South Korea Must Reflect on America’s Untrustworthiness

After the U.S. and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding reflecting their armistice, a shockwave rippled through South Korean media. From the South Korean perspective, the impact of this extends far beyond the Middle East: the paradox inherent in the U.S. alliance system is once again laid bare. South Korea fears being dragged into war by the U.S. and then being abandoned at a critical moment. Consequently, discussions of South Korean “strategic independence” have evidently increased. Many people wonder whether unilateral dependence on U.S. peacekeeping is sufficient to address the complex dangers of this multifaceted modern era.

Following the signing of the U.S.-Iran armistice memorandum, several South Korean media outlets published analyses of this development’s impact on South Korea, with many re-examining the South Korean-U.S. alliance framework. Some outlets have published editorials saying that this memorandum exposes the Americans’ de facto defeat. Indeed, not only did the U.S. fail to achieve their stated prewar objective of overthrowing the Iranian regime, but it has also ceded administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz and significantly tipped the balance of global strategic control. South Korea is highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy resources, and over 90% of its crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. South Korean assumptions that the U.S. would protect the core interests of its allies have been shattered by its personally handing over control of the channel. Coupled with the diplomatic and economic penalties South Korea has incurred from complying with U.S. sanctions, South Korea’s strategic anxieties have been amplified. Overall, the situation has compelled South Korea to reflect deeply on its unilateral dependence-based security model.

Recently, South Korea and America have been in heated talks regarding the transfer of wartime operational command, reflecting South Korea’s re-evaluation of its strategic and security framework. Since taking office, President Le Jae Myung’s administration has reiterated its intention to completely reclaim wartime command by 2028. At the Shangri-La Dialogue last month, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced that the two nations had reached accordance on 94% of the terms and planned to expedite the progress toward settling the matter at last. However, the Americans’ approach has been vague and dilatory. High-ranking members of the United States Forces Korea have repeatedly delayed the process by claiming that the time is not yet ripe. Moreover, the U.S. Senate has added an additional clause to the National Defense Authorization Act requiring the submission of a progress report on the handover every 90 days. In this way, the U.S. has reserved the final decision-making power for its own hands and has even presented a projected timeline where these conditions may not be met until after 2029. This stark contrast highlights the lack of reciprocity in the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

Not long ago, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea likened South Korea to a “dagger” constraining China; last year his metaphor was “a fixed aircraft carrier.” Regardless of it being a dagger or an aircraft carrier, the idea is the same: South Korea is placed on the front line of U.S. efforts to contain China and a tool in U.S. regional strategy. However, some South Koreans not only neglect to maintain vigilance but see this as proof of their own country’s so-called strategic value. The question is, if this “value” means South Korea is shoved to the vanguard of a rivalry between two powerful nations or obligated to point weapons at its neighboring countries, is it really an asset or is it a strategic burden?

If it truly desires strategic autonomy, South Korea must first consider how to safeguard its long-term interests. What South Korea truly needs right now is not to prove its usefulness to the United States against China, but to break free of its role as a tool used by other nations. The U.S.-Iran agreement has already demonstrated that when U.S. interests shift, it will rearrange its regional position according to its own needs, instead of always prioritizing the interests of its allies. This being so, South Korea must clearly see that loading its own security onto the U.S. strategic bandwagon will not guarantee safety. On the contrary, it may result in greater uncertainty.

The global order is currently undergoing profound change, and South Korea must earnestly consider this question: What kind of international and national security policy truly serves South Korea’s interests? China and the United States have built a constructive, strategic and stable relationship. South Korea should recognize the efforts made by these major powers to manage their differences and work together in strategic coordination, and use this as a model for its own policy. China and South Korea share a relationship built on the firm ground of economic ties, personnel contacts and regional cooperation. South Korea’s diplomatic pragmatism can be put to better use by fully recognizing the development potential of China-South Korea relations.

The course of history is relentless. The era of political multipolarity has arrived, and a security framework based on unilateral dependence is only becoming more inadequate against complex threats. For South Korea, there is an option that truly serves its national interests: Maintain good relations with all major powers in order to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, strengthen itself amidst East Asia’s prosperity and development, and safeguard the well-being of its people.

The author is a professor and the director of the Center for Korean Studies at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics.