Empire vs. Empire: Part II
Published in OS Radio
(Russia) on 13 January 2012
by Valery Panov (link to original)
(Russia) on 13 January 2012
by Valery Panov (link to original)
Translated from
by Robin Phillips.
Edited by Janie Boschma.
The drafters of the new American strategy emphasize that the U.S. will continue to "build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage [Russia] to be a contributor across a broad range of issues." Patronizingly, so to speak, they clap us on the shoulder and point out our place: in the wake of American policy, naturally. The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of "Uncle Sam" clearly do not assess our capabilities very highly...
CSTO: A Shield against "Anaconda"
The defined Middle Eastern and Asia-Pacific vectors of further American expansion coincide with the locations of U.S. bases as exactly as one could foresee in a geopolitical concept known as "Anaconda." It is often said of this "snake," that its tail is located in New Zealand, its trunk lies in Asia and Africa, and the head is in Washington. Analysts note that since the Cold War, very little has changed in the relationship between Russia and the U.S. Russia, essentially, did not become part of the Euro-Atlantic system of relations. But today, first of all, we must talk about the North-South confrontation provoked by America, which completely replaces the former East-West line of political-military division. Thus, for Russia the military threat from the South, which until recently was hypothetical, has become completely real.
Such a turn of events was not unexpected for Russia. In September 2011, in a report given at Southern Federal University, Director of the Center for Geopolitical Expertise Valery Korovin emphasized:
"The Americans are counting on using the "Anaconda" plan: the encirclement of the enemy and cutting off contact with the outside world. We have lost our nearest allies: the countries of Eastern Europe. Around 100 U.S. military bases are located in Eurasia. The last gap along Russia's border is Iran, and therefore American forces are actively punching toward it."
Long before the Americans took concrete steps to realize the final parts of the "Anaconda" plan with respect to Russia, in May 1992, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent. Today it includes Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. At the Moscow session of May 14, 2002, a decision was taken to transform the CST into a full-fledged international organization: the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Today the CSTO is the largest security organization in the post-Soviet space. Its task is the protection of the territorial and economic space of member countries from any external military-political aggressors international terrorists, or large-scale natural disaster, by means of joint army and support units.
Since February 2009, the CSTO has included a Collective Rapid Reaction Force, which will be used primarily to deflect military aggression, to conduct special operations in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, transnational organized crime, narco-trafficking, and for emergency response. At the same time, the representative of the CSTO Secretariat said that Iran could eventually receive the status of an observer nation in the CSTO. The press secretary of the CSTO Secretariat, Vladimir Zainetdinov, recently announced the approval of a program to equip 20,000 RRF troops with the latest weapons and combat equipment. The backbone is the 98th Airborne Division from Ivanovo and the 31st Air Assault Brigade from Ulyanovsk. Other members of the CSTO have designated units for sustained combat readiness; the battalion made up of their police and army units amounts to some 17,000 bayonets. The RRF includes more than 2000 special forces troops and Ministry of Emergency Situations troops.
What kind of interests do the Central Asian countries of the CSTO have? In Astana, Tashkent or Bishkek, do they consider this military-political union as an ideological burden in the relationship with Russia, or are they solving some of their own practical problems?
Political scientist Alexander Knyazev gave his opinion in an interview with "Radio Liberty”: "I think that the CSTO is fulfilling a dual role. This is one of the variations of maintaining regional, and for each separately, national security. Not one country in the region, even Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, is in a condition to independently provide it. Still, I think that subconsciously, any of the leaders of any of the countries in the region hope that the CSTO's potential could be used in case of internal instability... But often the local, national interests of one or another country will raise the question of what they will think in Washington, or how will this play in Brussels, or sometimes in Beijing."
At the December 2011 session of the CSTO's Council of Collective Security, with the participation of the leaders of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, one of the main priorities of the CSTO summit was declared to be Afghanistan. "Currently Afghanistan is possibly the greatest threat to the member states of the CSTO. Impulses emanating from there are enabling the growth of terrorism, extremism, organized crime and narco-trafficking," said the Russian representative to CSTO, Igor Lyakin-Frolov. He added that in Afghanistan there are also training camps for militants, who include citizens from the countries of Central Asia. "They prepare not only for action on the territory of Afghanistan itself, but also for possible actions on the territory of member countries of the CSTO," said the diplomat. "The situation is worrisome. Moreover, the situation is tending to worsen, which causes us worry about the beginning of withdrawal of American forces from the country."
