International current affairs remind me of an Otto von Bismark’s quote, “The statesman’s task is to hear God’s footsteps marching through history, and to try and catch on to His coattails as He marches past.” We live in times of major changes in world politics and economics, and there are even bigger creeping changes. If Bismarck lived today, he would see epoch-making steps in those changes and would use the same activity formula: look at the historical dynamics, understand it and try to make it useful for his country. For the past 20 years, historic clocks seem to have been going faster than during previous epochs. We are used to being at a crossroads. But it’s quite possible that the decisions we are making now are the most significant ones since the collapse of USSR. That what my article is about.
The Historic Moment
A Historic Moment is a time when an epoch begins, when countries are trying to find their place in this new epoch. Therefore at this very moment, emotions, political eagerness and ambitions are supposed to fade. That is, it is the moment when coolness of judgment and conclusions are the only correct political approach, since that is what the state’s success in future decades depends on. Ukraine is going through that sort of moment right now.
First of all, we should admit that Ukraine, like many other countries, is on the verge of the new global reality, which is going to be either very positive or very negative. A period of global prosperity for the next decade is as likely as an economic crisis, which will lead to a reexamination of the traditional basics of international relations. Ukraine should be prepared for both scenarios. The most important thing is that whichever way the history unfolds, there is no scenario where those global changes would not influence Ukrainian foreign policy. The realization of what kind of influence it is going to be is crucial.
Crisis (or Reformation) of the West: The Economic Dimension
There is no point in arguing that the West is going through a crisis. It’s probably in the deepest one since WW II. The crisis has three dimensions: economic, geopolitical and ideological.
The economic dimension is the most evident one.
The financial shocks of 2008-2009 and the current eurozone crisis showed that the social security system established in the West loses stability with an escalation of negative demographic tendencies and the massive transfer of industrial production to the East. What seemed to be a solid financial base is moving away from the sight of several generations. Companies, plants and sometimes whole industries are transferred to China, India and Indonesia…. It is applicable not only to many E.U. countries, but to the U.S. as well.
Despite the scale of approaching problems, the U.S. is in a better disposition to solve them. With its power being more consolidated than the E.U.’s, the population being more mobile and the dollar possessing the status of a world’s currency, Washington can resist negative economic tendencies. Its most radical tool is raising the national debt ceiling from time to time, which includes printing more dollars, and uses the support of people all over the world who keep their savings in dollars.
As a result, we have a financial “bubble” of astronomical proportions. As of Jan. 26, the U.S. has its national debt ceiling at $16.4 trillion. The U.S. population is becoming more and more aware of the fact that this way is dangerous and that the country cannot keep moving in that direction. Particularly, the government will have to cut down expenses, increase taxes and search for new ways to encourage national industries. There will be opportunities for that, especially since the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns are coming to the end. Although, nobody can guarantee that cutting down expenses and raising taxes would not affect the economy in a negative way. In other words, the U.S. is going to face a challenging and important period of time and is going to concentrate on its national problems.
The European Union is going to face similar problems, but here the situation is more complex. There are at least three reasons for that.
First of all, the crisis caught the E.U. at the moment when an effective (for its extended format) decision-making tool had not been created yet. In such economic conditions, governments need not only a skilled leader, but also an effective guidance system. While there are several leaders in the E.U., their guidance system is still not perfect, despite the improvements made in the last few years.
A popular crisis recovery strategy through deepening integration sounds quite logical. But if it will be performed the same exact way it was done in one of the E.U. countries, it can lead to new tensions within the European Union.
Another thing is that Europeans are so used to all of the benefits and guarantees of a “welfare state,” which has been a big pride of the E.U. for many years, that any attempt to make a correction will require a painful struggle not only on the political level, but on the individual level as well. In the next few years, the E.U.’s citizens will have to sacrifice some of their luxury habits and create stricter models of everyday life. That is the way that can lead to the political landscape’s change, including the rise of political parties, practicing populism and isolationist ideology.
