Upheaval in the Arab World: More Challenges than Opportunities to the U.S.
Published in China.com
(China) on 2 June 2011
by Tang Zichao (link to original)
(China) on 2 June 2011
by Tang Zichao (link to original)
Translated from
by Pak Ng.
Edited by Heidi Kaufmann.
The violent upheaval throughout the Arab world could mean either challenges or opportunities for the United States. But it seems that for the time being, the challenges are greater than the opportunities.
Speaking of opportunities, the current “revolution” in the Middle East is just what the U.S. government has hoped for and has been vigorously pushing. After the Sept. 11 tragedy in 2001, the Bush administration launched the “Great Middle East Project.” Besides the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration also promoted the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” in 2002. The goal of this initiative was to promote democracy and freedom in the Middle East through extensive collaborations with local governments and non-government organizations. Although Obama lowered his objectives and tones of driving forward democratic reform in the Middle East after he assumed office, the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” was still being implemented and carried forward. The government has never weakened the strength of support to this initiative. According to statistics, since the initiative was launched in 2002, it already implemented or has been implementing up to 680 programs throughout 18 countries and regions and has subsidized up to $680 million in funds. Because of this, President Obama emphasized in his speech concerning the Middle East and North Africa on May 19 that the changes in the Middle East has led the U.S to face a “historic opportunity.” The basic strategy of the U.S. will be to adjust to the historical changes, to give judicious guidance according to circumstances, and to lead and push the Arab countries to switch direction to the benefit of the West. Such reforms will involve the political system, the economic system and social customs and culture.
However, the radical changes in the Arab world might just lead to more challenges for the United States. Above all, the U.S. global strategy and Middle East policy have been affected. In recent years the core of the U.S. strategy has moved eastward to the Asia-Pacific region. Now the sudden transformation of the Middle East has disarranged the U.S.’ established global strategic deployment; therefore, the U.S. has no other choice but to again expand its investment in the Middle East. At the same time, the radical changes in the Middle East have severely struck against the U.S.’ interests in the region and have posted multiple critical challenges toward the U.S.’ Middle East policy.
First, the stable supports to the U.S. strategy in the region will be weakened. The traditional alliance network and security system are facing disintegration; the pro-American governments, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Algeria, have all been attacked. In addition, Turkey has been distancing itself from the West in recent years, Israel has been increasingly isolated, and the U.S.’ Middle East alliance network is swaying in the midst of a raging storm. In Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters is located, the government is also facing great danger. The U.S. will be forced to again implement a strategic reorganization and construct a new alliance network.
Second, Obama’s Middle East agenda has been interfered with so the priority of the regional strategic order will face rearrangement. The Obama administration’s three major primary agendas are: the Iran nuclear issue, Iraq and the Middle East peace process. Promoting democracy has been placed in a less important position, but this position will now be greatly advanced because of the “revolution” in the Middle East. Therefore, in a short period of time the U.S. may not have the energy to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Obama’s promise to achieve peace between Palestine and Israel within the year will also come to naught.
Third, the U.S.’ strategic ally, Israel, is confronting increased threat, while its major adversary, Iran, is seizing the opportunity to grow. Protecting Israel’s security is one of the major goals of the U.S.’ Middle East policy. Now, the radical changes in the Middle East have caused Israel’s security to face a severe challenge; the Arab-Israeli conflict threatens to intensify. At the same time, Iran is taking the chance to expand in the region and may bring challenges to the U.S. on issues such as Iranian nuclear development and regional security, but the U.S. will not have time to deal with it in the short term.
Fourth, the U.S.’ regional anti-terror strategy and the efforts to improve its relationship with the Islamic world will face challenges. The U.S.’ two extremely opposite attitudes exhibited at the changing situation in the Middle East bitterly disappointed the pro-American governments in the region.
Aiming at the abrupt and rapid changes in the Middle East, in the last six months the U.S. government has adopted a way of bringing these allies through by treating problems on a case-by-case basis, depending upon where each of these problems occurs. On May 19, Obama gave an important speech that specifically addressed the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa and the U.S. policy. It was not only the Obama administration’s most focused and comprehensive response concerning the Middle East situation in the last six months, but it was also the second important speech regarding the Middle East problem given by Obama since he assumed office. The “Cairo Speech” in 2009 focused on policies such as improving the relationship between the U.S. and the Islamic world, withdrawing troops from Iraq, moving the forefront of the war on terror eastward to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and promoting peace in the Middle East. However, from the speech on May 19, we can perceive the U.S. government’s general train of thought and its framework concerning the changes in the Middle East.
To sum up, Obama’s speech mainly included three major subject matters: First, supporting the democratic reform in the Middle East will be his top-priority objective, and this would be the most urgent topic for Obama. He specifically presented the policy toward Arab governments that were facing “revolution”: He emphasized that Libya's Gadhafi doesn’t have much time left; he demanded that Syria’s President Assad either start transitioning to democracy or depart from power; he accused Iran of suppression and opposed its nuclear development and its support of terror; he requested President Saleh of Yemen to carry out his promise of transferring power; and he hoped that Bahrain would promote reform and conduct dialogue. Second, [Obama addressed] the use of economic means to support Tunisia and Egypt’s transformation to democracy through economic development. Obama stressed that the U.S. will focus on promoting these two excellent models — Tunisia and Egypt. Third, [he spoke of] promoting peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel. While increasing pressure on Israel, the U.S. will strengthen the military alliance with Israel and increase security assistance. A fourth objective would be to diversify cooperative partnerships so that in the future, the U.S.’ partners in the Middle East will not be limited to only the traditional allies — namely, those in power.