The second task of the CSTO — limiting the influence of the West — is less publicized. In the CSTO they recognize that this threat to the bloc is considered more serious than Afghan narco-trafficking.
A series of Moscow agreements is directed at exactly that struggle. "The Russian delegation considers one of the main agreements reached is the agreement concerning the placement of military bases of external regional powers within the CSTO territory only with the agreement of CSTO partners. Russia considers this an additional factor for stability in the Eurasian continent and a visible demonstration of the allied nature of relations among our countries," said Natalia Timakova, press secretary for the Russian president.
The U.S. edition of "EurasiaNet" wrote in September 2011: "Russian officials think the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a bloc of friendly ex-Soviet republics, can develop into a security grouping on par with NATO. But recent CSTO military exercises show that Moscow lacks a clear vision for how to utilize the alliance.
“'For a long time, Russia had a very uncertain position with the CSTO: it wanted allies, but it didn't want to have to pay,' said Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a retired general who until last year headed the Russian Ministry of Defense's International Cooperation Directorate.
"'When I was in my last position, I tried to convince two ministers of defense and two chiefs of general staff that if you want to have allies, you have to pay, like the Americans do — if they wanted to have allies in Europe, they paid,' Buzhinsky continued. 'Now it seems to me that the political decision has been taken that Russia is ready to pay. So the plan now is to strengthen the CSTO and make it a real political/military alliance.'
"'The processes taking place in North Africa and the Middle East were difficult to forecast. What will happen next? What leadership will come to power? This has to be a warning to all states. We have similar questions for the Central Asian countries. We must be prepared for anything. This is why we are practicing with these drills,' said Gen. Nikolay Makarov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Army, before the CSTO exercises began. 'Russia's military organization must be ready for a worst-case scenario.'"
When Western analysts once compared the CSTO to a second NATO, the general secretary of the CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha remarked: "We don't want to be the second NATO. We want to be the first CSTO."* Any organization and its ability to act is determined by the potential which it has at its disposal, he said. Today the CSTO has the necessary potential to influence the security situation in the post-Soviet space, the CSTO General Secretary believes.
In keeping with its status, the CSTO carries out work to ensure the cooperation of the member states of its international organizations on relevant, current issues, and establishes constructive contacts with the CIS, EurAsEC, the OSCE, SCO, the IOM and the European Union.
But it is both funny and sad when, participating in a session of the Permanent Council of the CSTO in Moscow, the secretary general of the OSCE, Lamberto Zannier, proposes a military organization to develop cooperation in the areas of economics and environmental action. And also to unite for the realization of the movement of "a single, common, and undivided Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok that would rely on common principles." Yet NATO has not reacted to the CSTO proposal on cooperation in the area of providing stability in Central Asia. At that time, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, spoke of the possibility of NATO and CSTO cooperation in Afghanistan.
On Dec. 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to grant the CSTO observer status at the UN General Assembly. But a letter sent to the UN General Secretary in August 2009, under the working title "Cooperation Between the UN and the CSTO," was never answered.
Although the document especially emphasizes that for a more effective level of cooperation and joint action, the CSTO and UN should deepen their mutual relationship. The member states of the CSTO proposed a draft resolution of the General Assembly on cooperation between the two organizations. They recall that an agreement went into effect on the peacekeeping activities of the CSTO. They pay attention to the fact that "in all of these areas, there are closely intertwined efforts undertaken by the UN and international groups, including the CSTO." The letter emphasizes: "The emerging mechanism of peacekeeping activities offers the opportunity of its use in peacekeeping operations, including under the aegis of the UN."
Undoubtedly, the CSTO, so to say, is not an analogy of NATO, which has already carried out three wars under the "aegis" of the U.N.: in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The Alliance needs no competition and it, together with international structures under its control, attempts to do everything it can to weaken the CSTO, and to negate all of its efforts to provide stability in the central region. This is what is actually observed. So, the CSTO can oppose the onslaught of the "Anaconda," but can hardly destroy it: there are not enough forces to solve this problem on a global scale. "America tells us to our faces that the world must be American. They are building a global American empire. National governments are not strong enough to oppose it. Opposing an empire can only be done by another empire," said Valery Korovin.