Finally, the E.U. is facing the problem of the eurozone, which was created unbalanced and with a number of errors. Its improvement is a complex issue at the moment, partially because of the problems mentioned above.
The situation is complicated, but it is not tragic. Western economic problems in both the U.S. and E.U. can be solved, but certain things, which seemed fundamental before, should be reconsidered to make it happen. I am talking not only about the foundation of the “welfare state,” but also about new models of government-business cooperation and new forms of control over financial markets. (The Dodd-Frank reform was the first step on this path.) I am also talking about the reconsideration of Western geopolitical influence. At that point, we should start talking about the second dimension of the crisis.
Leadership Crisis
First and foremost, the geopolitical crisis of the modern world is a leadership crisis. A bipolar world does not exist anymore, nor does a monopolar one. Predictions that we will have a multipolar world sound logical, but it is more likely to be a distant possibility. It looks like today there is no clear leader in the world. The U.S. and the E.U. are concentrated on themselves, and the “young tiger” nations have not created global expansionist policy traditions yet. Again, in the geopolitical sense, we are on the verge of a new reality that will not necessarily be positive. However, there are grounds for optimism. For example, the West perceives the impending changes without unnecessary tragedy.
There is little doubt that China will be the most powerful economy in the world starting in 2025. Some believe that it will happen in 2018. That just makes the U.S., and to a lesser extent the E.U., face the need to reconsider their global agenda. This trend will intensify in the future.
Among the particular characteristics of the situation is not only the fact that the West will be forced to spend the next decade trying to solve their economic problems, but also that other world regions are going through a period of self-actualization, awareness of their own ambitions and opportunities in the global arena. The time of impressive economic growth (that is what the last 20 years have been like) has created a unique situation where dozens of regional leaders with global opportunities and ambitions are taking the place of one world leader. Global power is becoming decentralized; a new system of international relations is being formed where the U.S. will still be an integral part, but will more likely perform as a mediator. And, according to Washington’s rhetoric, they are prepared for this role.
The United States will not lose its position of a global leader, but they will not be the only leader anymore. And, perhaps after the “decade of wars,” the U.S. will benefit from this. They need a break to fix internal affairs, as well as to gain trust back. We can see how the U.S. presidential campaign unfolds, as there is an ongoing debate on whether there is going to be another “American century” and whether the U.S. needs it or not. Americans should answer this question themselves. I will express my opinion: There is enough space for the U.S. and other global leaders. However, it is hard to imagine the U.S. not in a leading position.
Reconsideration of Western Ideology
The ideological dimension of the ongoing changes in the West is, first of all, a reconsideration of their place in the world. As mentioned above, this means a gradual limitation of America’s global leadership and a change of its geographical priorities. For the E.U., however, it means an ideological change of what we call the European alliance.
The ideological impulse towards European integration, which has been a determinative feature of the development on the continent for quite a long time, is declining, to some extent because of its cyclical pattern and partially because of the E.U.’s internal problems. There is an opinion, shared both in political circles and between the voters, that the history chapter associated with the continent’s integration is pretty much over and that the “United Europe” project succeeded. This explains why more and more legal obstacles are being encountered during the new wave of expansion (for example, the requirements of their approval during referendums held by several members). It means that after the accession of Balkan states, we can expect a long or even very long pause before the E.U. expansion to the East.
The fact that a large part of Europe remains outside of E.U. borders causes neither emotional nor political discomfort to the majority of European leaders, especially concerning two major states: Ukraine and Turkey. There is a stereotype that their accession will affect the power balance in the European Union, destroy a demographic balance and lead to financial expenses that the E.U. cannot afford. There are more emotions than rational analysis in those stipulations. However, it is their irrationality that makes the debate on Ukraine’s and Turkey’s European prospects particularly difficult.
Generally speaking, the philosophy of foreign policy for the transatlantic West cannot stay the same and is influenced by the fact that with the rise of China in the world, there are several models of successful modernization. Economic and political “Westernization” is no longer the only path to success. The modern East represents to some extent a new, alternative way, elements of which can be borrowed by other countries. But the main thing is cold reasoning and avoiding euphoria. Even in the East, it is not as simple as it seems.
