3 Criteria by Which To Gauge China-US Relations

Published in Takungpao
(Hong Kong) on 21 December 2023
by Zhou Bajun (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Matthew McKay. Edited by Mitchelle Lumumba.
In 2023, U.S. relations with China deteriorated to the brink of rupture in the first half of the year and stabilized somewhat in the second half; the Nov. 15 meeting between the U.S. and Chinese heads of state in San Francisco provided the world with a sense of relief. However, 17 days later, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo went on record stating that China was the greatest threat the U.S. had ever faced, and that China was no friend of the U.S. Will U.S. relations with China fare better in 2024? Or will they take a turn for the worse?

The United States Continues to 'Decouple' and 'De-Risk' from China

In my view, at the economic level, Washington will continue to “decouple” itself from China in the high-tech field while at the same time “de-risking” from China in other industries or sectors. Concretely, in areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, the U.S. will continue to clamp down on China, but in other areas it will maintain its economic and trade ties with China, as Biden’s reelection bid is contingent on his maintaining U.S. economic growth and avoiding a recession.

It bears pointing out that U.S. and Western claims that they are de-risking, not decoupling, are false, as to build a “small courtyard, high wall” against China in the high-tech field is tantamount to decoupling. What requires close monitoring is whether that “small courtyard, high wall" will expand to become a comprehensive decoupling from China. The answer to this question lies not in economics but in politics.

At the political level, U.S. relations with China depend on the following three criteria.

First, will the U.S. allow China’s comprehensive national power to narrow the gap between itself and China?

Ever since the U.S. overtook the United Kingdom to become the world’s number one superpower, it has adopted a strategy of suppression and containment, whether in its dealings with the different social systems and ideologies of the Soviet Union or in its dealings with those of Japan, which are basically the same as its own. There is a quantitative indicator — “Uncle Sam” does not allow any country’s economic aggregate to exceed 60% of its own. That is a criterion that China has shattered, which is why Raimondo lamented that China was the greatest threat the U.S. had ever faced.

Second, will the U.S. accept that China, which has a different social system and ideology than its own, is shifting closer to the world’s center stage?

China has no intention of surpassing or replacing the U.S. The main objectives and tasks for the next five years, as set out at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, are to further enhance China’s international status and influence, to play a greater role in global governance, and in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence, to build our country into a leading, modern socialist power by the middle of this century. Note that it is “a” leading, rather than “the” leading, as a multipolar world system is what President Xi Jinping advocates in jointly constructing a community with a shared future for humankind. The U.S. should accept that other major powers share responsibility for global governance along with it.

Third, will Americans allow the Chinese to develop their economy and enjoy the same prosperity that they do?

In an exclusive interview with the Australian media at the White House on April 15, 2010, then-U.S. President Barack Obama said, “If over a billion Chinese citizens have the same living patterns as Australians and Americans do right now, then all of us are in for a very miserable time, the planet just can’t sustain it, so they understand that they’ve got to make a decision about a new model that is more sustainable that allows them to pursue the economic growth that they’re pursuing while at the same time dealing with these environmental consequences.”

There were two implications to Obama’s statement. The first was his view that China’s leaders would strike a balance between economic development and environmental protection, and there is nothing wrong with that, as one of the hallmarks of Chinese-style modernization is for people to live in harmony with nature. But at the same time, he shifted responsibility for protecting the environment wholly onto the Chinese government and people, neither reflecting on the damage done to the environment by the capitalist system of the U.S. and the West nor expressing any intent to change developed countries’ production methods and lifestyles to protect the planet. This is a mentality of unreconstructed hegemony.

Not Accepting China’s Move toward the World’s Center Stage

There is a view that China should consciously maintain a development gap between itself and the U.S.; that is, that it should take the initiative to keep away from the first criterion — but this view is both naïve and unattainable. Not tailgating someone on a highway is simple enough, but in terms of economic and social development, countries cannot avoid catching up with each other. The main reason for this is the confidentiality adopted by countries in many areas of economic and social development, but another more technical reason is that statistics on economic and social development are compiled retroactively. What is more, U.S. relations with China depend on two other criteria. If China takes the initiative to slow down its economic and social development, the likely result will not be greater tolerance from the U.S. but intensified suppression.

For other Western countries in their dealings with China, the first criterion mentioned above is not important, but the second and third criteria are; if nothing else, the European Union referring to China as its “systemic rival” shows that the entire Western camp finds China’s move to the world’s center stage hard to swallow.

On Nov. 24, 2023, at the Shanghai Forum of the World Conference on Chinese Studies, University of Adelaide Professor Gao Mobo told a story. “Mobo,” one of his friends asked him, “what would life be like if China became as powerful as the United States?” Gao opined that although [Americans] complain about the creature comforts with which they are familiar from their lives today, such as Coca-Cola and Hollywood, these are what they are accustomed to. But how would they feel if China became so powerful that it could influence the world? They would be worried.

