Nuclear Iran
Published in Veja
(Brazil) on 29 December 2011
by Ciao Blinder (link to original)
Nothing like arriving at the end of the year with radioactive speculation over the Iranian nuclear crisis. On one side, we have the Iranian threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz, the artery through which one-fifth of the world's oil supply passes, in a scenario of a possible embargo by Western countries of Iranian petroleum exports. This would be part of the sanctions, so far unfruitful, against the regime in Tehran of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in an effort to get it to abandon its nuclear program. For Iran, direct sanctions against its petroleum sector (and also against its Central Bank) represent a virtual declaration of economic war.
More intriguing is what is happening on the other side, beyond the usual rhetorical shots, which followed the Iranian threats, that the U.S. will not tolerate a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. It is the information that the Obama administration tries to assure Israel will it launch its own attack against Iranian nuclear installations, if certain limits have been exceeded by Tehran in its nuclear program. Washington does this while trying to dissuade the Israelis from acting in a unilateral manner. Obama's juggling act happens in the electoral circus while the Republicans try to seduce Jewish voters and campaign donors.
The Democratic president during his campaign for re-election needs to make sure that Iran does not get its nuclear bomb during his term (and he hopes, clearly, that his first term will not be the last) and fears that an Israeli preventive attack against Iran could light fires of unpredictable proportions in the Middle East. And how would this not happen with a U.S. attack?
A high degree of distrust exists between Obama and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (who prefers a Republican in the White House). There is an uncomfortable alliance between the two. On these terms, U.S. diplomacy tries to calm the disquiet of the Israelis, who, with reason, see themselves as a prime target of Iran's militarized nuclear program.
The U.S. has drawn what are called red lines (in diplomatic jargon), which would justify an American preventive attack against Iranian Installations. In a provocative article in the publication Foreign Affairs, Matthew Kroenig, ex-special adviser on Iran at the Pentagon (in the Obama administration) traced these possible red lines. A preventive American attack would occur in the following conditions: the expulsion of international nuclear inspectors, the enrichment of uranium above 90 percent or the installation of advanced centrifuges at the Qom plant.
The arguments of Kroenig are explosive and more easily vented by someone who is no longer in the government. The official position is that "All options are on the table.” Actually, in the Council on Foreign Relations, Kroenig said that an U.S. attack against Iran is more acceptable in a range of unpalatable options. Another ex-high U.S. official who was closely connected to the nuclear question in the Clinton administration, Robert Gallucci, recently wrote an article for the New York Times criticizing the Bush administration for not adopting a firmer line with North Korea, when it was transferring nuclear technology to Syria.
Gallucci acerbically observed that without a preemptive strike by Israel in 2007, the Syrians would already have a well-developed nuclear program. The message of Kroenig and Gallucci is clear; non-military sanctions or sabotage can decelerate the nuclear development of a country, but not stop it. There are, in truth, cases of countries who abandoned their nuclear programs in special circumstances, not related to sanctions, but because of domestic factors (the end of apartheid in South Africa) or fear of military action (Libya, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003).
There are, therefore, unpalatable options: non-military methods which perhaps will not prevent Iran from turning into a North Korea or a preventative attack which could fail and provoke, who knows, uncontrollable fires in the Middle East. And there is always the less radioactive question: Is there a third route? At the most, one can envision sanctions so severe, the equivalent of economic war, that they strangle the Iranian economy and result in an implosion of the regime.
More intriguing is what is happening on the other side, beyond the usual rhetorical shots, which followed the Iranian threats, that the U.S. will not tolerate a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. It is the information that the Obama administration tries to assure Israel will it launch its own attack against Iranian nuclear installations, if certain limits have been exceeded by Tehran in its nuclear program. Washington does this while trying to dissuade the Israelis from acting in a unilateral manner. Obama's juggling act happens in the electoral circus while the Republicans try to seduce Jewish voters and campaign donors.
The Democratic president during his campaign for re-election needs to make sure that Iran does not get its nuclear bomb during his term (and he hopes, clearly, that his first term will not be the last) and fears that an Israeli preventive attack against Iran could light fires of unpredictable proportions in the Middle East. And how would this not happen with a U.S. attack?
A high degree of distrust exists between Obama and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (who prefers a Republican in the White House). There is an uncomfortable alliance between the two. On these terms, U.S. diplomacy tries to calm the disquiet of the Israelis, who, with reason, see themselves as a prime target of Iran's militarized nuclear program.
The U.S. has drawn what are called red lines (in diplomatic jargon), which would justify an American preventive attack against Iranian Installations. In a provocative article in the publication Foreign Affairs, Matthew Kroenig, ex-special adviser on Iran at the Pentagon (in the Obama administration) traced these possible red lines. A preventive American attack would occur in the following conditions: the expulsion of international nuclear inspectors, the enrichment of uranium above 90 percent or the installation of advanced centrifuges at the Qom plant.
The arguments of Kroenig are explosive and more easily vented by someone who is no longer in the government. The official position is that "All options are on the table.” Actually, in the Council on Foreign Relations, Kroenig said that an U.S. attack against Iran is more acceptable in a range of unpalatable options. Another ex-high U.S. official who was closely connected to the nuclear question in the Clinton administration, Robert Gallucci, recently wrote an article for the New York Times criticizing the Bush administration for not adopting a firmer line with North Korea, when it was transferring nuclear technology to Syria.
Gallucci acerbically observed that without a preemptive strike by Israel in 2007, the Syrians would already have a well-developed nuclear program. The message of Kroenig and Gallucci is clear; non-military sanctions or sabotage can decelerate the nuclear development of a country, but not stop it. There are, in truth, cases of countries who abandoned their nuclear programs in special circumstances, not related to sanctions, but because of domestic factors (the end of apartheid in South Africa) or fear of military action (Libya, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003).
There are, therefore, unpalatable options: non-military methods which perhaps will not prevent Iran from turning into a North Korea or a preventative attack which could fail and provoke, who knows, uncontrollable fires in the Middle East. And there is always the less radioactive question: Is there a third route? At the most, one can envision sanctions so severe, the equivalent of economic war, that they strangle the Iranian economy and result in an implosion of the regime.