Ukraine and the Crisis of American Leadership
Published in Vedomosti
(Russia) on 14 January 2015
by Vasiliy Kashin (link to original)
(Russia) on 14 January 2015
by Vasiliy Kashin (link to original)
Translated from
by Jeffrey Fredrich.
Edited by Nicholas Eckart.
A little over 100 years ago, a gunshot by Serbian terrorist Gavrilo Princip and an Austrian ultimatum to Serbia led to the start of World War I. But these had little to do with the war’s real causes, among which were the Anglo-German naval rivalry, German expansionism and nationalism, France’s longing for revenge for 1870, and Russia’s desire to control the straits. Ukraine occupies a similar place in the confrontation between Russia and the West, a confrontation into which all the new players are being drawn. It is part of a larger system of conflicts and crises overtaking various regions of the planet.
The U.S. saw the events in Ukraine as an opportunity to overcome a crisis of global leadership. It became evident after the humiliating and devastating revelations by Edward Snowden, who was granted asylum in Russia, and after Russia and China were able to derail an attempt at regime change in Syria by the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies. The U.S. continues to play an exceptional role in the world, but doing so is becoming increasingly difficult. Its share of the world's gross domestic product is gradually falling and will decline in the foreseeable future against the backdrop of Asia’s rise. American military power is still unequaled, but opportunities to exercise it are in decline. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, which still give their possessor untouchability, continues. The military might of some Asian military powers, and now even of Russia, is growing rapidly. U.S. fiscal possibilities are dwindling, and its people are tired of war.
American leadership is based on factors of soft power, and especially on the status of the United States as the architect of the world economic system and arbiter of the rules of the game in world politics. But relying on its own energies, the U.S. is not physically capable of ensuring compliance with these rules on a global scale. It can play a special role in the world only as long as the majority — out of fear or genuine interest — consent to this role. Therefore, an open, and especially a coercive challenge to American leadership is extremely dangerous and cannot be left unanswered. Even one truly major defeat could spell the beginning of the end of the existing model of world order with the U.S. at its center.
In the long term, Russia was a peripheral problem for the USA. For all its international activity, behind its back, the enormous shadow of China was always visible, a China turning into a truly key factor in world politics. But in the short term, the active Russian role in a whole range of world problems, Russian projects of Eurasian integration, and attempts to acquire levers of economic influence over Europe were becoming dangerous. The U.S. probably initially considered the events surrounding Ukraine’s Euromaidan an opportunity to give Moscow a good bop on the nose, to undermine its credibility, and weaken its ability to carry out an actively anti-American political course.
The U.S. underestimated the significance of the Ukrainian events for Moscow. Given its expected geopolitical implications, the Ukrainian coup was for Moscow not a bop on the nose but a potentially fatal blow to the entire political system. For Russia’s leaders, the only option as of February 2014 that could ensure political survival was an escalation of the conflict and its conversion into a military phase. As a result of the Crimean crisis, American leadership was once again thrown into doubt, and it was not easily and effectively re-established. By spring, Barack Obama had to convince allies that the U.S. is still strong and determined enough to prevent a Crimean scenario in East Asia.
As a result, all of 2014 was dedicated to attempts by the U.S. to achieve at least the semblance of a decisive victory over Russia. This goal was accomplished in two ways: through Russia’s increasing international isolation, and through support for the new Ukrainian government in establishing control over the Donbass. Both initiatives met with failure: Even the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s actions in Crimea barely won a simple majority. U.S. influence wasn’t enough to get anything more. Not only did not a single BRICS country endorse the measures against Russia, but neither did quite a number of U.S. allies, including Israel, Singapore and South Korea. China announced its readiness to provide Russia assistance in overcoming its economic difficulties. India and NATO member Turkey concluded new strategic deals with Russia. As for the Donbass, in spite of the warnings of the West, Russia intervened in the military conflict at a critical moment and saved its loyalists.
By Vladimir Putin’s estimate, the role of geopolitical factors in the Russian economic crisis amounts to 25 percent, while by Aleksey Kudrin’s estimate up to 50 percent. But in domestic political terms, the Ukrainian crisis has strengthened the Russian leadership’s position. Obama’s statement at his year-end press conference that the USA — having isolated Russia — has reclaimed leadership in world politics is yet another indicator of just how important the emotional and ideological aspects of the conflict in Ukraine are for the USA, and how little significance the substance of what is happening has.
Russia and the U.S. had been heading toward confrontation for a long time, and the policy of each side was based on profoundly erroneous assumptions about its own intentions and capabilities and those of its opponent. Russia is paranoid about U.S. policy in Eurasia and considers post-Soviet countries the first line of defense in both military and political terms. But in reality, the significance of Europe and the post-Soviet bloc has been steadily declining in American policy, while the significance of East Asia has grown. On the other hand, the U.S. underestimated Russia’s resolve, the stability of its political system, its military and political capabilities, and the harm Moscow is able to inflict if backed into a corner. Both sides have gone so far that in the coming years, they won’t be able to put a stop to this useless and dead-end struggle. But sooner or later a collision with reality awaits both Moscow and Washington. The reality is that Russia is merely a vast, second-tier country — and won’t be any more than that — while Washington is a fading world leader forced to deal with a growing number of crises with dwindling resources. Russia and the U.S. have more important things to do than settle scores.