This speech, compared to the “Cairo Speech” in 2009, indicated important changes in the U.S.’ Middle East policy. Firstly and most importantly, major shifts of the core of Obama’s Middle East policy occurred, compared to the past — from maintaining traditional regional security to supporting and advancing regional democratic reform, and for this purpose Obama reorganized strategic priority orders. In the past the U.S.’ Middle East policies were often criticized. One of the important reasons was that the U.S. orally advocated democracy but in fact supported “authoritarian Arab regimes”; thus, the promotion of democracy became a “secondary interest.” Now Obama said that he would change the slogans into “actions” and “urgency.” Obama also vowed that the U.S. will use “all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal” to “support political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region.”
Next, the U.S. has changed its ways of collaborating with its regional partners. Where previously special emphasis was on dealing with the rulers, he stressed that going forward the U.S. should “speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people,” and emphasized establishing contacts with diversified social forces such as the local masses, young people, women and various citizen organizations. This actually signified that the U.S. would abandon any of those allies who are not willing to carry out reform. The ways and means will be more diversified and will not be just as simple as the government-to-government assistance of the past.
Third, Obama demanded that Israel go along with the changes and adjust its policy. Obama delivered several messages in part of his speech concerning the Palestine and Israel issue: In the future Israel will be more isolated, and its security will be more fragile; Arab countries’ future foreign policies will further reflect the will of people, and the Palestine-Israel conflict will once again be the focal point; acceptance of Hamas in the future cannot be excluded; Israel must adjust to the change of the situation, and its leader must make “bold choices.”
Fourth, Obama accentuated that the balance of value, security and interest must be realized. Obama pointed out that “for decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel's security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.” He emphasized in the speech that a strategy only based on interest will no longer work and that the U.S. can no longer pursue “our own interests at their expense.” He wanted to accomplish the integration of the U.S.’ national interests and its values.
However, it is still in doubt whether Obama can achieve his goal and if the U.S. can successfully turn around its Middle East policy. Can the U.S. accomplish the balance in its value, security and interest? Will the U.S. choose to completely separate itself from its traditional regional partners? Will the U.S. be able to withstand the “great chaos” in the Middle East? Will Israel, the U.S.’ most loyal ally in the region, meet Obama’s Middle East “new ideas”? All of these problems have big question marks.
Speaking of opportunities, the current “revolution” in the Middle East is just what the U.S. government has hoped for and has been vigorously pushing. After the Sept. 11 tragedy in 2001, the Bush administration launched the “Great Middle East Project.” Besides the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration also promoted the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” in 2002. The goal of this initiative was to promote democracy and freedom in the Middle East through extensive collaborations with local governments and non-government organizations. Although Obama lowered his objectives and tones of driving forward democratic reform in the Middle East after he assumed office, the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” was still being implemented and carried forward. The government has never weakened the strength of support to this initiative. According to statistics, since the initiative was launched in 2002, it already implemented or has been implementing up to 680 programs throughout 18 countries and regions and has subsidized up to $680 million in funds. Because of this, President Obama emphasized in his speech concerning the Middle East and North Africa on May 19 that the changes in the Middle East has led the U.S to face a “historic opportunity.” The basic strategy of the U.S. will be to adjust to the historical changes, to give judicious guidance according to circumstances, and to lead and push the Arab countries to switch direction to the benefit of the West. Such reforms will involve the political system, the economic system and social customs and culture.
However, the radical changes in the Arab world might just lead to more challenges for the United States. Above all, the U.S. global strategy and Middle East policy have been affected. In recent years the core of the U.S. strategy has moved eastward to the Asia-Pacific region. Now the sudden transformation of the Middle East has disarranged the U.S.’ established global strategic deployment; therefore, the U.S. has no other choice but to again expand its investment in the Middle East. At the same time, the radical changes in the Middle East have severely struck against the U.S.’ interests in the region and have posted multiple critical challenges toward the U.S.’ Middle East policy.
First, the stable supports to the U.S. strategy in the region will be weakened. The traditional alliance network and security system are facing disintegration; the pro-American governments, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Algeria, have all been attacked. In addition, Turkey has been distancing itself from the West in recent years, Israel has been increasingly isolated, and the U.S.’ Middle East alliance network is swaying in the midst of a raging storm. In Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters is located, the government is also facing great danger. The U.S. will be forced to again implement a strategic reorganization and construct a new alliance network.
Second, Obama’s Middle East agenda has been interfered with so the priority of the regional strategic order will face rearrangement. The Obama administration’s three major primary agendas are: the Iran nuclear issue, Iraq and the Middle East peace process. Promoting democracy has been placed in a less important position, but this position will now be greatly advanced because of the “revolution” in the Middle East. Therefore, in a short period of time the U.S. may not have the energy to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Obama’s promise to achieve peace between Palestine and Israel within the year will also come to naught.