Rise of the East
Chinese economic growth rates are truly impressive: an amazing period of growth lasting for three decades (on average 10 percent annually) and 440 million people who overcame extreme poverty. They made a breakthrough, turning a marginal agricultural country into the “industrial plant” of the world economy.
China has found a perfect combination of communist ideology, market economy and an innovative “state capitalism”: perfect at least for themselves during an era of excess population resources. The fact that the era is not eternal, as well as repetitive signs of social tension in certain Chinese regions, does not mean that China’s rise will stall. Although, it means that in the next decade, the state will have to find new ways to maintain a high rate of economic growth, remain attractive to investors, maintain a positive balance of trade and, the most important thing, give their people a sense of personal involvement in the success of the state. The effectiveness of the model of “state capitalism,” which took many people by surprise, along with the new Chinese elite coming into power, give reasons to believe that China is not only capable of maintaining the growth, but also of applying necessary transformations.
Positive dynamics can be seen in many other emerging markets in the East as well. Under the generally favorable conditions of the modern global economy’s political stability, predictable rules of economics and positive demographics open the door to an economic breakthrough for dozens of new players. According to the predictions made by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, in 10-15 years, three out of five of the top world economies will be represented by the East, and only two out of five will be represented by the West. In the 20 top economies, only six will be Western; others will represent Asia, Latin America and Africa.
States, which were considered dysfunctional for centuries, are now the key to global economic stability. However, the recovery of the East does not necessarily mean that the West is going to decline. On the contrary, the modern world is so interdependent that a high level of economic development often implies a high level of integration with other economies. That’s why the rise of the East without the “collapse” of the West is not a paradox, but is the only possible form of continuing the course of global economic growth. That is what makes modern times unique and creates a chance for Ukraine, which experienced problems for centuries caused by its position between civilizations. Nowadays, this can be a source for new opportunities. This requires strategic balance in foreign policy, and that is where Russia plays the key role.
Russia: Located Between Epochs
The Russian Federation is Ukraine’s closest neighbor and biggest trade partner. Because of the historical and family ties between the countries, it is more than just a neighbor and partner for millions of Ukrainians. It is a kind of psychological marker in the identity and mindset for millions of Ukrainians. For some, it is the second cultural home country. For others, it is a state that suffers from the same post-soviet issues that exist in Ukraine itself and that are trying to get rid of them on its way to European integration.
Paraphrasing a widely used term in Russia political vocabulary, Russia is a part of the “Ukrainian world.” That explains both the power of the mutual attractions between the nations and the mutual sensitivity to any differences in matters of foreign policy doctrine, internal development and, of course, bilateral relations. The highly emotional background of Russia-Ukraine relations is their most distinctive feature both at the level of political class and at the level of ordinary voters. That leads to the politicization of many issues and therefore to speculation on them. Preparing for a new era, we should try to avoid emotions.
Speaking of the rise of one part of the world and the crisis of another part, we realize that we cannot relate Russia to either of them. It regained its status as a global player and an independent voice. It has no fear to conduct a dialog with either the West or the East. On the other hand, Russia is just like Ukraine between epochs. We will see for how long. I would like to highlight four things that affect Russia’s position on the world stage (and might push Russia to change).
First of all, with its minerals and other natural resources reserves, Russia has a special status in an era of increasing global competition for resources. Trouble-free functioning of a large segment of global economy depends on Russian energy inputs. It does not necessarily mean the country’s role is to be an “energy appendage.” On the contrary, they have the role of a global player, entering a new era with a head start on the others. And the way this head start will be used depends on Russia itself.
