The Weak One Always Pays
Published in Vzglyad
(Russia) on 9 April 2013
by Alexander Dugin (link to original)
(Russia) on 9 April 2013
by Alexander Dugin (link to original)
Translated from
by Tavus Kuliyeva.
Edited by Kyrstie Lane.
The events surrounding North Korea demonstrate the gravity of the West's intentions: To transform the entirety of the globe into a zone that it more or less controls; a zone with a common political system and global economic organization; a zone essentially without fully sovereign countries and societies that have the luxury to determine their own policy and political order. Essentially, this is a forced reduction of all the countries of the world into one single system, drafted by the West.
North Korea is a socialist state. North Korea is a closed and self-sufficient state. According to the West, that is exactly why it is guilty. The crime North Korea is accused of is that it wants to govern itself and build the order of its own society in the way that it prefers, which is drastically different from that of the West. This goes against the notion of globalization, the one world, and it stands in the way of creating a world government, a new world order. Accordingly, the West has been considering for some time how to put an end to this situation: how to destroy the North Korean bastion of freedom, its independence from the West and its own path.
Why did they procrastinate for such a long time in dealing with North Korea? In a different scenario, everything would have been decided a long time ago — with intervention, internal subversion and occupation, but North Korea lacks any substantial amount of oil or other natural resources that directly constitute the vital interests of the West. That is, the geographic location of the country saves it from the expansion and intervention that otherwise may have happened earlier.
On the other hand, any tensions in this region test the geopolitical balance of power in the Pacific and Far East. More than just North Korea will be engaged in this conflict with the West: South Korea — which is in fact a puppet of the West — and Japan — a great country that, after World War II, lost its freedom and independence — but also China. China is the issue.
Russia, being in the condition that it is today, is hardly ready to declare a position in the conflict. That is quite unfortunate, because it would be beneficial for Russia to support North Korea by saying: “In showing support for North Korea, we are supporting the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.”
If we are truly faithful to the principle of sovereignty, and if we oppose the unipolar world and we do not want a world government that will institute transnational law — something the West is moving toward — then we must endorse all those who are an exception in this concert of pro-American countries. Russia, however, does not currently have self-confidence in the Far East, yet it understands well enough what to do in Siberia. Relations with China, even though they are not bad and they represent a strategic partnership, have not yet brought about a coherent model for both parties. There is something that brings us together and also something that fundamentally divides us.
In this situation, now is the time for Americans to test the real state of affairs with a small war. Perhaps this is why, through various network technologies, they are teasing North Korea, striking her politically, diplomatically, militarily and strategically while maneuvering geographically, relocating armed forces, supporting South Korean military forces and therefore provoking North Korea to tough actions.
North Korea needs to demonstrate some sort of consolidating power in its domestic policy. I do not think North Korea is moving voluntarily toward escalation, but is doing so because it has no choice. Now much will depend on China and, ultimately, on Russia.
Certainly, as we consider this situation, we think: “Thank God it does not affect us.” Here, unlike in Syria, our interests are not affected directly; we have good relations with North Korea. However, I do not think there is much sympathy in the Kremlin for the North Korean regime.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that such escalation must qualitatively and substantially affect us. If Russia and China firmly say today, on this stage: “Keep your hands off North Korea,” and lay out military and strategic arguments for why a “hands-off” approach is needed, and if North Korea would conduct itself more or less adequately — which, in fact, is not guaranteed — then we might demonstrate a very important step of our Pacific strategy. For now, it is only on the level of economic partnership. But it would be appropriate to say that we are a great Pacific power. We have our own resources and a determination to influence the situation on our borders, in the zone of our attention.
It seems to me that the escalation is advantageous to us now. Even if we lose something, if North Korea goes to war — and it cannot win, unless one of the big neighbors gets involved — we should not get drawn in. But for the West it would be a Pyrrhic victory, because North Korea would hardly be integrated into South Korea without resistance, and, yet again, Americans would act as an aggressive interventionist force.