Third, the U.S.’ strategic ally, Israel, is confronting increased threat, while its major adversary, Iran, is seizing the opportunity to grow. Protecting Israel’s security is one of the major goals of the U.S.’ Middle East policy. Now, the radical changes in the Middle East have caused Israel’s security to face a severe challenge; the Arab-Israeli conflict threatens to intensify. At the same time, Iran is taking the chance to expand in the region and may bring challenges to the U.S. on issues such as Iranian nuclear development and regional security, but the U.S. will not have time to deal with it in the short term.
Fourth, the U.S.’ regional anti-terror strategy and the efforts to improve its relationship with the Islamic world will face challenges. The U.S.’ two extremely opposite attitudes exhibited at the changing situation in the Middle East bitterly disappointed the pro-American governments in the region.
Aiming at the abrupt and rapid changes in the Middle East, in the last six months the U.S. government has adopted a way of bringing these allies through by treating problems on a case-by-case basis, depending upon where each of these problems occurs. On May 19, Obama gave an important speech that specifically addressed the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa and the U.S. policy. It was not only the Obama administration’s most focused and comprehensive response concerning the Middle East situation in the last six months, but it was also the second important speech regarding the Middle East problem given by Obama since he assumed office. The “Cairo Speech” in 2009 focused on policies such as improving the relationship between the U.S. and the Islamic world, withdrawing troops from Iraq, moving the forefront of the war on terror eastward to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and promoting peace in the Middle East. However, from the speech on May 19, we can perceive the U.S. government’s general train of thought and its framework concerning the changes in the Middle East.
To sum up, Obama’s speech mainly included three major subject matters: First, supporting the democratic reform in the Middle East will be his top-priority objective, and this would be the most urgent topic for Obama. He specifically presented the policy toward Arab governments that were facing “revolution”: He emphasized that Libya's Gadhafi doesn’t have much time left; he demanded that Syria’s President Assad either start transitioning to democracy or depart from power; he accused Iran of suppression and opposed its nuclear development and its support of terror; he requested President Saleh of Yemen to carry out his promise of transferring power; and he hoped that Bahrain would promote reform and conduct dialogue. Second, [Obama addressed] the use of economic means to support Tunisia and Egypt’s transformation to democracy through economic development. Obama stressed that the U.S. will focus on promoting these two excellent models — Tunisia and Egypt. Third, [he spoke of] promoting peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel. While increasing pressure on Israel, the U.S. will strengthen the military alliance with Israel and increase security assistance. A fourth objective would be to diversify cooperative partnerships so that in the future, the U.S.’ partners in the Middle East will not be limited to only the traditional allies — namely, those in power.
This speech, compared to the “Cairo Speech” in 2009, indicated important changes in the U.S.’ Middle East policy. Firstly and most importantly, major shifts of the core of Obama’s Middle East policy occurred, compared to the past — from maintaining traditional regional security to supporting and advancing regional democratic reform, and for this purpose Obama reorganized strategic priority orders. In the past the U.S.’ Middle East policies were often criticized. One of the important reasons was that the U.S. orally advocated democracy but in fact supported “authoritarian Arab regimes”; thus, the promotion of democracy became a “secondary interest.” Now Obama said that he would change the slogans into “actions” and “urgency.” Obama also vowed that the U.S. will use “all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal” to “support political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region.”
Next, the U.S. has changed its ways of collaborating with its regional partners. Where previously special emphasis was on dealing with the rulers, he stressed that going forward the U.S. should “speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people,” and emphasized establishing contacts with diversified social forces such as the local masses, young people, women and various citizen organizations. This actually signified that the U.S. would abandon any of those allies who are not willing to carry out reform. The ways and means will be more diversified and will not be just as simple as the government-to-government assistance of the past.
Third, Obama demanded that Israel go along with the changes and adjust its policy. Obama delivered several messages in part of his speech concerning the Palestine and Israel issue: In the future Israel will be more isolated, and its security will be more fragile; Arab countries’ future foreign policies will further reflect the will of people, and the Palestine-Israel conflict will once again be the focal point; acceptance of Hamas in the future cannot be excluded; Israel must adjust to the change of the situation, and its leader must make “bold choices.”
Fourth, Obama accentuated that the balance of value, security and interest must be realized. Obama pointed out that “for decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel's security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.” He emphasized in the speech that a strategy only based on interest will no longer work and that the U.S. can no longer pursue “our own interests at their expense.” He wanted to accomplish the integration of the U.S.’ national interests and its values.
However, it is still in doubt whether Obama can achieve his goal and if the U.S. can successfully turn around its Middle East policy. Can the U.S. accomplish the balance in its value, security and interest? Will the U.S. choose to completely separate itself from its traditional regional partners? Will the U.S. be able to withstand the “great chaos” in the Middle East? Will Israel, the U.S.’ most loyal ally in the region, meet Obama’s Middle East “new ideas”? All of these problems have big question marks.
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