The ‘Shield of the Americas’ Doesn’t Help Latin America
The Shield of the Americas summit, held in Miami, was in many ways a familiar spectacle. President Donald Trump reiterated well-known themes: a firm hand against drug cartels, persistent antagonism toward Cuba and justification of the war with Iran.
However, amid this usual rhetoric, one detail stood out: Trump’s visible pride as he recalled the support he had given to right-wing figures in several Latin American countries. In Argentina, for example, making financial aid contingent on Javier Milei’s victory was a key factor during the recent legislative elections. It was a similar situation during the presidential elections in Chile and Honduras.
As elections in Brazil, Colombia and Peru draw closer, we could again see the same kind of dynamics. The Shield of the Americas could function less as a security mechanism than as a kind of political franchise, a vehicle for exporting a brand of conservative politics to the South, with Washington’s blessing.
In operational terms, the initiative appears to be driven primarily by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Both men enthusiastically supported the recent joint operation against drug trafficking networks in Ecuador, a precedent that warrants careful analysis. If the logic of the Shield of the Americas is taken seriously and developed further, similar operations could be repeated under the guise of a supposed regional consensus. The question is: Whose consensus? And to what end?
Here, the evident and fundamental contradiction at the heart of the agenda presented in Miami comes to light. Mexico and Colombia — the two countries most affected by drug trafficking, and whose cooperation would be indispensable to any genuine regional security framework — were not invited. Neither was Brazil.
This absence is perhaps the most telling of all. Brazil has the largest and most capable armed forces in Latin America, boasts the continent’s largest economy, and shares borders with 10 of the 12 South American countries. Any regional security initiative that excludes Brazil is not really a security framework, but rather a declaration of ideological preferences.
Decades ago, Argentinian political scientist Juan Carlos Puig argued that countries like Argentina and Brazil should not aspire to full alignment with a hegemonic power, but rather to autonomy: the ability to act within the international system without succumbing to external pressures. Lula da Silva’s Brazil has embodied precisely that logic, what Puig called “heterodox autonomy”: maintaining an open dialogue with Washington while systematically diversifying its partnerships in the Global South. That stance, it seems, is unacceptable in Miami.
A Fractured Region
Trump’s “Donroe” doctrine is prompting some Latin American leaders to diversify their international strategy on Africa, Asia and the Middle East, precisely to reduce their dependence on an unpredictable White House. However, theose who attended the Miami summit seem to prefer being more of a U.S. protectorate.
Furthermore, the Shield of the Americas resembles a political club more than a comprehensive security mechanism. Like Trump’s so-called Board of Peace, it is unlikely to address the structural factors that drive drug trafficking: poverty, institutional weakness, the lack of economic alternatives for rural populations, and the insatiable demand for narcotics in the U.S.
Security summits that exclude those most affected and prioritize ideology over pragmatism don’t produce lasting results – they produce photo ops. There is also another sign that demands attention. Contrary to the expectations of many, China did not emerge as a central priority at the Miami meeting, perhaps due to Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing.
The Panama Canal was mentioned, as expected, but there was no outright rejection of Chinese influence in Latin America. This is telling. The Shield of the Americas, despite its militaristic rhetoric, may end up being less a tool to contain China than a means of reshaping Latin America’s domestic political landscape in Washington’s image.
By framing regional security through an ideological lens and excluding key players, the Trump administration is likely accelerating the very South-South diversification it claims to want to prevent. As Latin American governments watch Washington attempt to impose its political preferences on the regional security architecture, the appeal of joining the BRICS, expanding ties with China — as has already happened with Uruguay — and strengthening trade partnerships with the Middle East may continue to grow stronger.
Reliance on a volatile hegemonic power has always been the most powerful incentive to seek autonomy. The lesson to be learned from decades of Latin American foreign policy is, in fact, the opposite of what was proposed in Miami.
The governments of the “pink tide” — those of da Silva, Christina Fernandez de Kirchner and Hugo Chávez — despite all their internal limitations, understood that autonomy in a multipolar world is built through diversification, not through alignment. That is the tradition of foreign policy on which Latin America should rely: one based on sovereign agency, South-South solidarity and the pragmatic expansion of the region’s range of international relations.
