Chinese-US Diplomatic Complications

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 28 February 2014
by Zhang Jingwei (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Renee Loeffler. Edited by Tess Chadwick.
President Obama has met with the exiled Dalai Lama three times in the last four years. Of the western powers, only the U.S. president dares to ignore political concerns with China and repeatedly test diplomatic tension with China. For former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron, the diplomatic difficulties that arise from meeting with the Dalai Lama are difficult to withstand. Europe's "three musketeers" want to undertake the long and difficult diplomacy required to repair their relationships with China as diplomatic actions during Cameron's 2013 visit to China demonstrate.

The source of Obama's spine and courage to meet with the Dalai Lama for the third time comes from the strategic strength of the U.S. as the top power in the world. The U.S. does not think meeting with the Dalai Lama will cripple Chinese-U.S. foreign relations because China can only retaliate by condemning actions through protest. Obama meets with the Dalai Lama to prove the status of the U.S. as a sole superpower. Nevertheless, when Obama meets with the Dalai Lama, it is done discretely — some might even say covertly; the meeting places are not clearly specified, and what is discussed is not clear — with information leaked deliberately to nongovernment websites. Publicly, the U.S. emphasizes the recognition of Tibet as a part of China and does not support the "Free Tibet" movement. During their most recent meeting, Obama and the Dalai Lama lightly talked about religion and culture.

Of course, it is all not that simple. In the continued fast pace of Chinese diplomacy, China's solemn stance on Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama is highlighted. Chinese-U.S. foreign relations begin the spring of 2014 with this disagreement, but this of course will not shake the foundations of the relationship between the two major powers on a larger scale. However, it highlights differences of opinion that are hard to get around for both parties.

The U.S. is returning to the geopolitical strategy of rebalancing in Asia, resulting in two unique tactics used in the political games between the U.S. and China. For starters, the actions by the U.S. are equal to dropping two deep-water bombs in the East and South China Seas, having inspired Japan and the Philippines to confront China over the sovereignty of disputed islands, thereby putting China in the difficult situation of having conflicts with neighboring countries. Furthermore, the U.S. is strengthening leadership power and arbitration in the western Pacific. Lastly, the U.S. has again stopped aiming for pacified consequences of its actions in Asia. Japan has isolated itself in Northeast Asia with its attitude regarding history and sex crimes during the war. With the deterioration of Chinese-Japanese relations, the U.S. fears getting involved in this new "Pacific war."

In the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. remains the leader, serving as arbiter in Chinese-Japanese foreign relations. However, looking at 2013 diplomatic relations, the U.S. was rather awkward, as Obama was dealing with internal conflicts in governmental politics, and at the same time was dealing with the PRISM incident. In matters such as civil unrest in Egypt, the U.S. is helpless, and Putin upstaged Obama regarding the mess in Syria; there was also drama in European and the BRIC countries' diplomacy. In contrast, with the new Chinese leader, Chinese foreign relations became more open — including, of course, the meeting of the Chinese and U.S. leaders at Sunnylands last summer.

The strategic force of the U.S. still reigns superior, but its diplomatic influence is relatively lower. The U.S. can only depend on low-key confrontation with China to demonstrate the existence of U.S. strategic power since Obama is obviously using the Dalai Lama as a diplomatic pawn. Moreover, under current circumstances, the U.S. can only start from the traditional structured "3T" (trade, Taiwan and Tibet) strategy to take action. The trouble is that this "T" structure has continuously been used for trade between China and the United States. There is a trade deficit because of the yuan exchange rate, which has led to a trade war between the U.S. and China, and the more the trade war goes on, the closer foreign relations between the two countries become. Even while going through the global economic crisis in 2013, China grew to be second only to the U.S. in trade power. As for the "T" for Taiwan, not only is the U.S. uncooperative, but relations between Taiwan and the mainland also continue to improve, so that the U.S. can no longer use traditional weapon sales as leverage for change. This only leaves the Tibet "T" — the exiled Dalai Lama still having a certain amount of value. However, the end of the road for the Dalai Lama is near, and now, only the superficial layer of religion and culture is of use to the United States.

Talk between Obama and the Dalai Lama about religion and culture can be considered a real fact. Nevertheless, the political and diplomatic significance of Obama meeting with the Dalai Lama cannot be shaken — only the U.S. can repeatedly challenge China at its core, demonstrating U.S. global supremacy.

Of course, besides using the "3T" strategy to provoke China, Obama also has other goals. Before the upcoming visit to Japan, he wants to comfort the Japanese by letting them feel the U.S. checks and balances of power with China.

[Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe's visit to the [Yasukuni] "war heroes" shrine caused the U.S. great disappointment. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to China confirmed a new era of diplomacy between China and America. His evaluation of Chinese-U.S. relations is very "constructive"* and "positive,"* and he expressed a desire to "set an example for this major-power relationship." This diplomacy makes Japan look bad, and Japanese officials have said they are "disappointed" in the United States.
Obama's recent meeting with the Dalai Lama was aimed at creating the impression of a structural contradiction between Chinese and U.S. politics. With the conflict between China and Japan, this is comforting to Japan. It is also part of the U.S. strategy to make itself the rebalancing power in Asia, proving its position as a facilitator and arbitrator.

