克劳福德农场会晤时就已提出,但美方并没有兴趣,迄今也未跟上。即使未来建立了两军相关工作组,也不意味上述障碍将很快得到排除。
但是,中方不懈地愿同美国经过对话来管控矛盾与减少分歧,并在同时加强合作互赢,则是不会改变的。只要两岸坚持一个中国的共识,大陆在领土完整的底线未被突破的前提下,还有与美国在竞争中发展合作、在合作中引导竞争的和平空间。应该说,随着中国的继续发展崛起,这样的空间也将继续扩大。美国国防部愿与中国军队共同发展,在工作组框架内逐步排除障碍,实现更为平等的两军关系和新型大国关系,都是事出有因。
对上述三大障碍的第三条再补一句。美国继续对中国抵近侦察,理论上它也不具限制中方进入美国专属经济区进行军事活动的权利。据悉,在今年6月的亚洲安全会议(即“香格里拉对话”)上,中方已将中国舰船进入美专属经济区的情况告知美方。美国太平洋总司令虽强颜欢迎我军进入,但他的继任者们将来或许会为此种情况不胜其烦。
美军向常部长开放北美防空司令部以及指挥中心核掩体,邀请我国北海舰队舰船在夏威夷海域进行联合搜救演习,并邀请我军参加明年的环太平洋多国海军军演,都是中美渐进式推动具有更多积极内涵的军事合作。中美还需在未来20年里坚持这样的良性合作,避免消极竞争,最终将此形成在双边与多边领域稳定亚太地区的自觉的行为习惯。
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Canada: We Can Dislike Trump, but That Shouldn’t Define Us

Saudi Arabia: Let Us Prepare for a New Reality

Poland: Donald Trump’s 1st Great War. Plenty of Doubts*

Australia: Oil’s Muted Reaction to Trump’s Attack on Iran

Australia: Trump Redraws the Links between Gulf States and Rest of the World

Topics

Ireland: Elon Musk Is Wrong about Empathy — and Irish Film Proves It

India: Iran’s Brinkmanship and Trump’s Redline: How the Crisis Is Reshaping India’s West Asia Strategy

Ghana: America’s Dual Approach: War and Diplomacy in International Relations

South Africa: Trump’s Tariffs Have Gutted Agoa’s Duty‑Free Promise

Egypt: Trump Is Fidgeting in His Chair

Australia: Defying Donald Trump and Stepping out of the Shadows, Mojtaba Khamenei Ascends

Related Articles

India: Iran’s Brinkmanship and Trump’s Redline: How the Crisis Is Reshaping India’s West Asia Strategy

Saudi Arabia: Is the US Quietly Retreating from China Confrontation?

Lebanon: From Venezuela to Iran: US Move To Contain China and Control Resources

Australia: Why Iran’s Most Powerful Ally Is Not Coming to Its Aid