Ankara Summit: A Turning Point for NATO and the US
The America celebrating its 250th anniversary is quite different from the one that recent generations of Europeans have come to know. This is worth remembering during days marked by a spirit of friendship, in which we will hear ad nauseam that the trans-Atlantic bond is still vitally important. That is fair, provided we let go of nostalgia and actually look at the world as it is today. Especially since, after Fourth of July celebrations, the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara will once again place U.S. allies at a crossroads between flattery and strategic autonomy.
After the U.S. asserted its economic dominance during the Second Industrial Revolution in the early decades of the previous century, American power became global after World War II. It was reinforced by the “exorbitant privilege” of the U.S. dollar –- as described by Giscard d’Estaing –- established through the Bretton Woods agreements and supported by a formidable network of military alliances and multilateral institutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the height of globalization then positioned the United States as the sole global superpower at the dawn of the new millennium. That era is now only a distant memory. The rise of China has challenged American hegemony and dispelled the belief that only democratic regimes could ensure economic prosperity. Meanwhile, the United States began questioning globalization and multilateralism, deeming them too costly for American industry and the middle class. The U.S. has since shifted its geopolitical focus toward Asia, often at Europe’s expense.
This is the context that set the stage for Donald Trump’s rise and his “America First” policy, which shaped the American political landscape during the first half of the last century. The United States is abandoning its role as a pillar of global order -- despite its president portraying himself as a modern Atlas carrying the world on his shoulders –- and is becoming a more isolated, inward-looking America. However, it is certainly not abandoning its role as a power defending its own interests. On the contrary, in some ways, it is reinforcing that role, and even becoming more predatory. It does not aspire to lead the world but rather to impose its will. We see this in its economic and commercial relations. We especially see it in the unprecedented entanglement between the state and digital giants. Europeans are thus facing threats over the digital services tax after Washington rejected the agreement proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The agreement aimed to tax digital companies in the countries where they generate profits, rather than where they are headquartered, while also establishing a minimum tax for multinational corporations. Non-Americans, including U.S. residents, are thus denied access to the most advanced AI programs, such as Mythos and Fable5. One might say this is less about being a global superpower and more about digital strong-arming.
The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara will take place right in the middle of this transition and cannot ignore the call for Europeans to take responsibility for their own defense. Responding to such a call by looking nostalgically to the past would be futile, and declaring the end of NATO would be irresponsible. The only sensible response is to work toward a different NATO structure with a significantly stronger European component. With the United States stepping back, there is an opportunity to strengthen a European pillar of NATO, which would naturally include its military commands, starting with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium, traditionally led by American commanders. The era of bending over backwards to keep Trump on board is over. As their military spending increases –- though not always aimed at collective defense -– European leaders should demand that the U.S. reaffirm the deterrence principle under Article 5 of the treaty and abandon its stance of “neutrality” between Moscow and Kyiv, rather than simply presenting their reports on spending figures. If Trump changes his stance, peace in Ukraine may become feasible. Otherwise, Ukraine could become the issue that causes a significant rift within the West.
The Ankara summit will also be an important event for Italy. Giorgia Meloni and Trump will meet again after a particularly intense exchange of words –- after all, family feuds are often the hardest to resolve. Now that Italy’s wishful attempt to act as a bridge has been set aside, the country has an opportunity to reclaim a more active role and overcome its reputation as the most reluctant on matters of common defense and the least committed among willing participants. The first step in this direction would be joining the Security Action for Europe program, which focuses on common defense rather than merely increasing national spending. The second, and crucial, step should be issuing eurobonds to finance European common defense. This would help avoid not only the risk of inefficiencies and duplication but also the imbalance caused by Germany’s new rearmament, before it becomes irreversible.
After the U.S. asserted its economic dominance during the Second Industrial Revolution in the early decades of the previous century, American power became global after World War II. It was reinforced by the “exorbitant privilege” of the U.S. dollar –- as described by Giscard d’Estaing –- established through the Bretton Woods agreements and supported by a formidable network of military alliances and multilateral institutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the height of globalization then positioned the United States as the sole global superpower at the dawn of the new millennium. That era is now only a distant memory. The rise of China has challenged American hegemony and dispelled the belief that only democratic regimes could ensure economic prosperity. Meanwhile, the United States began questioning globalization and multilateralism, deeming them too costly for American industry and the middle class. The U.S. has since shifted its geopolitical focus toward Asia, often at Europe’s expense.
This is the context that set the stage for Donald Trump’s rise and his “America First” policy, which shaped the American political landscape during the first half of the last century. The United States is abandoning its role as a pillar of global order -- despite its president portraying himself as a modern Atlas carrying the world on his shoulders –- and is becoming a more isolated, inward-looking America. However, it is certainly not abandoning its role as a power defending its own interests. On the contrary, in some ways, it is reinforcing that role, and even becoming more predatory. It does not aspire to lead the world but rather to impose its will. We see this in its economic and commercial relations. We especially see it in the unprecedented entanglement between the state and digital giants. Europeans are thus facing threats over the digital services tax after Washington rejected the agreement proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The agreement aimed to tax digital companies in the countries where they generate profits, rather than where they are headquartered, while also establishing a minimum tax for multinational corporations. Non-Americans, including U.S. residents, are thus denied access to the most advanced AI programs, such as Mythos and Fable5. One might say this is less about being a global superpower and more about digital strong-arming.
The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara will take place right in the middle of this transition and cannot ignore the call for Europeans to take responsibility for their own defense. Responding to such a call by looking nostalgically to the past would be futile, and declaring the end of NATO would be irresponsible. The only sensible response is to work toward a different NATO structure with a significantly stronger European component. With the United States stepping back, there is an opportunity to strengthen a European pillar of NATO, which would naturally include its military commands, starting with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium, traditionally led by American commanders. The era of bending over backwards to keep Trump on board is over. As their military spending increases –- though not always aimed at collective defense -– European leaders should demand that the U.S. reaffirm the deterrence principle under Article 5 of the treaty and abandon its stance of “neutrality” between Moscow and Kyiv, rather than simply presenting their reports on spending figures. If Trump changes his stance, peace in Ukraine may become feasible. Otherwise, Ukraine could become the issue that causes a significant rift within the West.
The Ankara summit will also be an important event for Italy. Giorgia Meloni and Trump will meet again after a particularly intense exchange of words –- after all, family feuds are often the hardest to resolve. Now that Italy’s wishful attempt to act as a bridge has been set aside, the country has an opportunity to reclaim a more active role and overcome its reputation as the most reluctant on matters of common defense and the least committed among willing participants. The first step in this direction would be joining the Security Action for Europe program, which focuses on common defense rather than merely increasing national spending. The second, and crucial, step should be issuing eurobonds to finance European common defense. This would help avoid not only the risk of inefficiencies and duplication but also the imbalance caused by Germany’s new rearmament, before it becomes irreversible.
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