As the three criteria mentioned here converge, U.S. relations with China look unpredictable.


判断中美关系的三根准绳

2023-12-21 04:02:50 大公报

2023年美国对华关系,上半年恶化至破裂边缘,下半年略呈回稳。11月15日,中美元首在旧金山会晤,让全世界感觉宽慰。然而,17天后,美国商务部长雷蒙多又公开表示,中国是美国有史以来最大威胁,中国不是美国的朋友。

2024年美国对华关系将好转抑或再恶化?

美持续对华“脱钩”“去风险”

在我看来,在经济层面,华盛顿会继续在高科技领域与中国“脱钩”,同时在其他产业或行业贯彻对华“去风险”。具体而言,在白宫已确定的半导体、人工智能和量子计算等领域,美国将继续对中国严厉封杀。但在其他方面,美国会维持对华经贸联系,因为,拜登为争取连任必须维护美国经济增长而避免衰退。

必须指出,美西方所谓与中国“不脱钩而是去风险”是虚伪的。在高科技领域对中国设置“小院高墙”,就是“脱钩”。需要密切关注的是,“小院高墙”会不会越扩越大而变成全面与中国“脱钩”?这一问题的答案,不在于经济而在于政治。

在政治层面,美国对华关系取决于下列三根准绳。

一是美国是否容许中国的综合国力缩短与美国的差距?

自美国超越英国而成为全球第一位的超级大国以来,无论对待与其社会制度和意识形态不同的苏联,还是对待与其社会制度和意识形态基本相同的日本,皆采取打压遏制的方略。有一个量化的指标──“山姆大叔”不容许任何一国的经济总量多于美国经济总量的六成。中国已显著超越这一根准绳。所以雷蒙多感叹中国是美国有史以来最大威胁。

二是美国是否接受与其社会制度和意识形态不同的中国走近世界舞台的中央?

中国没有超越和取代美国的打算。中共二十大所确定未来五年的主要目标任务是包括中国国际地位和影响进一步提高,在全球治理中发挥更大作用;到本世纪中叶,把我国建设成综合国力和国际影响力领先的社会主义现代化强国。请注意:是“领先”而不是“领头”。习近平主席倡导的共同构建人类命运共同体,是多极世界体系。美国应当接受其他大国同它一道分担全球治理的责任。

三是美国人是否容许中国人发展经济而过上同他们一样富足的生活?

2010年4月15日,时任美国总统奥巴马在白宫接受澳洲媒体专访时称:“如果超过十亿的中国居民也像澳洲人、美国人现在这样生活,那么我们所有人都将陷入十分悲惨的境地,因为那是这个星球所无法承受的。所以中国领导人会理解,他们不得不做出决定去采取一个新的、更可持续的模式,使得他们在追求他们想要的经济增长的同时,能应对经济发展给环境带来的挑战。”

奥巴马的这番话包含两方面涵义。一方面,他表示中国领导人会在发展经济与保护环境之间取得平衡。这一层意思没有错。中国式现代化的特征之一,便是人与自然和谐共生。但是,奥巴马同时把保护环境的责任完全推卸给中国政府和人民,毫不反思美西方资本主义道路和制度对环境的破坏,不打算改变发达国家的生产方式和生活方式以保护地球。这是赤裸裸的霸权心态。

不接受中国走近世界舞台中央

有一种观点称中国应当自觉保持与美国在发展上的差距,亦即自动不触及第一根准绳。这样的观点不仅幼稚而且无法实现。在高速公路上,不追尾是容易做到的。但在经济社会发展上,国家之间无法做到不追尾。主要原因是,关于经济社会发展诸多领域各国皆采取保密措施。另一个技术原因是,关于经济社会发展的统计是事后的。何况,美国对华关系还取决于另两根准绳。中国在经济社会发展上假如主动放慢速度,其结果不可能换来美国的宽容,而是变本加厉地打压。

西方其他国家处理对华关系,以上第一根准绳不重要,重要的是第二和第三根。欧盟称中国是其“制度性对手”,显示整个西方阵营都难以接受社会主义的中国走近世界舞台的中央。

2023年11月24日,澳洲阿德莱德大学教授高默波在“世界中国学大会.上海论坛”上说了一个故事。他的一位朋友问:“默波,如果中国强大到跟美国一样,我们的生活会是什么样子?”高默波表示,因为他们知道自己现在的生活,有可口可乐、荷里活等这些很熟悉的事物,虽然常有抱怨,但已经很习惯了。那么,如果中国强大到可以影响世界的话,生活会变成什么样?他们很焦虑。

在上述三根准绳汇聚到一起,美国对华关系将变幻不定。

资深评论员、博士
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