The U.S. saw the events in Ukraine as an opportunity to overcome a crisis of global leadership. It became evident after the humiliating and devastating revelations by Edward Snowden, who was granted asylum in Russia, and after Russia and China were able to derail an attempt at regime change in Syria by the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies. The U.S. continues to play an exceptional role in the world, but doing so is becoming increasingly difficult. Its share of the world's gross domestic product is gradually falling and will decline in the foreseeable future against the backdrop of Asia’s rise. American military power is still unequaled, but opportunities to exercise it are in decline. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, which still give their possessor untouchability, continues. The military might of some Asian military powers, and now even of Russia, is growing rapidly. U.S. fiscal possibilities are dwindling, and its people are tired of war.
American leadership is based on factors of soft power, and especially on the status of the United States as the architect of the world economic system and arbiter of the rules of the game in world politics. But relying on its own energies, the U.S. is not physically capable of ensuring compliance with these rules on a global scale. It can play a special role in the world only as long as the majority — out of fear or genuine interest — consent to this role. Therefore, an open, and especially a coercive challenge to American leadership is extremely dangerous and cannot be left unanswered. Even one truly major defeat could spell the beginning of the end of the existing model of world order with the U.S. at its center.
In the long term, Russia was a peripheral problem for the USA. For all its international activity, behind its back, the enormous shadow of China was always visible, a China turning into a truly key factor in world politics. But in the short term, the active Russian role in a whole range of world problems, Russian projects of Eurasian integration, and attempts to acquire levers of economic influence over Europe were becoming dangerous. The U.S. probably initially considered the events surrounding Ukraine’s Euromaidan an opportunity to give Moscow a good bop on the nose, to undermine its credibility, and weaken its ability to carry out an actively anti-American political course.
The U.S. underestimated the significance of the Ukrainian events for Moscow. Given its expected geopolitical implications, the Ukrainian coup was for Moscow not a bop on the nose but a potentially fatal blow to the entire political system. For Russia’s leaders, the only option as of February 2014 that could ensure political survival was an escalation of the conflict and its conversion into a military phase. As a result of the Crimean crisis, American leadership was once again thrown into doubt, and it was not easily and effectively re-established. By spring, Barack Obama had to convince allies that the U.S. is still strong and determined enough to prevent a Crimean scenario in East Asia.
As a result, all of 2014 was dedicated to attempts by the U.S. to achieve at least the semblance of a decisive victory over Russia. This goal was accomplished in two ways: through Russia’s increasing international isolation, and through support for the new Ukrainian government in establishing control over the Donbass. Both initiatives met with failure: Even the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s actions in Crimea barely won a simple majority. U.S. influence wasn’t enough to get anything more. Not only did not a single BRICS country endorse the measures against Russia, but neither did quite a number of U.S. allies, including Israel, Singapore and South Korea. China announced its readiness to provide Russia assistance in overcoming its economic difficulties. India and NATO member Turkey concluded new strategic deals with Russia. As for the Donbass, in spite of the warnings of the West, Russia intervened in the military conflict at a critical moment and saved its loyalists.
By Vladimir Putin’s estimate, the role of geopolitical factors in the Russian economic crisis amounts to 25 percent, while by Aleksey Kudrin’s estimate up to 50 percent. But in domestic political terms, the Ukrainian crisis has strengthened the Russian leadership’s position. Obama’s statement at his year-end press conference that the USA — having isolated Russia — has reclaimed leadership in world politics is yet another indicator of just how important the emotional and ideological aspects of the conflict in Ukraine are for the USA, and how little significance the substance of what is happening has.
Russia and the U.S. had been heading toward confrontation for a long time, and the policy of each side was based on profoundly erroneous assumptions about its own intentions and capabilities and those of its opponent. Russia is paranoid about U.S. policy in Eurasia and considers post-Soviet countries the first line of defense in both military and political terms. But in reality, the significance of Europe and the post-Soviet bloc has been steadily declining in American policy, while the significance of East Asia has grown. On the other hand, the U.S. underestimated Russia’s resolve, the stability of its political system, its military and political capabilities, and the harm Moscow is able to inflict if backed into a corner. Both sides have gone so far that in the coming years, they won’t be able to put a stop to this useless and dead-end struggle. But sooner or later a collision with reality awaits both Moscow and Washington. The reality is that Russia is merely a vast, second-tier country — and won’t be any more than that — while Washington is a fading world leader forced to deal with a growing number of crises with dwindling resources. Russia and the U.S. have more important things to do than settle scores.