The Three Losses of the United States

The North American vanguard in the international system emerged historically from three elements: ideas, geopolitics and leadership. Appeal to universal values and the superiority of democracy and liberty legitimized foreign action and guaranteed success. The position of power acquired in the first half of the 20th century and consolidated at the end of World War II made it possible to combat those who denied the march of history of free people. And the decisive leadership of Washington guaranteed that it would pay any price, endure any burden and conquer any adversity.

However, in recent decades these factors were fading. We only now realize it 10 years later.

In 1991, it lost its ideology. The United States declared victory over the “evil empire,” the final defeat of the Soviet enemy and the advent of the “new world order.” The Cold War was ending and with it, communism and even history. In the end, the world was converging toward democratization and liberalization. But financial crises in Asia and Latin America showed the limits of liberalization. Poverty and inequality didn’t fit in with the liberal fantasy, and the genocide in Rwanda, the disaster of Somalia and the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans shook the bien pensant Democrats.

In September 2001, as the twin towers fell, the United States began to lose its geopolitical position. This occurred through the combination of three factors. First, the excessive militarization of American foreign policy in response to the attacks. The inordinate confidence in force underscored the unipolar arrogance in which diplomacy and multilateralism were deemed to be for the weak.

The second factor was the public sector’s fiscal irresponsibility and the financial imprudence of the private sector. Economic preeminence was lost, and the nation was brought to an unsustainable fiscal deficit, an imbalance of its bank account and the devaluation of the financial system. Power through creditors is limited power — even more so when those creditors are possible strategic rivals.

The third factor is external: the rise of developing nations, with China in the lead. The balance of the global economy has changed in favor of developing nations, like Brazil, Indonesia, India and South Africa. In the world of politics, power in the system is redistributing itself, and the world is becoming more multipolar. The decade of 2001-2011 is the end of unipolarity.

Finally, it seems to be losing the final element: leadership. The United States seems to be self-destructing on all fronts: It suffocates its most noble principles under an intransigent partisan polarization, mortgages the future of its young with unsustainable debt and invites global retributions with successive armed interventions. North American leadership provides the system with a number of global public goods, from the containment of security threats to the commitment to an international free trade system. The U.S.’ withdrawal — through the decrease of its capacities or decision of its leaders — implies that it will no longer be able to sustain the system as it has done so far. At the same time, there are no candidates available or prepared to assume this role. Neither are there contenders with an alternative model.

If in 1991 the competition broke up between two superpowers, and in 2001 the attempt to impose a superpower collapsed, perhaps 2011 will teach us that the super-concentration of power is no longer possible. For many, a vacant podium is an empty podium. They fear that without the lighthouse, there will be darkness: The increase of economic competition and protectionism will bring with it a rise in the social tensions that will strengthen political factions. Coordination will then be more difficult, and cooperation will be more limited. But not everything always collapses when the center cedes. Sometimes everything collapses precisely because the center doesn’t cede. As much in psychology as in diplomacy, adjusting to new realities can help avoid the disaster of clinging to old realities that no longer exist. For Washington, it’s not about conceiving a world without the United States; rather, it’s about conceiving a new role for the United States in the world.