It Is Not Time for a Bargain

The bargaining discussion between Moscow and Washington about the Ukrainian agenda appeared again on the eve of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Russia.

Expectations intensified after the head of the Department of State, at a meeting of the G-7 foreign ministers in Lucca, asked his colleagues to explain why American taxpayers needed to support Kiev. Although, later on, the U.S. diplomatic department referred to the words of its leader as a rhetorical device, and Tillerson reassured Poroshenko in a telephone conversation, the bitter sludge remained with the Ukrainian authorities.

Indeed, according to mainstream thinking, which Western diplomats gladly share, one of the main reasons Russia joined the Syrian conflict was because of Moscow’s desire to escape international isolation by expanding the list of dialogue topics with the West on which it is possible to formulate a common position and cooperative behavior. The Kremlin was not satisfied with the narrowing of the agenda with the EU and the U.S. to focus solely on Crimea, the Minsk agreements and sanctions. Additionally, Russian authorities understood that they could not demand a trade-off in the Ukrainian question from Europeans and Americans as long as there is no possibility of offering something significant in return.

According to this theory, Russia was always considering the Syrian conflict as a starting point to search for areas of common interest. Under the best set of circumstances, supposedly, Moscow could exchange Bashar Assad, for example, with Petro Poroshenko, without any special sentiments.

In general, accepting this logic, the West insisted that Syria and Ukraine are completely different stories, and, with cooperation on one issue, one should not expect concessions on the other. Thus, even if Russia and Western countries could agree on the creation of a single coalition to combat international terrorism, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that this would not lead to the cancellation of sanctions in connection with the Crimea or the Donbass, or the cancellation of the famous “Magnitsky law.”*

Now, the moment of truth for this conceptual scheme of analysis of the Kremlin’s behavior has come. The attack by the U.S. Navy on government troops at the airport in Shayrat, Syria, as it seems, created the ideal conditions for a deal on the Ukrainian agenda. After the harsh accusations against the leadership of the Arab Republic in the chemical attack, the removal of Assad from power becomes a matter of prestige for the new American president. Trump is already expected to take further decisive steps that will lead to concrete results during his term in office. One key that will lead to a solution is in Russia’s hand; the other is in Iran’s. The only thing left is to persuade the Kremlin to abandon its support of Assad. In response, the Russian authorities can legitimately name their price to go to another camp in Syria.

However, Russia has given no hints that it will to move toward this scenario and has not admitted the possibility of surrendering Assad in exchange for concessions in the post-Soviet Union space. The Russian authorities have made it clear there will be no deal. On the contrary, the Kremlin, like Washington, expresses its readiness to raise the stakes and, if necessary, increase the pressure on Syria.

The reason for rejecting the deal is that, at the moment, there is nothing the United States can give Russia in the Ukrainian situation that could be a sufficient price for them to exit the Syrian conflict. The Kremlin clearly understands that Washington is incapable of preparing such a proposal for the Ukrainian agenda that would make all the risks associated with the rejection of Assad irrelevant.

We have to admit that the U.S. has rather limited influence on Ukraine’s behavior within the frame of the Donbass conflict.** The current administration does not have any direct political ammunition on Kiev to persuade it to follow the Minsk agreement. The U.S. president is capable of destroying Poroshenko’s comfort zone, but he cannot do this by himself. A lot of factors with the Minsk process depend on Germany and France which, as shown by Ayrault’s*** response to Tillerson in Lucca, are determined to continue supporting Kiev. Of course, in theory, the White House could create problems for Ukraine in the future by blocking the Minsk process. But the inertia from previous decisions is so great that it will take too much time. In this regard, it is easier for Russia to play on the contradictions inside the Ukrainian elite in the context of the 2019 election than to exchange anything with the American administration.

Washington can promise to reduce their financial support of Ukraine and to limit military cooperation in the future. However, it is obvious this price is way too small for the Kremlin. A guarantee to not provide lethal weapons to Kiev will also be a very symbolic concession, and one which will only confirm the policy of the Obama administration. Russia will get nothing from this because Washington does not supply arms to Ukraine. The same applies to guarantees within NATO. The possibility of Ukraine joining NATO or the European Union is not on the agenda.

The White House cannot promise to cancel the anti-Russian sanctions. In recent months, the U.S. and the European Union have made it clear that the sanctions will not be annulled until the Minsk agreements are implemented. Moreover, it is possible that new sanctions against Russia will be implemented in connection with the events in Syria.

Finally, if we return to the discussion about zones of influence in the post-Soviet space, both the Kremlin and the White House are aware that there are currently no conditions that will turn proposals into real steps that can be taken by Russia and the United States.

As a result, even if it used to be possible for the Kremlin to include the possibility of linking the Syrian and Ukrainian agendas, this will no longer work. Russia’s interests have significantly expanded compared to 2015, and Russia is not planning to axe out of them in either Ukraine or the Middle East. There will not be any bargain, not because the conditions for the normalization of Russian-American relations were spoiled by the U.S. attack on Assad, but because Moscow understands the limitations and unsatisfactory nature of the possible proposal from Washington. Thus, Russia will most likely continue to create challenges for the new American administration, which currently is forced to deal with a multitude of international crises simultaneously.

*Editor’s note: The phrase “Magnitsky law” refers to the Magnitsky Act of 2012, which sanctioned Russian officials connected to the death of imprisoned Russian lawyer and tax fraud investigator Sergei Magnitsky.

**Editor’s note: The “Donbass conflict” refers to the ongoing confrontation between pro- and anti-Russian forces in the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine.

***Editor’s note: The author is referring to French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Marc Ayrault.