In contrast, the Shield of the Americas proposes a return to the logic of the Monroe Doctrine (now “Donroe”): the region as a protectorate, whose security is defined by and managed from Washington. Latin America has already tried that model. It didn’t work.
However, amid this usual rhetoric, one detail stood out: Trump’s visible pride as he recalled the support he had given to right-wing figures in several Latin American countries. In Argentina, for example, making financial aid contingent on Javier Milei’s victory was a key factor during the recent legislative elections. It was a similar situation during the presidential elections in Chile and Honduras.
As elections in Brazil, Colombia and Peru draw closer, we could again see the same kind of dynamics. The Shield of the Americas could function less as a security mechanism than as a kind of political franchise, a vehicle for exporting a brand of conservative politics to the South, with Washington’s blessing.
In operational terms, the initiative appears to be driven primarily by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Both men enthusiastically supported the recent joint operation against drug trafficking networks in Ecuador, a precedent that warrants careful analysis. If the logic of the Shield of the Americas is taken seriously and developed further, similar operations could be repeated under the guise of a supposed regional consensus. The question is: Whose consensus? And to what end?
Here, the evident and fundamental contradiction at the heart of the agenda presented in Miami comes to light. Mexico and Colombia — the two countries most affected by drug trafficking, and whose cooperation would be indispensable to any genuine regional security framework — were not invited. Neither was Brazil.
This absence is perhaps the most telling of all. Brazil has the largest and most capable armed forces in Latin America, boasts the continent’s largest economy, and shares borders with 10 of the 12 South American countries. Any regional security initiative that excludes Brazil is not really a security framework, but rather a declaration of ideological preferences.
Decades ago, Argentinian political scientist Juan Carlos Puig argued that countries like Argentina and Brazil should not aspire to full alignment with a hegemonic power, but rather to autonomy: the ability to act within the international system without succumbing to external pressures. Lula da Silva’s Brazil has embodied precisely that logic, what Puig called “heterodox autonomy”: maintaining an open dialogue with Washington while systematically diversifying its partnerships in the Global South. That stance, it seems, is unacceptable in Miami.
A Fractured Region
Trump’s “Donroe” doctrine is prompting some Latin American leaders to diversify their international strategy on Africa, Asia and the Middle East, precisely to reduce their dependence on an unpredictable White House. However, theose who attended the Miami summit seem to prefer being more of a U.S. protectorate.
Furthermore, the Shield of the Americas resembles a political club more than a comprehensive security mechanism. Like Trump’s so-called Board of Peace, it is unlikely to address the structural factors that drive drug trafficking: poverty, institutional weakness, the lack of economic alternatives for rural populations, and the insatiable demand for narcotics in the U.S.
Security summits that exclude those most affected and prioritize ideology over pragmatism don’t produce lasting results – they produce photo ops. There is also another sign that demands attention. Contrary to the expectations of many, China did not emerge as a central priority at the Miami meeting, perhaps due to Trump’s upcoming visit to Beijing.
The Panama Canal was mentioned, as expected, but there was no outright rejection of Chinese influence in Latin America. This is telling. The Shield of the Americas, despite its militaristic rhetoric, may end up being less a tool to contain China than a means of reshaping Latin America’s domestic political landscape in Washington’s image.
By framing regional security through an ideological lens and excluding key players, the Trump administration is likely accelerating the very South-South diversification it claims to want to prevent. As Latin American governments watch Washington attempt to impose its political preferences on the regional security architecture, the appeal of joining the BRICS, expanding ties with China — as has already happened with Uruguay — and strengthening trade partnerships with the Middle East may continue to grow stronger.
Reliance on a volatile hegemonic power has always been the most powerful incentive to seek autonomy. The lesson to be learned from decades of Latin American foreign policy is, in fact, the opposite of what was proposed in Miami.
The governments of the “pink tide” — those of da Silva, Christina Fernandez de Kirchner and Hugo Chávez — despite all their internal limitations, understood that autonomy in a multipolar world is built through diversification, not through alignment. That is the tradition of foreign policy on which Latin America should rely: one based on sovereign agency, South-South solidarity and the pragmatic expansion of the region’s range of international relations.
In contrast, the Shield of the Americas proposes a return to the logic of the Monroe Doctrine (now “Donroe”): the region as a protectorate, whose security is defined by and managed from Washington. Latin America has already tried that model. It didn’t work.
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