Great Power Relationship vs. Rebalance: The 'New Model of Great Power Relations' Trap

At the U.S.-China summit held in The Hague suburbs, two people discussed the “new model of great power relations.” I have been told by a Sankei reporter that, as first lady Michelle Obama was warmly welcomed during her visit to China, the meeting began with unusually sticky air. The first lady’s prior invitation was, in all likelihood, a production meant to spread this political slogan at home and abroad.

First, China’s President Xi Jinping broke the ice, saying, “I have received and carefully read your recent letter to me, Mr. President. In the letter you said that you remain committed to building the new model of major country relations with China .… I appreciate these statements.” In fact, though the letters and new model of great power relations were mentioned in China’s presentation, the United States glossed over the subject.

Deputy Aide Rose, who attended a press conference after the summit, did not mention the “new model of major country relations” at all. In the United States, the president has been criticized for going along with China’s slogan, so the administration likely does not reference things disadvantageous to it.

When I ordered a memo from U.S. journalists who had pooled coverage at the beginning of the summit, it was reported that the president stated, “President Xi and I are both committed to continuing to strengthen and build a new model of relations between our countries.” President Obama did not mention the letters in particular, but responded by subtly changing his wording to the “new model of relations.”

It is quite incomprehensible for an existing power that is losing its position to accept, without definition, a concept employed by a rising power hot on their heels. If one raises the concept of China’s so-called “new model of great power relations,” is it not the “rebalance” touted by the Obama administration?

The Core Interests under the Mask

When Mr. Xi Jinping visited the United States as China’s vice president in February 2012, the so-called “new model of great power relations” political slogan lay at the core of his policy toward the U.S. Subsequently, Chinese officials have repeatedly stressed this slogan, seeking U.S. agreement. At the press conference following the U.S.-China summit held in California last June, President Xi purposefully had a Chinese reporter ask about the new model of relations and bring to light the two leaders’ “important consensus.”

Senior Fellow Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American Security, speaking of China’s intent, explained that the new model concept is viewed by China as “a framework for acknowledging China’s newfound status and respecting its core interests.” “Core interests” refers to that which China will not hesitate to use force in order to acquire. In addition to Tibet and Taiwan, in recent years China has claimed areas from almost the entire South China Sea to our Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

However, Ratner says that the United States considers this concept only as “a way to manage competition and encourage China to cooperate on critical geopolitical issues.” From the standpoint of its allies, including Japan, the United States accepting a concept that suggests a U.S.-China G-2 looks like nothing more than the relegation of other countries in the region to supporting roles.

Behind Mr. Ratner’s words, I think there is an underlying idea that “the United States prioritizes the G-2 relationship above all else, so there is no point in relying on the U.S. from this point on,” and that China is implicitly threatening countries in Asia. China has set a clever trap, designed to induce the United States to be easily ensnared.

Altering the Status Quo by Force Is a Contradiction

In an address at Georgetown University last November, National Security Adviser Susan Rice stated, “When it comes to China, we seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations,” causing uneasiness among Asian countries. If the United States agrees to the framework, China will likely misinterpret it as the U.S. respecting China’s core interests, and increasingly assert itself in the South China and East China Seas. During his testimony with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, former Senator [Max] Baucus, who took office as ambassador to China, was questioned by Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Menendez about the “new model for great power relations” and had this to say:

“It is not an approach that makes sense to me. That’s not an approach which makes sense, I’m sure, to the president, though we’ve not talked specifically about this.”

I’d like to hope so. Subsequently, Mr. Baucus stated of the East China Sea air defense identification zone that China established unilaterally, “The United States does not recognize nor confirm that action. I think it is important for the United States to let China know that, so as to discourage other potential actions that China may take.”

The United States should discard the “new model of relations” political slogan that it is prone to misinterpreting and declare to China that altering the status quo of territories and territorial waters is contrary to this concept. If China continues to look out for itself without defining its ideas, it could stray in a dangerous direction because of distrust and misunderstanding.