The Elephant and the Mouse

The “strong pro-Israeli lobby” motif on its own is no use in understanding the relationship between Tel Aviv and Washington.

The commentary on the Middle East conflict is overloaded with many opinions, ideologies, truisms, clichés and wishful thinking. On one hand, it has to do with its actual explosiveness, which owes to its real status in global politics in the 20th century. On the other hand, it also has to do with the characteristic neuralgia of talking about this conflict. This neuralgia, for its part in the line of its protagonists, feeds the idea, which seems almost mythical, of the conflict’s inability to be solved and the constant danger to world peace that has emerged from this very inability. It seems that talking about the Middle East conflict always transcends the Middle East conflict.

In this context, the emphasis on the alleged power of the so-called Israel lobby and its legendary influence on U.S. politics is common and yet surprising. At the same time, the establishment and increasing reinforcement of the idea of this influence can be completely understood, because the close relationship between infinitesimal Israel and the U.S. super power is by no means considered self-evident and therefore needs to be explained. It could certainly — with a reasonable attitude — occur to people that “the Jews” are at work here and are exerting a power that may make the real proportions and power relationships between the countries seem profoundly inadequate. Moreover, since this exertion of influence also manifests itself in an institutionalized form, it can not only be represented ideologically, but also occupied with the projective aspect. This must be assumed to be inadequate and “explained” according to conspiracy theories.

Struggling for Influence

To set an example for the many lobbying organizations, we should start to keep close eyes on the most important one: the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. According to Wikipedia — a source that is sufficient in the present context — AIPAC is “a lobbying group that advocates pro-Israel policies to the Congress and Executive Branch of the United States.” The German-language version of Wikipedia also states that AIPAC was founded in 1953 by Isaiah L. Kenen as the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs and was renamed at a later date. It also explains that AIPAC is considered to be the most powerful pro-Israel lobby and is also one of the most powerful lobbies in the United States. The importance of the organization as an element in the U.S. establishment is reflected in the prominence of many of its past and present members, not least U.S. top-ranking politicians such as presidents George Bush Sr., George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, vice president Dick Cheney, secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice or prominent senators who were also nominated for the U.S. presidency, such as John Kerry and John McCain. Accordingly, on the Israeli side of the spectrum we find all the prime ministers from the Israeli Labor Party, from Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak to Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert of the Kadima party, which was founded by members of the Likud party, to Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party.

Given that the formation of lobbies, pressure groups and other special interest groups since the end of World War II basically always played by the usual liberal democratic rules, the establishment of institutions like AIPAC cannot be subjected to criticism per se if the system that produced them is not called into question. If this were to happen it would be tantamount to a sacrilege in the U.S. context. In addition, the combination of capital and authority will in time account for the character of this form of (formal) democracy. Thus the question is not whether the influence of AIPAC is legitimate — it is beyond doubt legitimate — but first and foremost, how such an influence can even be explained. The question is all the more suggestive as — as previously mentioned — the leaders of Israel and the United States have been among the members of this organization for decades.

The obvious answer arises from the instrumental logic of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. In terms of domestic policy, it is about a simple structural requirement: The U.S. president — both for governing in his first term in office and his reelection into his second term — needs the support of institutions and organizations that are capable of exerting an influence on Congress, which Obama strives to “align with” and recruit the electorate in due course. In this regard, AIPAC will be able to notch up even more of a success the more they succeed in establishing a network of close-knit affiliations with senators whose support the president is striving for, and in becoming stronger in their common interests. For example, when the American-Israeli relationship came into a crisis in March 1975 because Israel strictly refused the United States’ request to withdraw to a particular front line on the Sinai peninsula without a regulated disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, the White House threatened a reassessment of U.S. relations with Israel. In response to this, U.S. president Gerald Ford received a letter that contained a statement supporting Israel that was signed by three-quarters of the members of the Senate. The crisis only came to an end when a “civil” presence of Americans in the area in question was agreed, which established the interim agreement of 1975 between Israel and Egypt to extend U.S. influence to Egypt possibly. They therefore snatched Egypt from the Soviet sphere of influence and also caused repercussions on U.S.-Israeli relations and bilateral obligations of both countries, including a commitment from Washington to not start any more new U.S. policies in the region without consulting with Israel first.