The second thing is that vectors of mutual influence settled down in such a way that both the West and the East need Russia. That is where a new tone in relations with the E.U. comes from, as well as the “reset” in relations with the U.S. (I think it will resume as soon as presidential campaigns in both countries are over.) That is where active dialog and trade between Russia, China, India and other emerging markets come from. Russians may miss the USSR, but fairly speaking, the end of the bipolar world was beneficial for Russia from a geopolitical point of view. For different countries, the Soviet Union was either a friend or an enemy. Modern Russia is a global player, and everybody is interested in gaining their support. At least they do not want Russia to be their enemy. That point is especially relevant for Ukraine.
Another thing is that Russia demonstrates a renewed national consciousness, which is primarily based on a realization of past greatness of the Russian nation and willingness to bring this greatness to a new era. Some people call this realization a “new Russian nationalism” — the common denominator that unites current Russian authorities with most of their internal critics. External critics may see this process as a revival of the imperial spirit. However, it is actually a factor that helps Russia to “focus” and develop as a solid unit. It is essential for Ukraine that this development should not have an anti-Ukrainian component.
Finally, the fourth factor is that Russia is still waiting for the results of its declared modernization policy. Russia wants to restore its position as a regional leader. There are certain conditions that may allow them to become such a leader in a large part of the former Soviet Union. But they should become a symbol of effective economic reforms in their environment to make it happen. The completion of the presidential campaign gives them a chance to make those reforms. Hopefully, they will succeed.
Ukrainian Path
So, the third decade of Ukrainian independence started as we see Western expansion slowing down, the growth of Eastern economies, and the revival of a strong Russian national spirit.
The expansion of the West (in the form of U.S. global leadership and E.U. expansion) is traditionally an important factor for many Ukrainian politicians. Some of them have created a philosophy based on Bzhezinski’s theory that Ukraine is the key to the “imperial status” of the Russian Federation and that it is Ukraine’s main geopolitical value. Although, they did not think how Ukraine could be valuable for the West once “imperial status” would not bother them anymore. As Grebenschikov (a famous Russian singer) used to sing, “If your path is printed into the pavement, where will you go when it is covered with snow?”
In these conditions, when a monopolar world becomes a multipolar one, we may assume that it “snowed.” The Ukrainian environment has changed, even compared to the end of the ’90s. Russia has changed. The West has changed its priorities. Should we change ours as well? We should not change the priorities, but we should change the ways of their realization.
It is better to be a construction site for the East and the West than to be a battleground between the two. To be attractive for the world in that way, we need our foreign policy to be mostly oriented towards business development. We need policy that creates new trade routes: a policy where a citizen is the main priority.
Which foreign policy concept meets all of those requirements and Ukraine’s modernization needs? The E.U. was the answer to anything as long as they were funding, watching over and guiding transformation in the candidate countries. Today, they have no real desire (and they actually have no resources) to see Ukraine as a candidate country. This may change in future, but right now we need to accept as a fact that it is going to have a direct influence on Ukrainian policy in Europe in the upcoming decade, and we need to form a foreign policy in accordance with that.
The Modernization of Ukraine
There are two successful modernization models in modern Europe. For our purpose, we will name them Polish and Turkish. The first model comes down to the state declaring a reformation policy based on European model, mobilizing national resources, carrying out the reforms and working on each of those steps under genuine maximum supervision from the E.U. The second model comes down to basically the same thing, but the E.U. support is not the most important factor.
The Polish model is the realization of modernization in accordance with the E.U.’s criteria during the process of becoming a E.U. member. Meanwhile, the Turkish model is the realization of modernization in accordance with the same criteria under conditions when it is uncertain whether or not they will become an E.U. member.
In the current conditions, Ukraine needs a type of European policy that is close to the Polish model, but even closer to the Turkish one, still with some Ukrainian unique features.
The first unique thing is the fact that Ukraine’s entry into the E.U. remains a goal, but this goal depends not only on our progress, but also from a number of Europe’s actual development components (the financial condition of the E.U., the success of its reform, the popularity of the idea their further expansion, etc.).
That is why we should first of all emphasize modernization, while European integration should have secondary status: The modernization of Ukraine in accordance with European requirements depends mostly on Ukraine itself, while European integration depends on both Ukraine and other countries.