*Editor's note: This quote could not be verified.
Editor's note: To be continued tomorrow: "A New Warsaw Pact?" part three in a three-part translation of Valery Panov's "Empire vs. Empire."
Read Part I here.
Read Part III here.
CSTO: A Shield against "Anaconda"
The defined Middle Eastern and Asia-Pacific vectors of further American expansion coincide with the locations of U.S. bases as exactly as one could foresee in a geopolitical concept known as "Anaconda." It is often said of this "snake," that its tail is located in New Zealand, its trunk lies in Asia and Africa, and the head is in Washington. Analysts note that since the Cold War, very little has changed in the relationship between Russia and the U.S. Russia, essentially, did not become part of the Euro-Atlantic system of relations. But today, first of all, we must talk about the North-South confrontation provoked by America, which completely replaces the former East-West line of political-military division. Thus, for Russia the military threat from the South, which until recently was hypothetical, has become completely real.
Such a turn of events was not unexpected for Russia. In September 2011, in a report given at Southern Federal University, Director of the Center for Geopolitical Expertise Valery Korovin emphasized:
"The Americans are counting on using the "Anaconda" plan: the encirclement of the enemy and cutting off contact with the outside world. We have lost our nearest allies: the countries of Eastern Europe. Around 100 U.S. military bases are located in Eurasia. The last gap along Russia's border is Iran, and therefore American forces are actively punching toward it."
Long before the Americans took concrete steps to realize the final parts of the "Anaconda" plan with respect to Russia, in May 1992, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent. Today it includes Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. At the Moscow session of May 14, 2002, a decision was taken to transform the CST into a full-fledged international organization: the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Today the CSTO is the largest security organization in the post-Soviet space. Its task is the protection of the territorial and economic space of member countries from any external military-political aggressors international terrorists, or large-scale natural disaster, by means of joint army and support units.
Since February 2009, the CSTO has included a Collective Rapid Reaction Force, which will be used primarily to deflect military aggression, to conduct special operations in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, transnational organized crime, narco-trafficking, and for emergency response. At the same time, the representative of the CSTO Secretariat said that Iran could eventually receive the status of an observer nation in the CSTO. The press secretary of the CSTO Secretariat, Vladimir Zainetdinov, recently announced the approval of a program to equip 20,000 RRF troops with the latest weapons and combat equipment. The backbone is the 98th Airborne Division from Ivanovo and the 31st Air Assault Brigade from Ulyanovsk. Other members of the CSTO have designated units for sustained combat readiness; the battalion made up of their police and army units amounts to some 17,000 bayonets. The RRF includes more than 2000 special forces troops and Ministry of Emergency Situations troops.
What kind of interests do the Central Asian countries of the CSTO have? In Astana, Tashkent or Bishkek, do they consider this military-political union as an ideological burden in the relationship with Russia, or are they solving some of their own practical problems?
Political scientist Alexander Knyazev gave his opinion in an interview with "Radio Liberty”: "I think that the CSTO is fulfilling a dual role. This is one of the variations of maintaining regional, and for each separately, national security. Not one country in the region, even Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, is in a condition to independently provide it. Still, I think that subconsciously, any of the leaders of any of the countries in the region hope that the CSTO's potential could be used in case of internal instability... But often the local, national interests of one or another country will raise the question of what they will think in Washington, or how will this play in Brussels, or sometimes in Beijing."
At the December 2011 session of the CSTO's Council of Collective Security, with the participation of the leaders of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, one of the main priorities of the CSTO summit was declared to be Afghanistan. "Currently Afghanistan is possibly the greatest threat to the member states of the CSTO. Impulses emanating from there are enabling the growth of terrorism, extremism, organized crime and narco-trafficking," said the Russian representative to CSTO, Igor Lyakin-Frolov. He added that in Afghanistan there are also training camps for militants, who include citizens from the countries of Central Asia. "They prepare not only for action on the territory of Afghanistan itself, but also for possible actions on the territory of member countries of the CSTO," said the diplomat. "The situation is worrisome. Moreover, the situation is tending to worsen, which causes us worry about the beginning of withdrawal of American forces from the country."
The second task of the CSTO — limiting the influence of the West — is less publicized. In the CSTO they recognize that this threat to the bloc is considered more serious than Afghan narco-trafficking.
