War on Terror
Published in El País
(Spain) on 29 September 2014
by Editorial (link to original)
(Spain) on 29 September 2014
by Editorial (link to original)
Translated from
by Lee Shotton.
Edited by Laurence Bouvard.
The first week of U.S. bombing against Islamic State targets in Syria to hold back the jihadi on their Iraqi and Mediterranean fronts has come to a close. The fight against the caliphate is no longer an anti-terrorist operation, regardless of how the White House describes it, but a new regional war without borders that Obama had no choice but to enter despite its uncertain development and unpredictable end.
The hardest is still to come. The Islamic State is not the cause of the situation in Iraq and Syria. The ruthless, fundamentalist Sunni militia is mainly a product of a corrupt environment — failed states, corrupt regimes, dictatorships of every shade — framed by the primordial conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. A struggle overseen by the two opposing powers in the Near East: Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Arriving at a valid strategy with which to destroy the Islamic State group means accepting that along with military containment, it is equally important to combat the conditions which feed the Islamic State group. Its barbarity has become a defensible cause for many young Arabs and non-Arabs, as demonstrated by the involvement of European and U.S. citizens and the existence of Western recruitment networks, like that brought down in Spain. It is a problem close to us; it is our problem.
In the face of this complex reality, Obama’s propositions are feeble. It could take years for the Iraqi army to be in a position to fight the Islamic State group, or for the Sunni tribes making the jihadi advance possible to stop doing so. In Syria, it is unlikely the 5,000 moderate rebels whom Washington will arm would present any real threat to the fanatics. There is also the additional problem that Bashar al-Assad feels reinforced by the U.S. attacks. Washington says that its missiles are not helping the Syrian despot, but the version from Damascus is that Obama has finally understood that Assad is a bastion against terrorism.
The U.S. needs to build a long-term and reliable coalition, which goes beyond the inventory of planes lent by its partners. Two important examples show that this will be a complex process. Turkey, a NATO member, is still not providing the key support that is expected of Ankara. As for the United Kingdom, a loyal sidekick of Washington’s causes, it has pledged half a dozen Tornado jets to operate exclusively in Iraq; this only came about after a wary Cameron brought before parliament a motion that he could have decided on alone.
The big question is whether the U.S. president is looking into a viable plan against Islamist totalitarianism and that he is in a position to push it through. Iraq or Afghanistan is irrefutable proof that bombs alone cannot end conflicts that are so rooted in sectarianism and dependent on external powers. Obama has a difficult task ahead of him, one which only he is capable of carrying out, regardless of how much he has tried to avoid it.
The hardest is still to come. The Islamic State is not the cause of the situation in Iraq and Syria. The ruthless, fundamentalist Sunni militia is mainly a product of a corrupt environment — failed states, corrupt regimes, dictatorships of every shade — framed by the primordial conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. A struggle overseen by the two opposing powers in the Near East: Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Arriving at a valid strategy with which to destroy the Islamic State group means accepting that along with military containment, it is equally important to combat the conditions which feed the Islamic State group. Its barbarity has become a defensible cause for many young Arabs and non-Arabs, as demonstrated by the involvement of European and U.S. citizens and the existence of Western recruitment networks, like that brought down in Spain. It is a problem close to us; it is our problem.
In the face of this complex reality, Obama’s propositions are feeble. It could take years for the Iraqi army to be in a position to fight the Islamic State group, or for the Sunni tribes making the jihadi advance possible to stop doing so. In Syria, it is unlikely the 5,000 moderate rebels whom Washington will arm would present any real threat to the fanatics. There is also the additional problem that Bashar al-Assad feels reinforced by the U.S. attacks. Washington says that its missiles are not helping the Syrian despot, but the version from Damascus is that Obama has finally understood that Assad is a bastion against terrorism.
The U.S. needs to build a long-term and reliable coalition, which goes beyond the inventory of planes lent by its partners. Two important examples show that this will be a complex process. Turkey, a NATO member, is still not providing the key support that is expected of Ankara. As for the United Kingdom, a loyal sidekick of Washington’s causes, it has pledged half a dozen Tornado jets to operate exclusively in Iraq; this only came about after a wary Cameron brought before parliament a motion that he could have decided on alone.
The big question is whether the U.S. president is looking into a viable plan against Islamist totalitarianism and that he is in a position to push it through. Iraq or Afghanistan is irrefutable proof that bombs alone cannot end conflicts that are so rooted in sectarianism and dependent on external powers. Obama has a difficult task ahead of him, one which only he is capable of carrying out, regardless of how much he has tried to avoid it.