Besides, despite the consistent support of our E.U. friends (for which we are very grateful), there will be neither “lavish” subsidies nor euphoric political statements on our way to European integration; moreover, there will be no consensus. Regardless of our success, there is always one E.U. country that will block us for their own selfish reasons. (It is easy to guess exactly which one.) There will be situations when we will have to fight for something other countries received in advance. New Europe will be more selfish. There will be situations when even Ukraine, which is obviously pro-European, will have to have influential “advocates.” We should be prepared for that.
Why Do We Need European Integration?
The question arises: If the political situation has changed so much and if the ideological impulse of European expansion is obviously declining, do we even need such a strong connection between Ukraine and the E.U.? The answer is yes, we do, and here is the reason why.
First of all, the fact that the ideological impulse of the expansion is declining does not mean that it would not be compensated by the economic impulse. The theory that Europe needs a combination of European technology resources and Asian energy resources is quite logical. This can lead to a new form of the European Union that involves Turkey and former Soviet Union countries, primarily focusing on the four main European freedoms: freedom of migration, freedom of transportation, freedom of money transfer and service relocation. Most Ukrainian voters do not even need a deeper level of integration.
Another thing is that the E.U. is important to us not because it is like a comfortable house that we want to be inside, but because we need a guide to help us build a luxury home of our own. In this case, European integration is a device for the implementation of European success recipes in Ukraine. But we should think before performing implementation of something that does not seem that successful in the light of the current crisis. The E.U.’s ambivalence towards accepting Ukraine as a member (and it has always been there, regardless of how critical the dialog is), gives us a lot of freedom in regard to that issue.
The third thing is that despite existing problems, Europe is an example of success for most Ukrainians. It is a symbol of hope that Ukrainian politicians have been implanting into minds of Ukrainian voters for two decades. The minds of Ukrainian voters are firmly set on the idea of future E.U. membership. Focusing on the E.U. has become a “common ground” for all Ukrainian political forces. Taking this formula away will mean bringing some confusion into our domestic policy.
Therefore, Ukraine’s European policy should remain a priority, but it should be more down to earth and pragmatic. The modernization of Ukraine and European openness is important for us (within the already authorized Free Trade Area and action plan regarding liberalization of the visa regime). However, European policy is just a part of a broader concept related to the modernization of the country. It is the answer to the question of where we are going, but it does not completely explain how to get there. The availability of strategic balance regarding other areas should help answer this question.
Russia as a Perspective and a Challenge
Nowadays the issue of successful reform is primarily a question of successful investment policy. Where do the investments come from? Why not from Russia? It is related to us historically and culturally. Trade between us is growing rapidly. It has funds and interest.
The problem is that the interest is mostly not economic, but emotional. Russia can get investment dividends from any growing economy in the world. Even the Eurasian Union project can function without involvement of Ukraine, despite common belief. But it seems that only Ukraine’s return to its area of influence will make some Russian politicians think that things went back to normal. And that is a difficulty. We are ready to invest our economic potential into the partnership, but we are not willing to sacrifice the idea of building Ukraine in accordance with European criteria.
That was the first thing. Another issue that partially because of traditional mindset and partially under certain political influence, the thought of Ukraine as a “foreign project” is more appealing to the minds of many Russians than the idea of a separate independent state friendly to Russia. Thus, a not entirely healthy background for future relations has been created. We should work on improving it. We should expand the understanding of “the norm.”
On the other hand, desire for a partnership with Russia is a basic feature of our foreign policy. Being a part of the “Ukrainian world,” Russia will always be one of our biggest attractions. Under favorable circumstances, it can become the friendliest and most understanding partner in both realizing economic goals and strengthening national security. Even under unfavorable circumstances, they would not become hysterical and fall into negativity. We should be ourselves, which means staying a European democracy and being determined and sincere in the partnership development whenever Russia is ready for it.
