Isolation Measures*

Political scientist Viktor Pirozhenko on the U.S. attempts to build up alliances against China in Asia.

President Joe Biden’s Asian tour has gone way beyond the scope of American-South Korean and American-Japanese bilateral relations. During the visit to South Korea and Japan, the U.S. conducted a review of its Asian allies and possible partners in keeping the People’s Republic of China in check. All the results of Biden’s tour served this specific objective in one way or another, even those results that were not directly related to the issue of U.S. opposition to China.

For China, among the more important outcomes of this visit and something China experts are paying special attention to, is a shift in the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” with regard to the military guarantees the U.S. military is providing to Taiwan, America’s intention to provide security guarantees to South Korea in view of a hypothetical nuclear threat from China, Washington’s push of an initiative to create the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and U.S. efforts to delegate specific work to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Let’s be specific. Starting with Taiwan, until now, the U.S. has pledged to support the island’s status quo and assist it with security matters, but has not specified how and to what degree. Now, Biden has suggested that the U.S. could station American troops on the island in case of a military confrontation. He practically confirmed America’s readiness to “defend Taiwan militarily.” However, in revised statements by Biden and his administration that followed, the focus shifted toward a pledge by the U.S. to “provide Taiwan with the military means to defend itself.”

The West, and especially China did not view Biden’s remarks as a slip of the tongue. Opinion among U .S. experts uniformly holds that that Biden’s words were “a very intentional statement that was meant to send a signal not only to Beijing but also to Taipei,” and that Biden’s remarks were part of a deliberate two-part strategy. The strategy consists of Biden showing strength about the main issue of Taiwanese politics and then giving his team an opportunity to restore balance in more specific detail.

China, represented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China spokesman Wang Wenbin, expressed “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to the remarks by the U.S. side.” He also warned that “China will take firm actions to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests.”

Chinese experts have also noted that the tendency of the U.S. to change its policy from “strategic ambiguity” to one of clarity has become more apparent. They contend that the U.S., in a step-by-step violation of the “One China” policy, is assessing the reaction of mainland China to U.S. anti-Chinese policy in Taiwanese matters.

At the same time, it seems that the main goal of Biden’s Asian tour was to promote America’s new regional economic initiative — the IPEF. Washington anticipates that the same framework will become a key link in the economic isolation of China. This is also clear from the list of its members that include India, the U.S. and members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, excluding China, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

At the moment, the facts demonstrate that the entire idea of creating the IPEF serves American geopolitical interests in this region, in that it is forcing local countries to side with the United States in its confrontation with Beijing. Chinese experts point out that American partners in the IPEF are selected so they can help Washington undermine China’s competitiveness. Certain countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could receive short-term economic benefits, considering their new opportunities to gain easy access to the U.S. market through the IPEF.

Consider Vietnam, for example, which can bolster its textile exports to the U.S., or Malaysia, which can replace China in the semiconductor manufacturing supply chain. But the IPEF’s main role is isolating China as the first economy of the world (if we calculate gross domestic product by purchasing power parity) and the largest trade partner of the majority of the region’s countries. This, according to Chinese experts, guarantees the organization’s ultimate demise.

During Biden’s tour, the U.S. attempted yet again to involve the Quad in keeping China in check, especially on the issue of opposing the Belt and Road Initiative. Meetings between leaders of the four countries produced a commitment to increase investment in Indo-Pacific economic infrastructure to $50 billion over the next five years.

But China raises a rhetorical question. If the U.S. truly wants to play a constructive role in the region, why doesn’t it do so through cooperative mechanisms that are already in place, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation?

China understands that Biden’s Asian visit involved the creation of a “small circle” of countries, led by the U.S., to “disintegrate the existing development-centered Asia-Pacific cooperation mechanisms” and ultimately force the region to serve the egoistic interests of the U.S.