Biden, Maduro and Realpolitik
Published in Analítica
(Venezuela) on 15 March 2022
by Ramón Escovar León (link to original)
… there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.
(Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter VI)
The visit of senior officials of Joe Biden's administration to Miraflores has several consequences that cannot go unnoticed. The first is the effect on the legitimacy of the government of Nicolás Maduro; the second is the effect on the opposition.
Max Weber distinguishes three types of legitimacy: legal, charismatic and traditional. The first refers to the domination exercised by rulers based on the legal structure. Bureaucracy is an instrument in the exercise of this domination. The charismatic refers to the source of power associated with the exceptional qualities of leadership that certain leaders manage to develop. Traditional power has to do with the custom of obeying the orders of the rulers who exercise effective control over a territory. (Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 941-956.)
The passage of time is fundamental for traditional legitimacy. Through repeated conduct, citizens consent to the exercise of power by those who hold it. This power relationship is admitted when a passport or identity card is obtained, taxes are paid or the sale of real estate is registered. These behaviors, when they become customary, are ways of admitting the dominant power. To this can be added that judicial power is recognized every time citizens file a lawsuit or exercise an appeal before the courts controlled by the one who holds power. The passage of time consolidates traditional legitimacy.
The Venezuelan situation fits into this modality. Chavism has exercised power for 22 years, nine of them under the command of Maduro. This is an important period of time that cannot be ignored. Despite the fact that several governments of Western countries do not recognize Maduro's government, the reality is that it is he who exercises effective control of the territory and who controls the state bureaucracy.
Within this context we observe the visit of the three high-ranking officials sent by Biden. They are Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez; U.S. Ambassador for the Venezuela Affairs Unit James "Jimmy" Story, based in Colombia; and President Biden's Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens. Although they did not announce the issues discussed, you don't have to be a dowser to figure it out. They came to buy oil; to attempt to weaken the Venezuelan government's alliance with Vladimir Putin, the new Russian czar; and to promote negotiations in the search for an electoral solution to the Venezuelan political crisis. Some might say it was not for those reasons, but that is what it looks like.
In any case, Maduro would benefit from this rapprochement and improved relations with the Biden administration. He should also remember that Venezuela was born under the inspiration of the values of American democracy. His alliance with Putin will hurt him in the long run. The Moscow dictator may win battles, but he will lose the war against Ukraine, and alliances with losers are costly. Therefore, Maduro could be better off playing a role similar to that of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey — taking a pragmatic position, as recommended by realpolitik.
Several consequences could result from this visit. Among them, that the Biden administration recognizes Maduro (at least indirectly) as the de facto ruler of Venezuela who can sell them oil, and who serves as the linchpin for an electoral solution to the crisis. A direct negotiation with Maduro could potentially open the door for Western companies to increase the country's oil production and, more importantly, initiate a democratization process in Venezuela.
Realpolitik is always pragmatism, rather than illusion or unfulfilled promises. It allows for a contradictory scenario: On the one hand, the U.S. government offers rewards for Chavist leaders; on the other hand, its representatives visit Miraflores, the seat of power. This pragmatism works with Saudi Arabia, a country from which, despite its violation of human rights, Western democracies buy oil.
On the other hand, the visit reveals, once again, the control of the judicial power by the government. The release of two American "prisoners" (which should be celebrated) is not due to a sentence issued by a judge after a transparent process, but a decision made by the executive. The sincere and total reform of the judiciary should be included in the negotiation agenda. Not a reform that goes through a political distribution, but one that allows for a renewal — without exceptions.
The meeting in Miraflores promotes the political negotiation between Maduro and the opposition. And this invites another reflection: the need to revamp the opposition leadership to reflect the political reality of the present. It is worth taking into account the results of the past regional elections, in which, notwithstanding advantages and disqualifications, regional leaderships emerged. Just as the passage of time has strengthened Maduro, it has also weakened the leadership of the opposition.
Likewise, the visit shows that the solution to the Venezuelan crisis is political. To this end, the opposition needs a leadership that is committed to democracy and free from personal ambition. It is advisable that the opposition be represented at the negotiating table by all sectors, without leaving out civil society.
Venezuela is presented with a new opportunity; hopefully it can be seized by all parties to seek the best outcome. It must be recognized that a democratic and institutional country is more reliable for global stability than one in permanent conflict.
(Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter VI)
The visit of senior officials of Joe Biden's administration to Miraflores has several consequences that cannot go unnoticed. The first is the effect on the legitimacy of the government of Nicolás Maduro; the second is the effect on the opposition.
Max Weber distinguishes three types of legitimacy: legal, charismatic and traditional. The first refers to the domination exercised by rulers based on the legal structure. Bureaucracy is an instrument in the exercise of this domination. The charismatic refers to the source of power associated with the exceptional qualities of leadership that certain leaders manage to develop. Traditional power has to do with the custom of obeying the orders of the rulers who exercise effective control over a territory. (Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 941-956.)
The passage of time is fundamental for traditional legitimacy. Through repeated conduct, citizens consent to the exercise of power by those who hold it. This power relationship is admitted when a passport or identity card is obtained, taxes are paid or the sale of real estate is registered. These behaviors, when they become customary, are ways of admitting the dominant power. To this can be added that judicial power is recognized every time citizens file a lawsuit or exercise an appeal before the courts controlled by the one who holds power. The passage of time consolidates traditional legitimacy.
The Venezuelan situation fits into this modality. Chavism has exercised power for 22 years, nine of them under the command of Maduro. This is an important period of time that cannot be ignored. Despite the fact that several governments of Western countries do not recognize Maduro's government, the reality is that it is he who exercises effective control of the territory and who controls the state bureaucracy.
Within this context we observe the visit of the three high-ranking officials sent by Biden. They are Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez; U.S. Ambassador for the Venezuela Affairs Unit James "Jimmy" Story, based in Colombia; and President Biden's Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens. Although they did not announce the issues discussed, you don't have to be a dowser to figure it out. They came to buy oil; to attempt to weaken the Venezuelan government's alliance with Vladimir Putin, the new Russian czar; and to promote negotiations in the search for an electoral solution to the Venezuelan political crisis. Some might say it was not for those reasons, but that is what it looks like.
In any case, Maduro would benefit from this rapprochement and improved relations with the Biden administration. He should also remember that Venezuela was born under the inspiration of the values of American democracy. His alliance with Putin will hurt him in the long run. The Moscow dictator may win battles, but he will lose the war against Ukraine, and alliances with losers are costly. Therefore, Maduro could be better off playing a role similar to that of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey — taking a pragmatic position, as recommended by realpolitik.
Several consequences could result from this visit. Among them, that the Biden administration recognizes Maduro (at least indirectly) as the de facto ruler of Venezuela who can sell them oil, and who serves as the linchpin for an electoral solution to the crisis. A direct negotiation with Maduro could potentially open the door for Western companies to increase the country's oil production and, more importantly, initiate a democratization process in Venezuela.
Realpolitik is always pragmatism, rather than illusion or unfulfilled promises. It allows for a contradictory scenario: On the one hand, the U.S. government offers rewards for Chavist leaders; on the other hand, its representatives visit Miraflores, the seat of power. This pragmatism works with Saudi Arabia, a country from which, despite its violation of human rights, Western democracies buy oil.
On the other hand, the visit reveals, once again, the control of the judicial power by the government. The release of two American "prisoners" (which should be celebrated) is not due to a sentence issued by a judge after a transparent process, but a decision made by the executive. The sincere and total reform of the judiciary should be included in the negotiation agenda. Not a reform that goes through a political distribution, but one that allows for a renewal — without exceptions.
The meeting in Miraflores promotes the political negotiation between Maduro and the opposition. And this invites another reflection: the need to revamp the opposition leadership to reflect the political reality of the present. It is worth taking into account the results of the past regional elections, in which, notwithstanding advantages and disqualifications, regional leaderships emerged. Just as the passage of time has strengthened Maduro, it has also weakened the leadership of the opposition.
Likewise, the visit shows that the solution to the Venezuelan crisis is political. To this end, the opposition needs a leadership that is committed to democracy and free from personal ambition. It is advisable that the opposition be represented at the negotiating table by all sectors, without leaving out civil society.
Venezuela is presented with a new opportunity; hopefully it can be seized by all parties to seek the best outcome. It must be recognized that a democratic and institutional country is more reliable for global stability than one in permanent conflict.
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