How to End a War
Published in La Croix
(France) on 18 November 2010
by Jean-Christophe Ploquin (link to original)
(France) on 18 November 2010
by Jean-Christophe Ploquin (link to original)
Translated from
by Drue Fergison.
Edited by Heidi Kaufmann.
It has been nine years since Western soldiers began fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Nine years during which the level of violence has not ceased to grow. Last year, more than 2,400 civilians were killed there, according to the United Nations, as well as 521 Western soldiers — 11 of whom were French — more than 4,500 insurgents and, undoubtedly, more than 2,000 Afghan soldiers and police. This year, the numbers are on the rise. Even if battles are rare, security is relative in the bulk of the country. Cities and valleys are always at the mercy of assaults or targeted attacks that incite the population to a cautious neutrality.
For Western countries, this distant war is not in vain. Launched after the attacks of 9/11 in order to expel the al-Qaida leadership from its Afghan refuge, it has considerably reduced the nuisance capacity of the terrorist network — which has not perpetrated an attack in Europe since those in London in 2005. The threat certainly remains real, but the conflict in Afghanistan has had a totally mesmerizing effect.
Until when? For five years, the confrontation has intensified rather than diminished. It is not tenable to maintain European populations that contribute — contrary to the initial mission — to the instability of a country marking its 30th year of war, since the Soviet invasion of 1979. Searching for a political settlement is necessary, but the strategy is very delicate while power rests, above all, on the relations of the military forces. A possible agreement between the Taliban and President Hamid Karzai, installed by the U.N. in December 2001, risks ending up in a guerilla conquest for institutions. At this stage, in planning their departure several years from now, the Westerners still hope to be able to leave a solid Afghan army and police force behind them. It is this scenario that will be evaluated Friday and Saturday during a NATO summit in Lisbon. It is a hypothesis that many consider optimistic, mainly by virtue of the ambiguous game of one of the neighboring countries — Pakistan, the base camp of the Taliban.
For Western countries, this distant war is not in vain. Launched after the attacks of 9/11 in order to expel the al-Qaida leadership from its Afghan refuge, it has considerably reduced the nuisance capacity of the terrorist network — which has not perpetrated an attack in Europe since those in London in 2005. The threat certainly remains real, but the conflict in Afghanistan has had a totally mesmerizing effect.
Until when? For five years, the confrontation has intensified rather than diminished. It is not tenable to maintain European populations that contribute — contrary to the initial mission — to the instability of a country marking its 30th year of war, since the Soviet invasion of 1979. Searching for a political settlement is necessary, but the strategy is very delicate while power rests, above all, on the relations of the military forces. A possible agreement between the Taliban and President Hamid Karzai, installed by the U.N. in December 2001, risks ending up in a guerilla conquest for institutions. At this stage, in planning their departure several years from now, the Westerners still hope to be able to leave a solid Afghan army and police force behind them. It is this scenario that will be evaluated Friday and Saturday during a NATO summit in Lisbon. It is a hypothesis that many consider optimistic, mainly by virtue of the ambiguous game of one of the neighboring countries — Pakistan, the base camp of the Taliban.
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