If we could get involved in the process in concert with China, sit at the table and say: “We demand that you get your American destroyers out of the Pacific region,” and if we were active and aggressive, it would be valued by the entire world and appreciated by the Americans.
Americans do not see Russia as a decent sparring partner, as they see China. But if we concede the palm of supremacy to China, which will deal with the Americans one-on-one in this conflict, and if China has its own way — which is quite possible in certain aspects — then our own position in dealing with China would be weakened.
Do you know how poignantly the Chinese reacted to our position after the events of 9/11? When we let the Americans into Central Asia, they said: “You Russians are not even capable of controlling your own region.”
Whether it is our weakness or our detachment, such serious and long-term partners as China perceive it as our defect. We are paying for it, perhaps not directly, but indirectly we will surely pay, because the weak always pay. As the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said, there is always an army in every nation: either its own or someone else’s. This is just the same — there are no empty spots. Korea either will be American or will not be American — meaning it will be ours. It will either be unipolar or multipolar, but multipolar means it is also ours.
Accordingly, understanding the fundamental map, the fundamental scheme of the great game that we are playing and that we cannot cease to play, we must take the vanguard position in Korea. Right now, we pretend to evacuate or not evacuate embassies as if it does not concern us. This is unattractive in a great empire. It is necessary to intervene in Korea by saying: “No, Korea is ours, do not touch North Korea.” We may dislike what is happening there and it may not truly be ours, but it is in exactly these situations that courage is shown — perhaps not to the Koreans, and not even to the Americans, but to the Chinese. We must claim North Korea as our protectorate in this political moment, as czarist Russia often used to do.
It must be understood that an attack on North Korea is not an attack on a small proud power that does not want to play according to the global rules of the world government. It is actually an attack on us. And even if we lose, we will say: “Oh, you struck us, hold on, guys, we will find a way to repay you.” In global politics, such symbolic steps are of great significance.
Today North Korea is fighting against the absolute evil, against American hegemony, against a unipolar world, against globalism and world government. It is our moral duty to support North Korea. And if this moral duty is manifested in symbolic diplomatic démarches — as well as those of the military-strategic sort — it will produce important, specific, practical, tangible results. If we seriously want to build a multipolar world, we must support North Korea until the end.
North Korea is a socialist state. North Korea is a closed and self-sufficient state. According to the West, that is exactly why it is guilty. The crime North Korea is accused of is that it wants to govern itself and build the order of its own society in the way that it prefers, which is drastically different from that of the West. This goes against the notion of globalization, the one world, and it stands in the way of creating a world government, a new world order. Accordingly, the West has been considering for some time how to put an end to this situation: how to destroy the North Korean bastion of freedom, its independence from the West and its own path.
Why did they procrastinate for such a long time in dealing with North Korea? In a different scenario, everything would have been decided a long time ago — with intervention, internal subversion and occupation, but North Korea lacks any substantial amount of oil or other natural resources that directly constitute the vital interests of the West. That is, the geographic location of the country saves it from the expansion and intervention that otherwise may have happened earlier.
On the other hand, any tensions in this region test the geopolitical balance of power in the Pacific and Far East. More than just North Korea will be engaged in this conflict with the West: South Korea — which is in fact a puppet of the West — and Japan — a great country that, after World War II, lost its freedom and independence — but also China. China is the issue.
Russia, being in the condition that it is today, is hardly ready to declare a position in the conflict. That is quite unfortunate, because it would be beneficial for Russia to support North Korea by saying: “In showing support for North Korea, we are supporting the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.”
If we are truly faithful to the principle of sovereignty, and if we oppose the unipolar world and we do not want a world government that will institute transnational law — something the West is moving toward — then we must endorse all those who are an exception in this concert of pro-American countries. Russia, however, does not currently have self-confidence in the Far East, yet it understands well enough what to do in Siberia. Relations with China, even though they are not bad and they represent a strategic partnership, have not yet brought about a coherent model for both parties. There is something that brings us together and also something that fundamentally divides us.
