Changes and Constants of US Policy in Latin America

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 5 February 2021
by Wang Youming (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Liza Roberts. Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.
During the Obama administration, the current United States president, Joe Biden, acted as Barack Obama’s deputy, participating in adjusting Latin American policy. With the arrival of Biden in the White House, the traditional and pragmatic Democratic Party will reenter the U.S. political arena, and policies related to the United States’ backyard will enter a new period of adjustment as a result. It can be predicted that U.S.-Latin American relations during the Biden era will not undergo major changes generally, but there will be two significant changes in some parts, evolving in the complicated direction of reconstruction and diversification.

During the Trump administration, Obama’s Latin America policies were entirely upended, especially by raising a big stick toward radical left-leaning countries and categorizing Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the “troika of tyranny.” Donald Trump also recognized Juan Guaido as the president of Venezuela. He reversed policies regarding Cuba; soon after taking office Trump announced the cancellation of nearly all the Obama-era policies easing relations with Cuba. Before he stepped down, he did not forget to put Cuba back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

However, the extreme blockade against Cuba not only had little effect, but also prompted old forces in Cuba to band together against the U.S. With Biden in office, the U.S. may once again soften its stance on Cuba and pursue a strategy of engagement. U.S.-Cuba relations will tend toward moderation, and it is expected that restrictions on American travel, remittances, finance and trade with Cuba will be loosened. Cuba may also be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Similarly, for Venezuela, the Biden administration is unlikely to rush to the forefront in support of the opposition party’s efforts, but will instead use the international ally system against Venezuela.

After Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro took office, he changed the left-leaning government’s policy of gradually distancing from the U.S. and instead turned entirely toward Trump, closely following the foreign policy agenda of the U.S. Trump returned this favor, using both false claims and the truth to produce many benefits for Bolsonaro and bringing U.S.-Brazil relations closer. With Biden in power, U.S.-Brazil relations may enter a period of reconstruction. Although Bolsonaro said in his message congratulating Biden on his election victory that he hopes to continue strengthening the U.S.-Brazil alliance, promoting trade cooperation between the two countries and defending democracy and freedom, Bolsonaro’s ideas on climate change, multilateralism and other issues differ greatly from Biden’s. Such differences are difficult to overcome in the short term. Biden has made it clear, and Bolsonaro should recognize, that if Brazil cannot act as a responsible guardian of the Amazon rain forest, the U.S. will initiate joint international actions to adopt trade restrictions and sanctions to ensure that the region is protected. Bolsonaro responded that he has no intention of using such fiery rhetoric, but the other party needs to recognize Brazil’s strength. This war of words indicates that future U.S.-Brazil relations may enter a period of fine-tuning and adjusting. However, in light of the status of the two countries in the world and in the Americas, they cannot maintain a rigid stalemate and will instead seek a common point of interest in the midst of conflicting interests.

Although Biden disclosed before taking office that he would correct Trump’s foreign policy, the revisiting of his Latin American policy will inevitably serve the overall strategic interests of the U.S. and the security interests of the Western Hemisphere. The two U.S. political parties have reached consensus on some fundamental strategies, and these cannot be changed.

First, the tradition that the Latin American backyard is not a priority consideration for U.S. global strategy will remain unchanged. Latin America has never been the focus of U.S. global strategy. Based on geopolitics the U.S. is confident that since Latin American geopolitics, history and culture have naturally close ties to U.S. traditions, it would be extremely difficult for another major power to replace it. Additionally, many Latin American countries have already begun the process of democratization and their political distancing is within a controllable range. The Indo-Pacific, Middle East and Atlantic alliance systems remain the top priorities of the U.S. global chess match. Therefore, although the Biden administration may someday increase investments in and pay more attention to its backyard, Latin America will not rise in the ranks of the U.S. global strategic agenda.

Second, the U.S. aim of suppressing radical left-leaning countries in its backyard will not change. Although the Biden administration may reduce the intensity of its pressure on radical left-leaning countries in Latin America, the methods by which this suppression is carried out will grow more diverse. In order to ensure the safety of Latin America, the Biden administration may use less hard power and more soft power, coupling strength and gentleness to eliminate radical anti-American regimes and clear a path for American control of its backyard. Thus, the Biden administration will not abandon the “Color Revolution” against Cuba and Venezuela, the axis states of the anti-American Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. The administration will continue to exert pressure on these left-leaning powers to push for human rights, democracy and good governance, and will list the countries of this alliance as a national security threat to the U.S. The Biden administration may once again break the ice of U.S.-Cuba relations, showing goodwill in the international community, but it will not completely melt the ice with Cuba. Such pleasing rhetoric as “equal partnership” and “shared responsibility” will resurface, while at the same time the strategies of supporting with one hand while striking with the other and dividing to conquer will not change.

Third, the redline strategy of preventing foreign powers from encroaching on the U.S. backyard will not change. Although Latin America is not a priority consideration for U.S. global strategy, the bottom line remains that other major powers cannot gain influence in the region. Although Biden and Trump have conflicting political views, Biden will not reverse every Trump decision. It is likely Biden will continue Trump’s initiative of pursuing American growth by increasing control over its backyard, preventing China and Russia from gaining influence over the development process in Latin America. Washington will not be happy to see China and Russia becoming new neighbors of the U.S. and certainly will not tolerate Latin American countries playing the China or Russia card to subvert American influence and control over its backyard. The specter of the Monroe Doctrine will continue to linger in Latin America.