A series of Moscow agreements is directed at exactly that struggle. "The Russian delegation considers one of the main agreements reached is the agreement concerning the placement of military bases of external regional powers within the CSTO territory only with the agreement of CSTO partners. Russia considers this an additional factor for stability in the Eurasian continent and a visible demonstration of the allied nature of relations among our countries," said Natalia Timakova, press secretary for the Russian president.
The U.S. edition of "EurasiaNet" wrote in September 2011: "Russian officials think the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a bloc of friendly ex-Soviet republics, can develop into a security grouping on par with NATO. But recent CSTO military exercises show that Moscow lacks a clear vision for how to utilize the alliance.
“'For a long time, Russia had a very uncertain position with the CSTO: it wanted allies, but it didn't want to have to pay,' said Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a retired general who until last year headed the Russian Ministry of Defense's International Cooperation Directorate.
"'When I was in my last position, I tried to convince two ministers of defense and two chiefs of general staff that if you want to have allies, you have to pay, like the Americans do — if they wanted to have allies in Europe, they paid,' Buzhinsky continued. 'Now it seems to me that the political decision has been taken that Russia is ready to pay. So the plan now is to strengthen the CSTO and make it a real political/military alliance.'
"'The processes taking place in North Africa and the Middle East were difficult to forecast. What will happen next? What leadership will come to power? This has to be a warning to all states. We have similar questions for the Central Asian countries. We must be prepared for anything. This is why we are practicing with these drills,' said Gen. Nikolay Makarov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Army, before the CSTO exercises began. 'Russia's military organization must be ready for a worst-case scenario.'"
When Western analysts once compared the CSTO to a second NATO, the general secretary of the CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha remarked: "We don't want to be the second NATO. We want to be the first CSTO."* Any organization and its ability to act is determined by the potential which it has at its disposal, he said. Today the CSTO has the necessary potential to influence the security situation in the post-Soviet space, the CSTO General Secretary believes.
In keeping with its status, the CSTO carries out work to ensure the cooperation of the member states of its international organizations on relevant, current issues, and establishes constructive contacts with the CIS, EurAsEC, the OSCE, SCO, the IOM and the European Union.
But it is both funny and sad when, participating in a session of the Permanent Council of the CSTO in Moscow, the secretary general of the OSCE, Lamberto Zannier, proposes a military organization to develop cooperation in the areas of economics and environmental action. And also to unite for the realization of the movement of "a single, common, and undivided Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok that would rely on common principles." Yet NATO has not reacted to the CSTO proposal on cooperation in the area of providing stability in Central Asia. At that time, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, spoke of the possibility of NATO and CSTO cooperation in Afghanistan.
On Dec. 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to grant the CSTO observer status at the UN General Assembly. But a letter sent to the UN General Secretary in August 2009, under the working title "Cooperation Between the UN and the CSTO," was never answered.
Although the document especially emphasizes that for a more effective level of cooperation and joint action, the CSTO and UN should deepen their mutual relationship. The member states of the CSTO proposed a draft resolution of the General Assembly on cooperation between the two organizations. They recall that an agreement went into effect on the peacekeeping activities of the CSTO. They pay attention to the fact that "in all of these areas, there are closely intertwined efforts undertaken by the UN and international groups, including the CSTO." The letter emphasizes: "The emerging mechanism of peacekeeping activities offers the opportunity of its use in peacekeeping operations, including under the aegis of the UN."
Undoubtedly, the CSTO, so to say, is not an analogy of NATO, which has already carried out three wars under the "aegis" of the U.N.: in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The Alliance needs no competition and it, together with international structures under its control, attempts to do everything it can to weaken the CSTO, and to negate all of its efforts to provide stability in the central region. This is what is actually observed. So, the CSTO can oppose the onslaught of the "Anaconda," but can hardly destroy it: there are not enough forces to solve this problem on a global scale. "America tells us to our faces that the world must be American. They are building a global American empire. National governments are not strong enough to oppose it. Opposing an empire can only be done by another empire," said Valery Korovin.
*Editor's note: This quote could not be verified.
Editor's note: To be continued tomorrow: "A New Warsaw Pact?" part three in a three-part translation of Valery Panov's "Empire vs. Empire."
Read Part I here.
Read Part III here.