In this situation, now is the time for Americans to test the real state of affairs with a small war. Perhaps this is why, through various network technologies, they are teasing North Korea, striking her politically, diplomatically, militarily and strategically while maneuvering geographically, relocating armed forces, supporting South Korean military forces and therefore provoking North Korea to tough actions.
North Korea needs to demonstrate some sort of consolidating power in its domestic policy. I do not think North Korea is moving voluntarily toward escalation, but is doing so because it has no choice. Now much will depend on China and, ultimately, on Russia.
Certainly, as we consider this situation, we think: “Thank God it does not affect us.” Here, unlike in Syria, our interests are not affected directly; we have good relations with North Korea. However, I do not think there is much sympathy in the Kremlin for the North Korean regime.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that such escalation must qualitatively and substantially affect us. If Russia and China firmly say today, on this stage: “Keep your hands off North Korea,” and lay out military and strategic arguments for why a “hands-off” approach is needed, and if North Korea would conduct itself more or less adequately — which, in fact, is not guaranteed — then we might demonstrate a very important step of our Pacific strategy. For now, it is only on the level of economic partnership. But it would be appropriate to say that we are a great Pacific power. We have our own resources and a determination to influence the situation on our borders, in the zone of our attention.
It seems to me that the escalation is advantageous to us now. Even if we lose something, if North Korea goes to war — and it cannot win, unless one of the big neighbors gets involved — we should not get drawn in. But for the West it would be a Pyrrhic victory, because North Korea would hardly be integrated into South Korea without resistance, and, yet again, Americans would act as an aggressive interventionist force.
If we could get involved in the process in concert with China, sit at the table and say: “We demand that you get your American destroyers out of the Pacific region,” and if we were active and aggressive, it would be valued by the entire world and appreciated by the Americans.
Americans do not see Russia as a decent sparring partner, as they see China. But if we concede the palm of supremacy to China, which will deal with the Americans one-on-one in this conflict, and if China has its own way — which is quite possible in certain aspects — then our own position in dealing with China would be weakened.
Do you know how poignantly the Chinese reacted to our position after the events of 9/11? When we let the Americans into Central Asia, they said: “You Russians are not even capable of controlling your own region.”
Whether it is our weakness or our detachment, such serious and long-term partners as China perceive it as our defect. We are paying for it, perhaps not directly, but indirectly we will surely pay, because the weak always pay. As the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said, there is always an army in every nation: either its own or someone else’s. This is just the same — there are no empty spots. Korea either will be American or will not be American — meaning it will be ours. It will either be unipolar or multipolar, but multipolar means it is also ours.
Accordingly, understanding the fundamental map, the fundamental scheme of the great game that we are playing and that we cannot cease to play, we must take the vanguard position in Korea. Right now, we pretend to evacuate or not evacuate embassies as if it does not concern us. This is unattractive in a great empire. It is necessary to intervene in Korea by saying: “No, Korea is ours, do not touch North Korea.” We may dislike what is happening there and it may not truly be ours, but it is in exactly these situations that courage is shown — perhaps not to the Koreans, and not even to the Americans, but to the Chinese. We must claim North Korea as our protectorate in this political moment, as czarist Russia often used to do.
It must be understood that an attack on North Korea is not an attack on a small proud power that does not want to play according to the global rules of the world government. It is actually an attack on us. And even if we lose, we will say: “Oh, you struck us, hold on, guys, we will find a way to repay you.” In global politics, such symbolic steps are of great significance.
Today North Korea is fighting against the absolute evil, against American hegemony, against a unipolar world, against globalism and world government. It is our moral duty to support North Korea. And if this moral duty is manifested in symbolic diplomatic démarches — as well as those of the military-strategic sort — it will produce important, specific, practical, tangible results. If we seriously want to build a multipolar world, we must support North Korea until the end.
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