It is being decided right now, whether the timing is good or not. And one of the biggest factors that it will depend on is our cooperation in attempts to finish the “energy debate,” based on long-term strategic interests and the standards currently existing in the world.
That means that even Russia is in fact only a part of a solution, a partnership with which could have been the answer to basic questions on Ukraine’s foreign policy.
Expanding the Horizons
We live between two points of influence, and there is a mutual attraction and some tension with each of them as well. In addition to those two points, the importance of which is not in doubt, we need partners in a multipolar world who are free of a hidden agenda or a desire to impose their will. We can only find them if we go beyond our traditional limits. We should find partners who will benefit economically and politically from cooperation with Ukraine and who are ready to accept Ukraine the way it is, i.e. independent; democratic; with priorities of our own: pro-Russian in some ways, pro-European in other ways but partially concentrated only on ourselves.
Let us look at Turkey. It is the most dynamic European economy and is 1) close and 2) interested in Ukraine. Also, Ukraine and Turkey are experiencing not exactly the same, but similar issues in dialog with the E.U. And the fourth thing is that its realization model is the closest to the Ukrainian one (based on the European one, but realized independently).
The last point is the most important in my opinion. During the last decade, we have seen how Turkey succeeded with a reformation and impressive transformation, both internal and external, under the supervision of its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After a long period of uncertainty, crisis, corruption and hatred, Turkish people were able to reunite and make a breakthrough into a new national reality. Those who see numerous Turkish-Ukrainian government contracts, including the ones on the level of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as more than just diplomatic routine are correct. It really is more than just a routine. First of all, we see a new national tandem emerging, and secondly, we are assimilating the experience, which can be very important for us. This includes the experience of integrating the national economy into the global one without participating in any existing integration associations, but on their own.
China is a more distant, but still a promising partner. There were times when trying to get ahead of time in Europe, we were falling behind in the Chinese area of focus. Making it up is not an easy thing, but we do not have a choice. China is a global power. Besides, it can be a quiet, unobtrusive power in regards to European policy, which is particularly important for us.
The fact that Ukrainian authorities are finally consolidated is a good thing. The fact that they have no strong ideological marking and their primary focus is putting things in order in the country is even a better thing. Paraphrasing Henry Kissinger, China, like many other countries, finally has a “fax number,” which needs to be dialed when they need to have a dialog with official Kiev.
There are two things that struck me when I was visiting China in recent years. The first thing is the awareness of the Chinese and their understanding of complex realities of Ukrainian political life, i.e. the fact that we do not have an articulated policy does not mean that China has lost interest in Ukraine.
The other thing is how interested they are in Ukraine. China is at least as interested in us as we are in them. Obviously, Ukraine has its own financial investment “El Dorado.” But we are always scared that an investment boom will lead to “selling Ukraine” and end national sovereignty. (Sometimes this is reasonable, but sometimes it happens because of the national mindset.) I am sure that the Chinese investment fund’s arrival is a good thing. We should not only stop being afraid of it, but also welcome it as a factor that will provide our economy with additional stability and confidence in the future.
The same applies to Brazil, which I visited a few weeks ago; Vietnam, where I was last week; and the countries of Persian Gulf, where I have been and am going to go again. It also applies to other places important for Ukraine’s foreign policy and confirms the obvious: Ukraine’s horizons are increasing dramatically.
Using Our Own Resources
Ukrainian discourse on the topic of “the E.U.-Russia” amazes me for a number of reasons, but the political “nightmare” way of thinking is the most surprising thing. Some keep saying that, “if we do not become an E.U. member, Russia is going to ‘swallow’ Ukraine.” Others say, “If we become an E.U. member, they will just turn us into a field used for their purposes.” I believe that Ukraine has its own very distinct personality and is too big to be “swallowed” or turned into something.
We should be more self-sufficient. We are not that poor and unfortunate; we have something to offer to the world. And we are not small enough for somebody else’s “umbrella” to be able to protect us from all of our problems. If the new world that we enter will indeed be the world where everybody has to fight for resources, we should remember that nature has been generous to us in that regard, including the resources that will be valued the most: food, water and energy. The only question is whether those resources will work in favor of Ukraine’s national interest and make the country attractive to others.
