Obama and His Strategy Escape From Iraq
Published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi
(U.K.) on 28 February 2009
by (Editorial Opinion) (link to original)
American president Barack Obama set the end of August of 2010 as the date to conclude American combat operations in Iraq, and confirmed his intent to withdraw all his country’s forces by the end of 2011, although he left the final word on this matter to the American military leadership.
This decision will place a heavy burden on the Iraqi government, because it will be responsible for maintaining security throughout Iraq, in particular the capital, Baghdad. And questions remain about Iraq’s ability to assume this responsibility, and whether it has the necessary troops to render it practical on the ground.
It is difficult to give conclusive answers in this regard. The period stipulated for American forces to terminate military operations is short, and not enough to train the Iraqi Security Forces and National Guard to be able to take the place of the withdrawing troops.
Tests on the ground confirm the incompetence of the Iraqi forces to impose security and stability, and what limited successes have been achieved, especially in the south and some areas of the capital, are attributed primarily to direct American supervision and compliance with the security plans, and most of the time with American participation.
Perhaps the most important point for clarification is that which is related to political accord among the Iraqi political blocs, most of which stand on a sectarian or ethnic basis, for security is tied to national reconciliation, and the rebuilding of the foundations of the country on the national basis, far from the ethnic and sectarian contingents.
The Iraqi Security Force, like the National Guard, is under the control of the ruling coalition and includes elements and individuals from former sectarian militias. Other competing political blocs thus cannot feel reassurance.
It is true that the political wing of Prime Minister Nuri Maliki won most of the seats on the southern municipal councils during the last elections, but this victory does not offer the necessary guarantee for national rule without help from American forces.
The Iraqi Army needs to develop on the basis of national, not sectarian, affiliation, as is presently the case, while at the same time intensifying efforts of national reconciliation. But what is currently happening is a slowing of reconciliation, while procuring 20 billion dollars to arm this force with modern equipment. This means the status quo will remain as it is with only slight changes.
President Obama set before the Iraqi government a great challenge with this decision of his, one which they might not be qualified to face. The main concern of the new American president is extraction from the Iraqi quagmire with the fewest possible losses, especially given that the two wars which he inherited in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the state treasury around 140 billion dollars annually, never mind the continuing death toll among the ranks of the American army, which has reached nearly 5000 dead and more than 30,000 wounded.
This decision will place a heavy burden on the Iraqi government, because it will be responsible for maintaining security throughout Iraq, in particular the capital, Baghdad. And questions remain about Iraq’s ability to assume this responsibility, and whether it has the necessary troops to render it practical on the ground.
It is difficult to give conclusive answers in this regard. The period stipulated for American forces to terminate military operations is short, and not enough to train the Iraqi Security Forces and National Guard to be able to take the place of the withdrawing troops.
Tests on the ground confirm the incompetence of the Iraqi forces to impose security and stability, and what limited successes have been achieved, especially in the south and some areas of the capital, are attributed primarily to direct American supervision and compliance with the security plans, and most of the time with American participation.
Perhaps the most important point for clarification is that which is related to political accord among the Iraqi political blocs, most of which stand on a sectarian or ethnic basis, for security is tied to national reconciliation, and the rebuilding of the foundations of the country on the national basis, far from the ethnic and sectarian contingents.
The Iraqi Security Force, like the National Guard, is under the control of the ruling coalition and includes elements and individuals from former sectarian militias. Other competing political blocs thus cannot feel reassurance.
It is true that the political wing of Prime Minister Nuri Maliki won most of the seats on the southern municipal councils during the last elections, but this victory does not offer the necessary guarantee for national rule without help from American forces.
The Iraqi Army needs to develop on the basis of national, not sectarian, affiliation, as is presently the case, while at the same time intensifying efforts of national reconciliation. But what is currently happening is a slowing of reconciliation, while procuring 20 billion dollars to arm this force with modern equipment. This means the status quo will remain as it is with only slight changes.
President Obama set before the Iraqi government a great challenge with this decision of his, one which they might not be qualified to face. The main concern of the new American president is extraction from the Iraqi quagmire with the fewest possible losses, especially given that the two wars which he inherited in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the state treasury around 140 billion dollars annually, never mind the continuing death toll among the ranks of the American army, which has reached nearly 5000 dead and more than 30,000 wounded.
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