Why Has the West Abandoned Assad?

The Centres for Strategic Studies are discussing the significant shift in the American and European positions towards the Syrian revolution. This has taken place for numerous reasons, including the regime’s use of repression. The martyrdom of a young boy, Hamza Khatib, reveals the extent the regime has slid, reducing it to the lowest of the low. It has used excessive force in Daraa, Homs and Baniyas, and continues to do so everywhere with confirmed reports of rockets being launched, beginning a new stage of repression that perhaps inches us closer to the events of February 1982, when the army levelled parts of the city of Hama in response to a revolution there.

What this in part means is that they will go down the path of almost completely destroying the country in order to save the regime. No one believes the regime’s claims that it will carry out institutional reforms any longer, since according to the New York Times, if President Assad did inaugurate these reforms, it would be tantamount to him putting an end to his regime himself.

The Assad family descends from the Alawite sect which occupies leading positions in the secret forces and the army, and is therefore involved in the repression. Yet in order to reach a political solution, there must be political reforms which would undermine the rule of the minority government. And this is reason why the Obama administration is now taking a more offensive stance. Its announcement on May 18 that it will impose sanctions on Syrian President Bashar Assad was, to be specific, the beginning of removing the haze surrounding the United States’ policy towards this pivotal state since mass revolution erupted there in the middle of March.

It seems Obama has become convinced of the point of view of those strategic schools that have completely put an end to the excuse of not ousting the “devil that we know.” They presented him with compelling arguments to refute the basis of those claims, tearing them to pieces. The justifications of “the devil we know” policy are, according to those Western intellectual schools, as follows:

Assad’s nature is well known; he is a ruler who has been wary of securing some sort of stability throughout his rule, the most probable alternative to him being the re-emergence of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which could shift the current secular state toward a radical fundamentalist Sunni regime, representing a significant risk. Disorder will prevail after Assad, and the Syrian regime’s removal could lead to deep sectarian divisions being unleashed. Finally, the chaos that might overwhelm Syria after Assad could open the door to the nightmare of weapons of mass destruction. Syria’s massive supplies of chemical weapons could either be deployed by the corrupt remnants of the regime or its most reckless successors, or these weapons stocks could be pass on to Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations.

All of these claims have been demolished one after the other in the following logical and rational way:

The illusion of Assad being a force for stability: They say it is difficult to imagine a conceivable successor to Assad pursuing policies that cause more problems or distress than he did. History in fact shows that a regime in the post-transitional period tends to be preoccupied with internal problems, and therefore does not pursue aggressive behavior towards its neighbors, meaning that the new regime will continue Assad’s policy to maintain the situation of the occupied Golan Heights. The Syrian army under Assad’s successor will also concentrate on ensuring internal security rather than engaging in foreign adventures for which Syria could pay highly. Due to the differences in military capabilities between Israel and Syria, Assad has the weaker army, and it has turned its task from protecting the homeland to protecting the regime; and so I think that the Syrian army has not yet had its say. They also reject out of hand that a Sunni leader would maintain Assad’s close relations with Shia Iran and Hezbollah. In this regard, there is an added advantage in ousting Assad.

In regard to the scarecrow of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, they believe that “the devil we know” from the Sunni sect could be politically more secular and moderate in comparison to Assad. Nevertheless, if we assume for the sake of argument that the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a relatively weak movement in Syria considering that many of its members have been killed or put in Assad’s prisons and what remains of them resides outside of the country, will dominate the new regime, it is likely that this new regime will cause fewer problems than the Assad regime did. Furthermore, there is a secular majority in Syria.

As for the pretense that there is a risk of internal collapse after Assad and that “civil war is inevitable,” Syria is in fact less sensitive to ethnic tensions and religious extremism.

And as for the fear of weapons of mass destruction, well, they say that Syria has an arsenal of chemical weapons they describe as “concerning.” It is also important not to exaggerate the threat of weapons of mass destruction “that cannot be controlled.” This analysis suggests that Western powers need not fear taking more decisive measures to support the regime’s opposition in Syria.

The key change in the American and European position is in the clarity of the message sent to Syria. The men surrounding Assad, the commanding officers of the army, the Sunni business class and the brave demonstrators must all know that the best option is the “removal of Assad.”

Dr. Abdul Azim Mahmoud Hanafi is an Egyptian expert on political and strategic affairs.