Fourth, the primary argument in U.S.-Latin American relations of control and opposing control will not change. In recent years, along with changes in the political environment in Latin America, some countries have views inconsistent with the U.S., which complicates relations. There are vague feelings of distance but not separation, and entirely conflicting ideas of opposing the U.S. and staying close to it. Although such relations are complex, building a secure barrier in its backyard is the unchanging strategic position of the U.S. toward Latin America. Although the variability and increments of U.S.-Latin American relations are determined by the changing political landscapes of both sides, the U.S. has always been the driving force in changing these relations. Dependence and autonomy, control and opposing control are all common themes of U.S.-Latin American relations.



奥巴马执政时期,美国现任总统拜登曾作为副手参与对拉美政策的调整。随着拜登入主白宫,民主党建制派传统与务实的政风将重归美国政坛,美“后院”政策也因此进入新一轮调整期。可以预见的是,拜登时代的美拉关系在总体不会出现大的改变情况下,局部将呈现两大显著变化,朝着重构、多元、复杂的方向演变。

特朗普执政时期对奥巴马的拉美政策进行全面回调,尤其对激进左翼国家重新举起大棒,将委内瑞拉、古巴、尼加拉瓜定性为“暴政三驾马车”,一手策划并指挥代理人瓜伊多在委内瑞拉搞“倒马行动”。对古巴大开倒车,上任不久便宣布取消奥巴马时期对古巴的几乎所有宽松政策,临下台还不忘将古巴重新列入“支持恐怖主义国家”名单。

然而,对古巴极限封锁不但收效甚微,反而促使古国内抱团抗美。拜登任上,美国可能再次对古巴松开拳头,奉行“接触+演变”策略,美古关系将趋于缓和,有望在美公民赴古旅游、侨汇、金融、经贸等方面松动限制,也可能再次将古从支恐名单上删除。同样,对于委内瑞拉,拜登政府也不太可能冲到前台支持委反对派的“变天”行为,而是会利用盟友体系对委恩威并用。

巴西总统博索纳罗上台后,一改左翼政府“渐行渐远、疏而不离”的对美政策,全面倒向特朗普,对外政策与美国如影随形。特朗普为此投桃报李,虚实两用对博索纳罗许以诸多利好,美巴密切互动。拜登上台后,美巴关系可能进入重构期。虽然博索纳罗在祝贺拜登当选的电文中希望继续构建巴美联盟,推动两国经贸联合,捍卫民主自由,但博索纳罗在气候变化、多边主义等方面的理念与拜登有不小差异,短期难以弥合。拜登曾明确表示,博索纳罗应认识到,若巴西无法成为亚马孙雨林负责任的守护者,其上台后将采取国际联合行动,对巴采取贸易限制措施,确保该地区得到保护。而博索纳罗则回击称巴方无意使用此类“火药”言辞,但对方需知道巴方实力。此番口水仗预示未来巴美关系可能进入调适和磨合期。但鉴于两国在世界及美洲地区的地位,也不会闹得太僵,将在不断的利益碰撞中寻求彼此的利益融合点。

尽管拜登在上台之前就透露出将对特朗普的对外政策做纠偏,但其拉美政策回调必然服务于美国的整体战略利益及西半球安全利益,一些带有根本性且两党达成共识的战略部署不会改变。

其一,拉美“后院”并非美国全球战略优先考量的传统不会改变。拉美素来不是美国的全球战略重点,囿于地缘政治的缘故,美国自信地认为,拉美地缘政治、历史文化与其有天然的亲近因素,其他大国难以取而代之,且拉美多国已进入民主进程,其政治裂变程度在可控范围。印太、中东、大西洋盟友体系依然是美国全球大棋局中的重中之重。因此,尽管拜登政府日后可能会加大对“后院”的投入和关注,但拉美在其全球战略议程中的位置不会前移。

其二,美国对“后院”激进左翼国家以压促变的宗旨不会改变。尽管拜登政府对“后院”激进左翼国家的打压烈度可能会有所降低,但其施压手段会更加多元。为确保“后院”无虞,拜登政府可能会少用“锐实力”,多用“巧实力”,刚柔并济,消除反美激进政权,为美控制“后院”清除荆棘。因此,拜登政府不会放弃对反美联盟“美洲玻利瓦尔联盟”的轴心国古巴和委内瑞拉进行“颜色革命”,将继续对这些左翼政权进行“人权、民主、良治”施压,仍然会将委列入美“国家安全威胁”。拜登政府可能会再次对美古关系“破冰”,在国际社会显露“善意”,但不会对古彻底实现“融冰”。会释放所谓“平等伙伴关系”“共同责任”的动听辞藻,同时“扶右打左”的战略不会变,拉一打一、分而治之的策略不会变。

其三,防止域外大国染指其“后院”的战略红线不会改变。尽管拉美不是美全球战略的优先考量,但确保其他大国不能动其奶酪的底线未变。尽管拜登与特朗普政见相左,但也不会“逢特必反”,很可能续推特朗普祭出的旨在加大控制“后院”力度的“美洲增长”倡议,力防拉美发展进程打上“中国烙印”和“俄罗斯标志”。华盛顿不会乐见中俄成为美“新邻居”,更不容忍拉美国家打中俄牌以抵消美国对“后院”的控制力和影响力,“门罗主义”的幽灵将继续徘徊在拉美大地。

其四,控制与反控制的美拉关系主线不会变。近年来,随着拉美政治生态的变化,拉美国家对美亲疏不一,关系错综复杂,既有“疏而不离”“若即若离”的模糊形态,也有“反美抗美”和“亲美傍美”的泾渭分明。尽管个中关系错综复杂,但筑牢“后院”安全屏障是美对拉不变的战略定位。美拉关系的变量与增量虽由双方政治版图变化而定,但美国始终是美拉关系变化的主导力量,依附与自主、控制与反控制是美拉关系的主题。
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