If you take this “incident” into consideration, it may at first seem as though pro-Israel lobbying, as was reflected in the letter from the senators, has enabled the U.S. president to give up his reassessment policy, or even change it altogether. Thus, in fact, such “successes” are celebrated in the Department of State and Israel’s compliant media, without actually abandoning any accountability on the matter. This is whether whatever is currently being “fought against” actually contradicts Israel’s real interests, or whether it is simply an ideologically pre-established policy — for example, the stagnation in the Middle East conflict and the repression against the Palestinians — that is implemented for Israel’s alleged interest. It is nevertheless noteworthy that even during this “incident” in 1975, though the Israelis deluded themselves into thinking that they had defeated the Americans, the U.S. president’s policy still emerged as the real winner in the geo-political and actual conflict of interests. The United States was to return to this policy at a later date. Thus, the fact that the Israelis can put their small success in foreign policy down to a thrown-together diplomatic appetizer may be recorded as a secondary phenomenon of American graciousness in the dynamics of real power relationships, but in this current context it plays a completely inferior role.

The Bloc Powers’ Plaything

The other reason for Israel’s influence on U.S. foreign policy primarily has to do with the global line-up of the so-called Middle East conflict and its repercussions on the major powers. During the peak of the Cold War and immediately after the declaration of the State of Israel, the country very quickly got involved in the conflict in the bloc system that was established by the United States and the Soviet Union. What at first seemed uncertain for Israel was soon explained at the beginning of the 1950s: Israel entered into the Western alliance, which was at first in conjunction with France, especially in terms of military arms. Then, as a result of the French arms embargo after the Six Day War, this role was assumed by the United States. There are several contributing factors that made the Western world seem attractive to Israel: democratic governments, sympathy for the Jewish state as the creation of Shoah foundations, empathy for its fight against overly-powerful hostile surroundings and other similar factors relating to morals and their instrumentally-ideological value.

Nevertheless, a matter-of-fact consideration can hardly ignore the fact that Israel, its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians and their “requests” are passing the plaything of a bitter policy of self-interest to the bloc powers that are striving for regional hegemony. The perennial conflict situation in the Middle East may not only have been acceptable in the eyes of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in fact they may have even had a genuine interest in fuelling the conflict. They did this by not continuing to make peace in the region with any consistence, and now and again — when it came to testing new weapons on “neutral” ground — promoting and supporting periodically flaring clashes between Israel and the Arab countries. In the process of political rhetoric, what was passing under the name of assistance for the friend and allies, or military support of Israel’s right of existence and of self-defense also has to do with comparing the efficiency of the U.S. Phantom fighter jets and the Soviet MiG fighter jets. It is evident that the same applies to the ideological orientation of the Soviet Union towards the Arabic states that they supported, especially Syria and Iraq.

However, what still appeared to be the fight of great ideologies and philosophies during the Cold War era, and consequently may have exhibited a certain normative dimension, may have needed to be wrapped in moral values after the collapse of the USSR. But people had the effrontery to boast about combating the Axis of Evil and corresponding complimentary slogans of a strikingly self-righteous self-image. The mission of bringing democracy to Iraq is a good example of this. But ultimately, a strictly interest-based geopolitics was at work here with such absolute right to unhindered implementation that George W. Bush was able to afford in order to reign the war back into the service of U.S. capitalist interests. This was at a time when this instrument of state power practice became obsolete with the end of the bloc system, or would seem to be obsolete in time.

What role could the Middle East conflict still play in this world-historical context? The United States was the only country acting as a world policeman in real terms and barely needed to care about international organizations and their interests. This then begs the question: What kind of an influence on U.S. politics could the Israel lobby, above all AIPAC, draw upon in this context? The most recent diplomatic verbal exchange between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may shed some light on this.

Showdown in Congress

As is well-known, Obama entered his first term in office with the foreign policy aim of creating a new approach to the Islamic world and thus clearly distancing himself from his predecessor’s approach. This had to have an impact, not least on U.S. policy in the Middle East. Generations of U.S. presidents and their administrations have each had their own ideas about the solution to the permanent conflict between the Israelis and Arabs or Palestinians in their own form and enthusiasm. In that respect, Obama shook things up when he proved to be unimpressed by the enthusiastic gestures of friendship between George W. Bush and Ariel Sharon or Ehud Olmert. This was a line-up of demonstrative affinity that did not end in escalating violence between Israel and its enemies in Lebanon and Gaza, for example. But rather, Obama prepared — or so people hoped — to take the details of the conflict seriously and to direct these details toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The fact that Obama cannot show much after the first half of his term in office has to do with priorities determined by domestic policy and the severe defeat that he faced during congressional elections. Now, in the House of Representatives, the Republicans, who are acting like they were hostilely voted into opposition, are calling the shots. The main reason for Obama’s occasional ineffectiveness that makes him look powerless in the Middle East is certainly down to the fate of the currently determining political line-up. Not only is the most right-wing government coalition that Israel has ever had currently in power, it is a coalition that could immediately collapse with the slightest move by Netanyahu toward giving up land to the Palestinians, which would also mean a loss of power for Netanyahu. Furthermore, Netanyahu himself is by no means ideologically interested in reconciliation with the Palestinians that would be inevitably accompanied by a massive withdrawal from the occupied territories, the dismantling of the settlements, the solution to the question of Jerusalem and the recognition of the Palestinian refugee problem. Regardless of the mutual aversion — which certainly seems to be personal — between the two heads of state, the political position of Obama and Netanyahu as to the imminent resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could hardly be more polarized.