With some degree of generalization, we can say that there are three factors in the world that will determine the strength or weakness of a nation: the economy, demography and natural resources. A nation can have demographic problems, but still be strong due to its innovative economy and resources. There might be economic problems, but it is possible to address them using positive demographic trends and resources. But when something similar to the Ukrainian situation happens, when the economy has not been reformed for years and when there’s negative demographic trends and unused resources, it can only mean that a change is needed, an urgent change.
That is why the president pays so much attention to reforms. That is where an unwillingness to waste time on stalemate situations in Ukrainian political discourse comes from.
To illustrate what I just said, let me remind you that according to the U.N. estimate, global demand for food will have increased by 70 percent by 2050. It means that the global dinner table has 219,000 more mouths to feed every day. I would say that it is 219,000 extra arguments for Ukraine not to lose a single day and become self-sufficient as an international player who has the potential for global influence, at least in the area of commodities.
Strategic Balance
Ukraine is obviously a part of Europe. It should focus on European values and be loyal to its European nature. It is also clear that Ukraine is historically and culturally related to Russia — it was, it is, and it always will be. However, when the world becomes more and more East-centric, Ukraine should keep looking farther: to the East, to the West and to the South.
The activation of new strategic directions in foreign policy will give us space for diplomatic maneuvering, investments and partnerships, where the problem of a “double bottom” may not be as critical as it happened in other areas of interest. It will give us the strength to make the relations with Russia the way we want them to be and not be in the position of a petitioner in relations with the E.U.
Ukraine needs strategic balance, but this balance should be in a broader sense more than just a “balancing act.” The more connections Ukraine will have beyond the E.U.-Russia borders, the more stable and confident the country will be.
It applies to both the best- and the worst-case scenario for the next few years.
The prediction of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse is that, in the next five years, combined global GDP will increase by 50 percent and will reach the $345 trillion mark in the best-case scenario. According to bankers, it will happen primarily due to China’s “economic miracle” and strong growth in Asia Pacific, Latin America and Africa.
The worst-case scenario will happen if the Western financial “bubble” explodes, which will bring a number of negative consequences. In that case, those who have developed their own industries will be the first to recover. Among them, there will be emerging, fast growing markets first of all.
Ukraine needs not only an opposition to its traditional foreign policy dichotomy; it needs involvement in global dynamics if it is positive, or an “insurance policy” if the dynamics will be negative. Under the current conditions of a vague perspective of E.U. membership, the E.U.-Russia areas of interest, taken separately, will not give the first thing or the second one to Ukraine. While Ukraine is located in a limited geopolitical dimension, the realization of its potential will be very limited. It is more likely to become an object than a subject. However, the more active we are at the expansion of our foreign policy at expense of others, the better it will be for the realization of our priorities, including European ones, and there will be more of new dynamics around Ukraine.
Awareness of this need is one of the most obvious lessons of the first twenty years of independence. Another lesson is that just awareness is not enough. We need a partisan, multi-level national strategy: first of all, an economic strategy and secondly, a political one. We need a unity of thought, rhetoric and action. We have to understand that Ukraine can have a European goal, but under the existing circumstances, the path to this goal will not be the same one that the recent E.U. members have gone through. It will be a path of inner transformation in accordance with the European criteria. It will be done in a strategic partnership with Russia and the E.U., and also through the development of relations with the regions of the world where positive dynamics can be seen, as well as a lively interest in cooperation with Ukraine and with respect to Ukraine’s goals.
Finally, balance does not have a multidirectional nature. It means an inner strength and a clear understanding of what we want in combination with the ability “to hear God’s footsteps marching through history.” Victor Hugo said that balance is the fundamental law of the material world, and justice is the basic law of the spiritual world. It is necessary for Ukraine to be able to develop at the same pace as the world around us.
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