Will the United States Give Up on Its Commitment to Taiwan Security?

In the tide of the Jasmine Revolution, it appeared that the United States couldn’t decide initially which path to take; when it first started, the United States appeared to welcome it warmly, but by the time it had spread to Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the United States had begun to hesitate. Although it was at the request of many European countries, the United States reluctantly agreed to use military force in Libya, but refused to send in ground troops. Moreover, the United States is in a hurry to transfer command of the allied armies to NATO.

Many are calling this intervention in Libya “humanitarian intervention,” but the attitude of the American government is far from being a model example of this. Instead, it is making other countries in the world begin to suspect whether — because of Iraq and Afghanistan — U.S. hegemony has begun to deteriorate. Is U.S. foreign policy shrinking back into isolationism?

All along, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security was not only reaffirmed by the Taiwan Relations Act and all previous presidents, but it was also the United States making an associated pledge: a commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Now, however, there is a sound emerging that perhaps the United States will eliminate Taiwan from its security commitments.

2010 was a pivotal year in China-U.S. relations, first with joint U.S.-Korea exercises in the Yellow Sea, which triggered China’s protest. Then came the China-Japan sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; the United States, in the spirit of security cooperation, took the position of supporting Japan. Afterward, in the dispute in the South China Sea, the U.S., on behalf of Southeast Asian nations, told China it would intervene.

All of these controversies related to territorial waters never happened in the past because China had yet to build up strength. But now, following China’s rise, its military might and economic strength have already created friction between it and other powers.

Over the course of China’s rise, many have been looking forward to it becoming more docile, little by little, within the U.S.-led international order; they await the day when Beijing becomes a “responsible shareholder.” Yet 2010 proved that China will not follow in accordance with the rules set by the West, not only because it finds the rules to be unfair, but also because the legitimacy of U.S. leadership has no ground left to stand on after the financial economic crisis. For the sake of its own interests, the U.S. will often shift its troubles onto its neighbors — the quantitative easing (monetary) policy is just one example of this.

Consequently, the second pessimistic view emerged, maintaining that conflict between China and the U.S. is unavoidable. They look down upon the research of past sinologists and think that China or the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called “special characteristics” are simply secondary; what really has an effect is international power structure, which does not shift with individual willpower. If China really wants to rise and challenge the American hegemony, then there is bound to be conflict.

Lately, however, a third way of thinking has arisen. Professor Charles Glaser of America’s George Washington University wrote an article in the most recent edition of the periodical Foreign Affairs, advocating that the security dilemma between China and the U.S. is not at all absolute. If a few secondary tensions are able to be dealt with properly, then it’s not necessarily the case that automatic mutual confrontation will arise; a military conflict is avoidable.

He thinks that just because there are oceans of difference between the two countries as well as mutual nuclear deterrence, this does not mean that they are each other’s enemy. China’s rise will not go so far as to threaten the United States, but it could threaten the security of its Asia-Pacific allies and the U.S. military garrison there.

Glaser thinks that China will not push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific in pursuit of greater security. In reality, what he didn’t say is that the U.S. military power deployed in the Asia-Pacific can inhibit the expansion of the Japanese and Korean militaries. In other words, China doesn’t need to worry about Japanese, or even South and North Korean, military conflict, because America’s security coalition in the Asia-Pacific can actually promote security in the region.

But there is one exception to this — the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. He believes that Taiwan is not in the same category as Japan and South Korea. Until now, China still has not given up on using military force against Taiwan, focusing all its resources on intervening in Taiwanese and U.S. military affairs and increasing its threats. As the pace of the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization accelerates, the danger of bilateral conflict also rises.

According to the calculations of a realist like Glaser, since China will not change its intentions and the risk of conflict is so great, the U.S. should consider withdrawing its security commitment to Taiwan. This drastic measure could move us away from the conflict’s detonator, while also laying a smooth path for relations between the two nations for future decades.

Of course there will be critics who say this would mean the U.S. had yielded to China’s military might. Other than costing the United States its credibility in the Asia-Pacific, it could also whet China’s appetite. But “not all adversaries are Hitler,” as Glaser points out. Looking through the lens of negotiation and compromise, this could help reach a new equilibrium, and tensions would thus recede. Moreover, when announcing the decision to give up on the Taiwan security commitment, the U.S. could still reaffirm its security commitments with other nations and strengthen its exercises with other countries, thus reducing the unease about discarding Taiwan.

“Discarding Taiwan” is an idea that really makes one uneasy, and which easily calls to mind the eve of the Korean War when the U.S. defensive line — intentionally or otherwise — discarded the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, ultimately triggering the invasion of the south by North Korea and China. Of course we can just see this as the scholar’s personal view and not take it too seriously, but Foreign Affairs is an authoritative weather vane of U.S. foreign policy. It’s no coincidence that it published Glaser’s article at the same time as it published “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy” by Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing University. With sensitive international media, if the Wall Street Journal and the Economist catch wind, they will publish follow-up articles.

This way of thinking, however, is being discussed by more and more people. One of the reasons is that the gap between American and Chinese militaries is shrinking. As the U.S. military intervenes in Libya, it makes one wonder over and over: Would the United States really pay such a high cost for the sake of Taiwan? Or would it, as Glaser suggests, separate its “primary interests” from its “secondary interests?”

Secondly, although tensions between Taiwan and China have eased, the more we emphasize this special relationship for which the foundation was laid in the 1992 Consensus, the more it will make the United States think that “you and they are different,” and that Taiwan is endangered by the revocation of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan security.

Thirdly, arms sales to Taiwan are the concrete manifestation of the U.S. security commitment. If the United States wants to gradually and moderately reduce its security commitment, arms sales are an appropriate and measurable indicator. The Obama administration is re-evaluating its arms sales policy; this anecdotal evidence should concern us even more.

chenlungkuo@yahoo.com