Thus it came to a showdown. In Congress they may have played up the speech to be held by the Israeli prime minister as the “speech of his life” beforehand; they speculated about a possible breakthrough in the political contents and even ranted about Netanyahu announcing a change in his beliefs. And yet Obama’s speech before the arrival of Netanyahu in the United States, in which he spoke of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of those borders, was countered by Netanyahu by proclaiming that Israel will never withdraw to those borders because they were “indefensible.” In saying this, he expressed a course of clear confrontation with the U.S. president, and consequently made a speech in Congress that left little to the imagination in terms of rhetorical brilliance and performance-based gestures, but at the same time barely surpassed substantive emptiness, ideological clichés and a lack of political perspective.

Netanyahu’s popularity in Israel according to surveys carried out immediately afterward rose significantly, and he was also highly praised for his performance by Avigdor Lieberman, his minister of foreign affairs, after his speech in Congress was received with several standing ovations. Netanyahu may see this as notching up a personal success. The pondering Israeli media reacted with some bewilderment because of the blustering emptiness of this success and of the missed opportunity that slightly opened up the looming stagnation of the Middle East conflict before the world public. However, it is no less eloquent, albeit thoroughly consistent with the general public’s enthusiasm, which once again could be seen — as so often in recent domestic Israeli discourse — in its complete narcissistically chauvinistic rejection.

What did people think about this political interlude? Do they see it as a result of the recently effective influence of the Israel lobby in the United States? Or perhaps as the American president buckling before AIPAC, as after he had the big speech in which he postulated the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, he give a seemingly calming speech at AIPAC’s annual convention. Whoever interprets the political confrontation between Netanyahu and Obama in this way has not grasped something fundamental.

Limited Scope

The scope of Israeli independence from the United States has its borders right where the United States’ genuine interests are affected in a way that they could result in substantial damages because of Israel’s actions. Much is possible within this scope, therefore even talking about friendship, loyalty and similarly empty clichés from the collection of individual interpersonal relationships. Countries do not act on such a level; least of all do they interact with it. However, if they claim to do this in a declarative manner, then they are acting with an ideological purpose in mind in order to create a communicative basis for objective interests in a rhetorical style using gestures and emotions. Furthermore, recipients of such communication will still be able to waver in false awareness over the real nature of the relationships. The United States can accept and control Israel as long as Israel’s actions do not run counter to the United States’ geopolitical or other global interests. If Israel were to seriously endanger this, it would only be a question of time until the United States reprimands Israel. If this reprehension is no use, then they will simply turn its back on the country and even consciously oppose it. It does not even have to be about earth-shattering structures and aims.

Even on a symbolic level, there are quite precisely outlined boundaries of Israeli or Jewish actions. When Jonathan Pollard revealed his American-Israeli dual loyalty by spying against the United States for Israel in the 1980s, Washington was relentless in dealing with an emotional plea for mercy from Israel, despite the effort to build Jonathan Pollard up to the Alfred Dreyfus of the 20th century. That was no use to AIPAC or any other Israel lobby; as a consequence, there was no considerable difference between Democrats and Republicans. In U.S. political reality, the Israel lobby has as much influence as permitted by the official U.S. authority that is decisive in real terms. It’s like the well-known joke about the elephant and the mouse: The mouse can be happy about how much dust he and the elephant can swirl up together. The mouse can even claim to ride the elephant. But at this point, someone should explain to the mouse about real power relationships, possibly even those that the mouse attaches to the power of being able to ride an elephant and make it aware that it is serving an old anti-Semitic ideology.

The sociologist Moshe Zuckermann has taught at the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas at the University of Tel Aviv since 1990 and was Director of the Institute for German History at Tel Aviv University from 2000 to 2005. His latest publication is »Antisemit!« Ein Vorwurf als Herrschaftsinstrument. (“Antisemite!” An Accusation as an Instrument of Power, not available in English) Vienna, published by Promedia Verlag in 2010.