New Afghanistan Strategy Will Result in More Military Casualties
Published in die Welt
(Germany) on 21 September 2010
by Clemens Wergin (link to original)
(Germany) on 21 September 2010
by Clemens Wergin (link to original)
Translated from
by Ron Argentati.
Edited by Benjamin Beeghly.
Protecting Afghan civilians is meant to increase confidence in the U.S. security force. For the soldiers, it means more danger.
For the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2010 has thus far been the bloodiest year since the start of the Afghanistan campaign. Five hundred twenty-nine soldiers lost their lives there in 2010 — already more than the previous worst year, 2009. One shouldn’t draw hasty conclusions of failure from these figures. The (mainly U.S.) troop surge had the goal of going back on the offensive and recapturing those areas of the country that had come under Taliban control. Whoever expands military operations into enemy-held territory — such as in Helmand Province — may also expect to suffer greater casualties.
Another cause of the increase in combat deaths may be the new strategy that de-emphasizes air strikes and other “kinetic” means and relies more on “boots on the ground” soldiering. That approach is designed to minimize Afghan civilian casualties and regain the confidence of the civilian population. But it also exposes the soldiers to greater danger. That’s the latest gamble in the game of combating insurgents: redirecting the focus from force protection to population protection in the hope that it will pay off down the road.
That approach worked in Iraq. The first few months after the troop surge there were increased U.S. casualty figures, but then many clans switched tribal loyalties. They were persuaded that the Americans would protect them in the future from the radicals. That’s when the Americans began getting more and more information about the insurgents from the Iraqi people. The war began to turn and the number of U.S. casualties rapidly declined.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, one can only say the war will intensify. Who will ultimately win it remains open.
For the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2010 has thus far been the bloodiest year since the start of the Afghanistan campaign. Five hundred twenty-nine soldiers lost their lives there in 2010 — already more than the previous worst year, 2009. One shouldn’t draw hasty conclusions of failure from these figures. The (mainly U.S.) troop surge had the goal of going back on the offensive and recapturing those areas of the country that had come under Taliban control. Whoever expands military operations into enemy-held territory — such as in Helmand Province — may also expect to suffer greater casualties.
Another cause of the increase in combat deaths may be the new strategy that de-emphasizes air strikes and other “kinetic” means and relies more on “boots on the ground” soldiering. That approach is designed to minimize Afghan civilian casualties and regain the confidence of the civilian population. But it also exposes the soldiers to greater danger. That’s the latest gamble in the game of combating insurgents: redirecting the focus from force protection to population protection in the hope that it will pay off down the road.
That approach worked in Iraq. The first few months after the troop surge there were increased U.S. casualty figures, but then many clans switched tribal loyalties. They were persuaded that the Americans would protect them in the future from the radicals. That’s when the Americans began getting more and more information about the insurgents from the Iraqi people. The war began to turn and the number of U.S. casualties rapidly declined.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, one can only say the war will intensify. Who will ultimately win it remains open.