The Carrot and Stick Between Washington and Tehran
Published in Alquds Alarabi
(U.K.) on 10 December 2008
by Mohammed Krishan (link to original)
(U.K.) on 10 December 2008
by Mohammed Krishan (link to original)
Translated from
by Namir Shabibi.
Edited by Jessica Tesoriero.
“We are ready to talk directly (to the Iranians) and give them a clear choice in which they must decide whether they want the situation to be easy or difficult.” Let us analyse this sentence recently uttered by President-elect Barack Obama, discussing the future of relations between Washington and Tehran.
Replace ‘Iranians’ with ‘Americans,’ and imagine that the person who issued this statement was the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamena’i, or President Ahmedinejad. By doing this we find that the meaning becomes more accurate, since the politics of carrot and stick, with which Obama is threatening Iran, is in fact that practised by Iran towards the U.S., and not the opposite.
If Washington’s stick against Iran is still at the level of threat and signals, like its carrot, then Iran’s stick against Washington has been used on the ground and so too has its carrot. This has happened on the plains of Afghanistan and has manifested itself to the greatest degree in Iraq.
Even if we add that both sides are signalling to one another the way in which they will deploy the carrot or stick, Washington appears to be in a more difficult position to continue playing this game. In simple terms, this is because the United States has already begun to chew on the Iranian carrot in Iraq, tasting its sweetness particularly after the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which encountered little resistance from Iran’s allies in Iraq. In fact, Iran’s allies sold the agreement, which Iran could well have considered a treacherous mandate, as one of gradual withdrawal that serves the higher interests of the nation.
When the stick was laid aside in Iraq, it was raised gradually in Afghanistan with the addition of an increase in military attacks against Western coalition forces. Candidly admitted by its leaders, this was only after Iran had dangled the carrot before the United States and its allies by helping to bring down the Taliban in 2001 and assisting with the installation of Hamid Karzai to power. The same can be said for Tehran’s turning a blind eye, or perhaps even encouraging, the U.S.’ toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government and filling the echelons of power with its friends. In brief and simple terms, one can now say that Tehran relied at first on the carrot in dealing with Washington in the Iraqi and Afghani situations. Following that, two different pictures have emerged; In Iraq, the carrot was followed by the stick and then the carrot again, and in Afghanistan, the carrot (was offered and) then the stick.
The interesting part of these careful games is that Iran, which is clearly doing better in balancing this affair, is able to change from the carrot to the stick and vice-versa in both countries, as it deems fit. We should not discount the possibility of the stick turning into a carrot in Afghanistan and vice-versa in Iraq, in as much as Iran is able to weave a relationship between use of the carrot and stick in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, the carrot can be used with the stick or the stick with the carrot in both countries at the same time. This fine weave has rendered each country susceptible to influence with a stick or carrot, thus paining Washington on the one hand, while throwing it a line with the other.
It is not inconceivable that the United States today, with or without Obama, might be in control of this game of carrot and stick, but clearly the opposite is the case. This point becomes more obvious when we add two more pieces to Iran’s arsenal: Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, whose goals are harmonious not under any logic or reason, nor under some triangular coordination between them and Tehran, but rather under the harmony of those that labour under their own self-declared identification as ‘oppositon forces.’ Thus, Iran is becoming increasingly powerful because it is able to employ both the stick and the carrot, with both Israel and its number one ally, America.
The conclusion here, as one can assume from the current order of things, is that Washington’s stick needs to be denser, and its carrot thicker; yet its entanglement in both Iraq and Afghanistan are a source of both its strength and weakness in the region. Furthermore, Israel’s location in the crosshairs of a potential military strike, whether specific or limited, compels Obama to open the way to direct dialogue to develop understanding and coordination, thus compelling a division of duties between all of the U.S., Iran and Israel. This, it seems, is the most suitable and least costly of all the options available, which leaves only the role of watcher for the remaining players in the region. The alternative is the sticks of both powers falling on heads of all in the region.
Replace ‘Iranians’ with ‘Americans,’ and imagine that the person who issued this statement was the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamena’i, or President Ahmedinejad. By doing this we find that the meaning becomes more accurate, since the politics of carrot and stick, with which Obama is threatening Iran, is in fact that practised by Iran towards the U.S., and not the opposite.
If Washington’s stick against Iran is still at the level of threat and signals, like its carrot, then Iran’s stick against Washington has been used on the ground and so too has its carrot. This has happened on the plains of Afghanistan and has manifested itself to the greatest degree in Iraq.
Even if we add that both sides are signalling to one another the way in which they will deploy the carrot or stick, Washington appears to be in a more difficult position to continue playing this game. In simple terms, this is because the United States has already begun to chew on the Iranian carrot in Iraq, tasting its sweetness particularly after the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which encountered little resistance from Iran’s allies in Iraq. In fact, Iran’s allies sold the agreement, which Iran could well have considered a treacherous mandate, as one of gradual withdrawal that serves the higher interests of the nation.
When the stick was laid aside in Iraq, it was raised gradually in Afghanistan with the addition of an increase in military attacks against Western coalition forces. Candidly admitted by its leaders, this was only after Iran had dangled the carrot before the United States and its allies by helping to bring down the Taliban in 2001 and assisting with the installation of Hamid Karzai to power. The same can be said for Tehran’s turning a blind eye, or perhaps even encouraging, the U.S.’ toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government and filling the echelons of power with its friends. In brief and simple terms, one can now say that Tehran relied at first on the carrot in dealing with Washington in the Iraqi and Afghani situations. Following that, two different pictures have emerged; In Iraq, the carrot was followed by the stick and then the carrot again, and in Afghanistan, the carrot (was offered and) then the stick.
The interesting part of these careful games is that Iran, which is clearly doing better in balancing this affair, is able to change from the carrot to the stick and vice-versa in both countries, as it deems fit. We should not discount the possibility of the stick turning into a carrot in Afghanistan and vice-versa in Iraq, in as much as Iran is able to weave a relationship between use of the carrot and stick in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, the carrot can be used with the stick or the stick with the carrot in both countries at the same time. This fine weave has rendered each country susceptible to influence with a stick or carrot, thus paining Washington on the one hand, while throwing it a line with the other.
It is not inconceivable that the United States today, with or without Obama, might be in control of this game of carrot and stick, but clearly the opposite is the case. This point becomes more obvious when we add two more pieces to Iran’s arsenal: Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, whose goals are harmonious not under any logic or reason, nor under some triangular coordination between them and Tehran, but rather under the harmony of those that labour under their own self-declared identification as ‘oppositon forces.’ Thus, Iran is becoming increasingly powerful because it is able to employ both the stick and the carrot, with both Israel and its number one ally, America.
The conclusion here, as one can assume from the current order of things, is that Washington’s stick needs to be denser, and its carrot thicker; yet its entanglement in both Iraq and Afghanistan are a source of both its strength and weakness in the region. Furthermore, Israel’s location in the crosshairs of a potential military strike, whether specific or limited, compels Obama to open the way to direct dialogue to develop understanding and coordination, thus compelling a division of duties between all of the U.S., Iran and Israel. This, it seems, is the most suitable and least costly of all the options available, which leaves only the role of watcher for the remaining players in the region. The alternative is the sticks of both powers falling on heads of all in the region.