American Intentions toward Iraq

When it was necessary and justified, it must be said that the U.S. was prepared to do something.

Even before the attack on the economic and political capitals (New York and Washington) of America on Sept. 11, 2001, it was for Iraq’s oil, more than anything else in the Middle East, that the Americans attempted to justify their invasion, which aimed to stave off the end of the American era through gaining control of a large and rich region.

A report from that time, cited as an important boost to President George W. Bush in 2001 (before the events of Sept. 11), issued a warning. “We are at the dawn of the 21st century,” it notes, “and the oil sector is on the verge of a crisis which could break loose at any moment. The world is now close to consuming all the oil available at current production capacity.”*

The report warned Bush that the state of the global oil market would create ideal conditions for the most serious oil supply crisis the world had seen in the last 30 years. U.S. oil consumption in 2001 was at its highest level to date (19.7 million barrels per day), and imports made up 53 percent of all oil consumed. Dependence on oil from the Gulf states had increased to 14.1 percent of the total U.S. supply, domestically and abroad. It was essential “not to exacerbate political divisions that might impede the development of new oil fields in the Gulf states, and that the State Department and National Security Council develop a strategy to open up important countries in the region to investment.”*

Oil investment was vital for America, in spite of all the objections coming out of some of the oil states. Large corporations pointed to an alternative, namely, “energy security” (as if the most important thing was not oil supply, but rather the invasion of Iraq).

These oft-repeated words only confirmed Iraq’s centrality in the oil issue and were serious cause for concern for most oil nations. U.S. newspapers explicitly stated that the Bush administration had decided to use the tremendous U.S. military might in establishing an “oil reserve” in the Middle East. This would allow Western oil companies access to the oil fields. Moreover, they said that the Bush administration made the decision after presenting it to displaced and exiled Iraqis, who responded, “America can take our oil if it can return us to our country.”*

Big oil companies and American think tanks, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, called directly for war. Their advice coincided with Bush’s own plans, lying in the bottom of his desk drawers.

To those who claimed it was a war on terrorism, we respond that it was, first and foremost, about oil and U.S. strategic interests, filed away in drawers and finally unsealed and implemented in a timely manner. It could be argued that fighting terrorism, as the U.S. marketed the war, was a pretext; in fact, it has been instrumental in the preparation for war. Terrorism was the spark, but the target was Arab-Islamic wealth, from Morocco and Mauritania in the west to Indonesia and Malaysia in the east.

Over the years, Iraqi resistance and what happened, and is happening, in Afghanistan is overwhelming proof of deficient planning to the point of naïveté. The impact of what happened to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is extremely detrimental. Many soldiers now suffer from mental illnesses, which has led to many of their deaths. Observers have expressed great concern about how far this matter has gone among the ranks of U.S. troops, and how up to 200,000 troops are now affected.

Here’s a question: why has a large segment of U.S. troops become vulnerable and depressed? The reason for this is that the hyper-vigilance of U.S. forces requires the U.S. military to replace troops exhausted by Iraq and Afghanistan.

The realities of the U.S. troops ought to have been lined up with facts on the ground. Even then, informed opinion held that the the policy in effect was obsolete. The warnings repeated by U.S. military officers and civilian defense specialists alike confirmed that the strain of Iraqi and Afghanistan operations had greatly exhausted the U.S. military.

It was natural for the U.S. to quickly search for a leader who would save them from the impending decline. Thus Barack Obama was elected, who was described as the son of the crisis — the crisis of the end of the American era.

The pressing question is: What has President Obama done so far? Is it really possible to save waning American prestige?

The reality is that Obama wasn’t able (up to now, at least) to meet the expectations the American people set before him during his term. Evidence confirms that American decline is due to policy that relies on “strength first and foremost,”* despite the nature of the military and political targets pursued by current U.S. military strategy. Perhaps analysts’ concerns could turn U.S. military interests from the Middle East and Iran and instead, in the near future, toward the deterrence of China’s military power.

Quite possibly, the U.S. can bet that (unlike the policy that prevailed during George W. Bush’s reign) it can maintain its influence in the world through the channels of non-military power. In other words, the U.S. might move away from the logic of power and arrogance and toward soft forms of power, or perhaps even to diplomacy, in order to cover up its spectacular failure.

*Translator's Note: This quote, while translated accurately, could not be verified.