The Russian Price of Boorishness
Published in De Volkskrant
(Netherlands) on 6 April 2008
by Thomas von der Dunk (link to original)
(Netherlands) on 6 April 2008
by Thomas von der Dunk (link to original)
Translated from
by Dorian de Wind.
Edited by .
The expansion of NATO must not be accompanied by unnecessary arms rattling, such as the construction of a missile shield.
Each country has the right to choose its own allies. That was the correct starting point by President Bush at the last NATO summit. But Bush has, during recent years, by his own unilateral boorishness firmly contributed towards making it very problematic for the Ukraine and Georgia to stringently adhere to this starting point.
From that perspective it was inevitable, in order not to unduly tax the relationship with Russia, that the two countries fobbed off with a vague declaration of principles. It was easy for NATO to move on past this issue because the people of Ukraine are deeply divided over accession to NATO, and Georgia has to struggle with two separatist regions.
In that separatist movement, one can also suspect Moscow’s hand. But that does not alter the fact that NATO, through its hasty expansion into the Caucasus, is becoming entangled in a regional conflict and finds itself facing Russia directly. It is evident that Georgia, precisely for this reason, is looking for protection in Brussels, and by stepping in militarily in Afghanistan is hoping to eventually buy membership in NATO.
Putin considers the Atlantic Alliance’s advance up to the Russian borders a threatening expansion of the American sphere of influence, whereby Washington is trying to cash in on the geopolitical gains that came out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He is not entirely wrong: during a future conflict Moscow will be at a disadvantage. For the West, it is an important precautionary measure, just in case—that’s the way it is.
It is, therefore, politically and psychologically essential that this expansion not be accompanied by needless arms rattling—thus, no redundant missile shield on the basis of a transparent anti-Iran argument. This awakens the historically understandable distrust in the Kremlin, regardless of the official defensive objectives.
And Bush’s starting point will have a price: reciprocity. Other governments are also free to choose their allies—from Castro and Chavez to Palestine and Iran. Bush has great difficulty with this, and that undermines his credibility abroad.
Each country has the right to choose its own allies. That was the correct starting point by President Bush at the last NATO summit. But Bush has, during recent years, by his own unilateral boorishness firmly contributed towards making it very problematic for the Ukraine and Georgia to stringently adhere to this starting point.
From that perspective it was inevitable, in order not to unduly tax the relationship with Russia, that the two countries fobbed off with a vague declaration of principles. It was easy for NATO to move on past this issue because the people of Ukraine are deeply divided over accession to NATO, and Georgia has to struggle with two separatist regions.
In that separatist movement, one can also suspect Moscow’s hand. But that does not alter the fact that NATO, through its hasty expansion into the Caucasus, is becoming entangled in a regional conflict and finds itself facing Russia directly. It is evident that Georgia, precisely for this reason, is looking for protection in Brussels, and by stepping in militarily in Afghanistan is hoping to eventually buy membership in NATO.
Putin considers the Atlantic Alliance’s advance up to the Russian borders a threatening expansion of the American sphere of influence, whereby Washington is trying to cash in on the geopolitical gains that came out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He is not entirely wrong: during a future conflict Moscow will be at a disadvantage. For the West, it is an important precautionary measure, just in case—that’s the way it is.
It is, therefore, politically and psychologically essential that this expansion not be accompanied by needless arms rattling—thus, no redundant missile shield on the basis of a transparent anti-Iran argument. This awakens the historically understandable distrust in the Kremlin, regardless of the official defensive objectives.
And Bush’s starting point will have a price: reciprocity. Other governments are also free to choose their allies—from Castro and Chavez to Palestine and Iran. Bush has great difficulty with this, and that undermines his credibility abroad.