Why Does the US Maintain a Presence in the South China Sea?

When compared to the “Westphalian” vision of the international order adhered to by the West, according to which there is sovereign equality among states, China inherits from its imperial times a hierarchical and tributary notion of this order.

China claims 90% of the South China Sea for itself, ignoring the rights of several Southeast Asian countries, the norms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, in 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi declared that the South China Sea was of core interest to China, thereby elevating its possession to the highest level of national priority and self-limiting any possibility of negotiation in relation to it. The same Yang, at a high-level meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also in 2010, summed up Beijing’s attitude toward this maritime space with the following words: “China is a big country and the other countries are small countries; that is simply a fact.” In other words, as in the Melian Dialogue recounted by Thucydides in his “History of the Peloponnesian War,” the big countries do what they want, while the small countries must accept what they get.

Unlike the Westphalian view of the international order upheld by the West, according to which there is sovereign equality among states, China inherits from its imperial times a hierarchical and tributary notion of such an order, with China at its head. It also inherits the view that any appeal to the remote past is itself a source of law. Indeed, in asserting that the South China Sea was a historical transit route for its ships — a contention not recognized by international law or by existing international conventions — it claims maritime spaces bordering the coasts of modern states.

To counter Chinese arrogance, the United States has set itself up as a defender of the existing legal order, despite the fact that it has never signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In doing so, it challenges China’s control of the theater of operations manifested by its geographical proximity, by the construction and militarization of numerous artificial islands and by the presence in the area of the bulk of the Chinese navy — the largest in the world. Through the periodic voyages of American warships through parts of the sea that China considers its own, Washington makes clear its disregard for Beijing’s maximalist demands. Conversely, the Beijing regime views Washington’s presence in these waters as that of a foreign body in the region and makes clear its strategic aspiration to expel the U.S. Navy beyond what is known as the First Island Chain (the first chain of major archipelagos in the Pacific Ocean in East Asia, which includes Japan and the Philippines, among others).

Washington has several reasons for standing firm against China. Among them are the following: First, the United States has been an uninterrupted Asian power since 1854. While for a multimillennial nation like China this may seem like an insignificant period of time, for Americans it represents more than half of their independent history. From the Kanagawa Convention of 1854 that opened Japan to the West, to the Open Door policy of 1899 that guaranteed China’s territorial integrity, to the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 that ended the Russo-Japanese War, the United States has played a leading role in East Asian affairs. To this should be added the countless American lives lost in four major wars in that region: the struggle for control of the Philippines, the confrontation with Japan during World War II, and the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. China’s aspiration to expel the United States from these areas goes against the grain of what Washington considers to be a historic presence in the region.

Second, the reputation of the United States as a superpower is also at stake. Abdicating a leadership position in East Asia and a firm presence in the South China Sea would set in motion an avalanche that would eventually sweep away its international preeminence. This would embolden its rivals everywhere and drastically erode its various strategic alliances. For Washington, unless it is willing to retreat into a phase of isolationism, there is no choice but to resolutely confront Beijing’s expansionist drive in the South China Sea.

Third, the United States claims for itself and others the principle of free passage through the world’s seas and, by extension, through the South China Sea. The passage of its warships through the South China Sea is therefore presented as an action to protect a global public good: freedom of navigation on the high seas — particularly through a vital artery of international trade such as this one, through which about 70% of global trade transits, representing an amount of about $5 trillion (a million million million) a year. Moreover, it is through a sea that is fundamental for the survival and economic prosperity of the 620 million people living in the countries of Southeast Asia and through which 80% of Japan’s and South Korea’s oil supplies circulate. The mere possibility that China might activate restrictive control on the free transit of 90% of this sea could economically strangle more than one nation in the region. It is also a vital route for U.S. supply chains.

For the United States, however, this is no easy task. To contain another, that is, to prevent the expansion of someone who at the same time seeks to prevent the penetration of others, is a major geostrategic challenge. Especially when maritime distance is involved. Indeed, the distance from California to the South China Sea is 7,400 miles, while from Hawaii it is almost 6,000 miles. This is what Jon Mearsheimer* refers to as the paralyzing power of long maritime distances. Washington, however, does not seem willing to back down in the face of the excessive and overbearing demands of the Beijing regime. This makes this sea one of the hottest geopolitical spaces on the planet.

*Editor’s Note: Jon Mearsheimer is an American political scientist.