Brazil and the United States: More Like Enemies Than Friends
Published in Clarin
(Argentina ) on 16 December 2010
by Fabian C. Alle (link to original)
(Argentina ) on 16 December 2010
by Fabian C. Alle (link to original)
Translated from
by Robin Salomon .
Edited by Amy Wong.
New information arises concerning the relationship between the two countries, which should not go overlooked by those who consider foreign policy and Argentine defense.
It has been a little over a year that governments and Western press have had only praiseful words to describe the prudent policy, growth, flourishing economy, stability and societal improvements in Brazil. But something will be changing within the coming months and in most recent events: Since Obama’s defeat in the elections, up until WikiLeaks’ now present effects, there is strong confirmation that there will be a larger dose of caution lingering upon the relationship between the United States and this great South American country.
This rising perception in U.S. analysis and decision-making is convincingly evident in the work “Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy,” published a few months ago by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute. It inclines toward concluding that present and future logic between both countries lean more toward rivalry than toward alliance.
Thanks to WikiLeaks, in this transition, or “historical ending,” thousands of small, medium and medium- to high-grade security cables have spread from the State Department concerning the relationship with Brazil. A review of these cables allows us to see a more formal side of these perceptions. Some examples: the supposed decision of Brazil’s executive power to position the purchase of combat airplanes toward Europe and not toward the United States; previous knowledge in Brazil of there being a FARC presence in Venezuela; a Brazilian minister’s comment about the markedly anti-U.S. attitude of the recently named vice chancellor and current secretary of strategic affairs; the arrests of alleged international terrorist suspects who weren’t formally accused of such charges and the informal requests for intervention made to moderate Arab countries and to influential businessmen in order to avoid the presence of Islamic extremism in Brazil. Lula didn’t doubt to describe these filtrations as “insignificant” nor doubting that “Americans also do stupid things.”
Dilma Rousseff’s presidential election win didn’t do anything but reinforce the idea that this actively growing and challenging foreign policy (although with subtle styles and good characteristics of the Portuguese tradition) is expected to stay constant in the coming years.
In addition to what is expected to happen and what we expect from the president’s personality, as well as that of her collaborators, there will be important economic growth in Brazil in the coming years.
All of this should be an unavoidable fact for our country’s current and future decision-makers in foreign policy and defense matters. Even more so now with evidence of growing problems with Chavez’s government as well as what appears to be a positive stabilization of the United States and Argentine relationship, *as noticed with mutual agreement on anti-proliferation and tensions with the Iran regime.
Both matters subtract multitudes of impunity to Brazil’s strategies, while face-to-face with Washington’s intent stare.
*Translator’s note: (See original version starting at “a partir de puntos de acuerdos”) There seems to be a sort of typo. My translation is what I believed this sentence to have meant, even though in the original document beginning with “a partir” the sentence broke off and was not capitalized to indicate a separate sentence.
It has been a little over a year that governments and Western press have had only praiseful words to describe the prudent policy, growth, flourishing economy, stability and societal improvements in Brazil. But something will be changing within the coming months and in most recent events: Since Obama’s defeat in the elections, up until WikiLeaks’ now present effects, there is strong confirmation that there will be a larger dose of caution lingering upon the relationship between the United States and this great South American country.
This rising perception in U.S. analysis and decision-making is convincingly evident in the work “Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy,” published a few months ago by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute. It inclines toward concluding that present and future logic between both countries lean more toward rivalry than toward alliance.
Thanks to WikiLeaks, in this transition, or “historical ending,” thousands of small, medium and medium- to high-grade security cables have spread from the State Department concerning the relationship with Brazil. A review of these cables allows us to see a more formal side of these perceptions. Some examples: the supposed decision of Brazil’s executive power to position the purchase of combat airplanes toward Europe and not toward the United States; previous knowledge in Brazil of there being a FARC presence in Venezuela; a Brazilian minister’s comment about the markedly anti-U.S. attitude of the recently named vice chancellor and current secretary of strategic affairs; the arrests of alleged international terrorist suspects who weren’t formally accused of such charges and the informal requests for intervention made to moderate Arab countries and to influential businessmen in order to avoid the presence of Islamic extremism in Brazil. Lula didn’t doubt to describe these filtrations as “insignificant” nor doubting that “Americans also do stupid things.”
Dilma Rousseff’s presidential election win didn’t do anything but reinforce the idea that this actively growing and challenging foreign policy (although with subtle styles and good characteristics of the Portuguese tradition) is expected to stay constant in the coming years.
In addition to what is expected to happen and what we expect from the president’s personality, as well as that of her collaborators, there will be important economic growth in Brazil in the coming years.
All of this should be an unavoidable fact for our country’s current and future decision-makers in foreign policy and defense matters. Even more so now with evidence of growing problems with Chavez’s government as well as what appears to be a positive stabilization of the United States and Argentine relationship, *as noticed with mutual agreement on anti-proliferation and tensions with the Iran regime.
Both matters subtract multitudes of impunity to Brazil’s strategies, while face-to-face with Washington’s intent stare.
*Translator’s note: (See original version starting at “a partir de puntos de acuerdos”) There seems to be a sort of typo. My translation is what I believed this sentence to have meant, even though in the original document beginning with “a partir” the sentence broke off and was not capitalized to indicate a separate sentence.