It is also worth mentioning that Obama met with the Dalai Lama to anger the Chinese in order to cast a shadow over Chinese-U.S. relations, but this will not shake the foundation of new power relationships between China and the United States. The two countries quarrel without breaking apart because a structure for mutual benefit has already been established. Kerry, during his visit to China, declared, "The world is always waiting to see whether China and the United States can find the common ground despite some differences." Whether it's the Dalai Lama or "3T" structure bringing about conflict, China and the U.S. both have the wisdom to work together to resolve differences.

*Editor’s note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.


张敬伟:中美关系的“3T”困扰2014-02-28 09:47
环球网   
新加坡《联合早报》2月28日文章

奥巴马再次会见窜访美国的达赖喇嘛,算来是四年三次了。西方大国,也只有美国总统敢如此漠视中国的政治关切,而一再碰触中国的外交高压线。从法国前总统萨科齐到德国总理默克尔,还有现任英国首相卡梅伦,会见达赖承受的对华外交成本都是难以承受的。欧洲“三剑客”无不要做出艰难而漫长的外交公关才能修复对华关系,卡梅伦2013年的访华外交公关足以说明一切。

  奥巴马三会达赖的底气和勇气源自于美国强大的战略力量,作为世界上唯一的超级大国。美国以为会见达赖不会导致中美关系的颠覆,中国也只能是抗议谴责而已。就此而言,奥巴马会见达赖,存有证明美国唯一超级大国地位的意涵。尽管如此,奥巴马会见达赖秉承着一贯的低调立场:会见场所低规格(地图室)、会见消息隐秘(刻意隐藏,会见消息发在非政府网站),可谓偷偷摸摸。公开场合则强调承认西藏是中国一部分,不支持“西藏独立”。甚至,美国将这次会见轻描淡写地视为谈谈宗教、聊聊文化。

  当然没有那么简单,中国政府迅捷连续的外交行动,凸显中国对奥巴马会见达赖的严正立场。中美关系在2014年开春的这场龃龉,当然不会动摇中美新型大国关系的基础,但也彰显中美两强难以消解的结构性矛盾。

  美国重返亚洲和亚洲再平衡的地缘战略,造成了中美两强别具一格的博弈棋局。首先,美国此举等于在东海和南中国海扔下了两枚深水炸弹,激发了日本和菲律宾以岛屿主权对抗中国的斗志,中国陷入和邻国矛盾的困局中;其次,美国在西太平洋的领导力和仲裁力加强;其三,美国也收获了重发亚洲战略不平衡的副作用,日本走得太远,在历史和慰安妇问题上的倒行逆施,使其在东北亚变得孤立。中日关系的恶化,也使美国担忧被牵涉入新的“太平洋战争”中。

  在亚太区域,美国依然是盟主,在中日关系上充当着仲裁者的角色。但是考量2013年的外交,美国相当尴尬,奥巴马被内政恶斗所缠绕,同时陷入“棱镜门”事件中。埃及内乱,美国无能为力;叙利亚乱局,奥巴马又被普京抢了风头,相比之下,中国外交大开大合,新一届中国领导人,和欧洲和金砖国家外交大戏一场接着一场,当然也包括中美两国元首“庄园会”。

  美国战略力量虽依然一超独强,但是美国外交的影响力在相对降低。美国只能靠和中国低烈度的对抗来彰显本国的战略力量存在,达赖显然成为奥巴马的一颗外交棋子。而且,在现实的情境下,美国也只能从传统的、结构性的“3T”(贸易Trade、台湾Taiwan、西藏Tibet)入手。困扰的是,中美贸易这个“T”一直在用,而且从人民币汇率到美国对华贸易逆差,再到对华各种贸易战,中美之间越战越联系密切。即使经过全球经济危机,中国在2013年还是成长为仅次于美国的货物贸易大国。台湾这个“T”,美国用起来亦不顺手,两岸关系的持续好转,让美国无法再用传统的售武杠杆来撬动变异。唯有西藏这个“T”,流亡在外的达赖喇嘛还有一定的利用价值。但行将末路的达赖喇嘛,也只能披着华而不实的宗教和文化外衣,为美国所用。

  奥巴马和达赖喇嘛谈谈宗教、聊聊文化,也算是现实上的事实。尽管如此,奥巴马会见达赖,却脱不了政治外交上的行政意涵——只有美国才能屡次挑战中国核心底线,以证明美国的全球老大地位。

  当然,以“3T”武器直接刺激中国外,奥巴马还有其他目的。即在即将访日之前,让日本感受到美国制衡中国的力量,以安慰日本。

  因为安倍“拜鬼”,美国表示失望;国务卿克里访华,更确认了中美新型大国关系。他对中美关系的评价是非常“有建设性”、“积极”,中美要为“大国关系树立榜样”。这让日本难堪,日本官员反称对美国“失望”。奥巴马访日前会见达赖,旨在制造中美结构性矛盾难解的印象。带着中美冲突去访日,对日本是安慰,也是在落实美国的亚洲再平衡战略,更在证明美国在中日间协调者和仲裁者的角色定位。

  值得一提的是,奥巴马会见达赖让中国愤怒,也使中美关系蒙上阴影,但这并不会动摇中美新型大国关系的根基。中美吵而不破,互利共赢的架构,已经确立起来,何况,克里访华时已经宣示:“我认为全世界都在等着看中美如何求同存异。”对于中美因为达赖或者“3T”带来的“异”,中美两强有智慧去化解。(作者是中国察哈尔学会研究员)
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