What Does Xi Jinping's US Visit Signal?
Published in DW News
(China) on 23 May 2013
by Bi Kaiying (link to original)
(China) on 23 May 2013
by Bi Kaiying (link to original)
Translated from
by Leonard Fung.
Edited by Kyrstie Lane.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has been invited to visit the U.S. in early June. What does this signal for the currently tense situation in Asia?
First, the latest round of tensions may be coming to an end.
Since the end of the Cold War, Sino-U.S. relations have had a checkered history. Each time tensions flare, a visit from China's president to the U.S. has proven to be a sign that tensions were about to wane. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-to-late 1990s, Sino-U.S. relations were strained when the U.S. deployed aircraft carriers to intervene. Afterward, a visit by President Jiang Zemin to the U.S. calmed the situation.
Since the U.S.' return to Asia, there have been two rounds of tensions in the East Asia region. In the first round, there was the Diaoyudao incident, where a Japanese ship collided with a Chinese boat and detained its crew, and the inter-Korean Yeonpyeong crisis. Then, President Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. signaled the end of tensions. The current second round of tensions includes Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands, North Korea's nuclear tests, the Sino-Philippine island dispute in the South China Sea and the Philippines' fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman. Perhaps Xi Jinping's U.S. visit will again bring about a temporary end to the crisis.
Second, compromise is sought after a tense standoff.
In contrast to Soviet-U.S. relations during the Cold War, Sino-U.S. relations are not purely adversarial — amid conflict there is compromise and amid confrontation, cooperation. After each tense standoff, to maintain the paradigm of competition without violence, the U.S. usually invites China for talks to calm the situation and manage the crisis.
The U.S. has pursued a long-term strategy of brinkmanship to keep regional hot spots in line with its interests. Although it tolerates countries such as Japan and the Philippines challenging the regional security situation, it will not explicitly support the Philippines in any move to nationalize occupied Chinese islands or seize additional territories from China. The U.S. also will not explicitly recognize Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands or assist in the unification of the Korean peninsula. Perpetuating regional hotspots and territorial disputes in such a way that regional countries keep each other in check is an integral part of U.S. strategy.
In addition, the Chinese and U.S. economies are inextricably linked, and the EU is China's largest trading partner and source of technology imports. If violence were to erupt between the U.S. and China, the interests of U.S. multinationals and farmers would suffer, and those of the U.S.' European allies would suffer even more.
Third, gestures of goodwill reduce mutual suspicion.
With the U.S.' return to Asia, tensions have reached unprecedented levels around China's periphery. Chinese think tanks accuse the U.S. of trying to contain China, and anti-American sentiment is on the rise among the Chinese populace. Yet the U.S. claims its presence contributes to Asia's peace and stability.
For the U.S., causing offense to either China's government or its people is no small matter, especially as this could mean angering the 1.3 billion citizens of a rising superpower. The cyber attacks by Chinese netizens on the White House and Pentagon after the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Yugoslavia is something the U.S. will not likely forget. U.S. anxiety about cyber security is telling: Once China's people are angered, its government is held hostage to nationalism — a disastrous development for the U.S. and the world.
Hence, the U.S. has invited China's president to visit as a goodwill gesture to dissolve enmity and enhance trust through communication.
Fourth, this marks an effort to manage the crisis through communication and discussion.
Before the U.S.' return to Asia, the region was the scene of peace and prosperity. After the U.S. arrived, tensions rose abruptly. Regardless of whether the U.S. has any real intention of maintaining stability in East Asia, as the world's policeman it has to adopt certain posturing to maintain its international image.
A topic of discussion during President Xi's visit will likely include establishing a standard of conduct agreed upon by both sides and potentially additional countries on how to manage crises jointly in East Asia. Naturally, the outcome of the discussion may largely be the product of a negotiation game based on both sides' strengths and interests. The U.S. may demand that China restrict North Korea's actions by reducing aid to the country; China may demand that the U.S. rein in Japan and the Philippines from making provocations against China in their territorial disputes.
But nothing occurs in isolation. After the U.S. announced President Xi's planned visit, North Korea immediately sent a special envoy to China with the presumed aim of persuading China to increase support to the north and preventing China from making any tradeoffs with the U.S. to North Korea’s detriment.
Fifth, once the U.S. and China reach a compromise, the political situation in Japan may change.
Since the U.S.' return to Asia, Japan has been the vanguard against China in both confrontations. A compromise struck between China and the U.S. would essentially pull the rug out from under Japan, leaving them in an awkward position.
As a not-quite-sovereign nation, Japan's foreign policy is almost entirely subordinate to U.S. direction. Only with the U.S.' tacit approval would it dare to provoke such frequent incidents. If China and the U.S. reach a settlement, not only will Japan's previous efforts have come to naught, but it will also lose big in several areas. Politically, it will have lost ground. On the economic front, its exports to China will take a nosedive. As for foreign policy, after confrontation failed to produce the desired results, Japan will seek to repair relations with China, but this will be more difficult than ever.
After Japan backed down in the first crisis, it did not hesitate to take advantage of every chance to make good with Chinese leaders. When the Chinese leaders showed no interest, Japan's prime minister reportedly met the Chinese premier outside a bathroom in what was ridiculed as "toilet diplomacy." But based on the behavior of the current Abe government, not even toilet diplomacy may have any effect. Thus, if Japan sincerely wants to mend relations with China, the possibility of political change in Japan cannot be ruled out. After all, its is a weak government with a new prime minister every year.
There is a saying in Chinese, "yizhang yichi, wenwu zhidao," which speaks of Zhou dynasty kings Wen and Wu governing with the principle of alternating tension and relaxation. Based on this principle, the calm after each round of tensions in East Asia benefits the people of all countries in East Asia, as well as China and the U.S., perhaps even the whole world. However, it would be wishful thinking to mistake this for world peace. Even now, the next round of tensions may already be brewing.
After the American Revolutionary War was won, U.S. founding father George Washington said, "Do not trust the British until we become their masters."* Today, China should be similarly vigilant.
*Editor’s Note: This quote, accurately translated, could not be verified.
First, the latest round of tensions may be coming to an end.
Since the end of the Cold War, Sino-U.S. relations have had a checkered history. Each time tensions flare, a visit from China's president to the U.S. has proven to be a sign that tensions were about to wane. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-to-late 1990s, Sino-U.S. relations were strained when the U.S. deployed aircraft carriers to intervene. Afterward, a visit by President Jiang Zemin to the U.S. calmed the situation.
Since the U.S.' return to Asia, there have been two rounds of tensions in the East Asia region. In the first round, there was the Diaoyudao incident, where a Japanese ship collided with a Chinese boat and detained its crew, and the inter-Korean Yeonpyeong crisis. Then, President Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. signaled the end of tensions. The current second round of tensions includes Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands, North Korea's nuclear tests, the Sino-Philippine island dispute in the South China Sea and the Philippines' fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman. Perhaps Xi Jinping's U.S. visit will again bring about a temporary end to the crisis.
Second, compromise is sought after a tense standoff.
In contrast to Soviet-U.S. relations during the Cold War, Sino-U.S. relations are not purely adversarial — amid conflict there is compromise and amid confrontation, cooperation. After each tense standoff, to maintain the paradigm of competition without violence, the U.S. usually invites China for talks to calm the situation and manage the crisis.
The U.S. has pursued a long-term strategy of brinkmanship to keep regional hot spots in line with its interests. Although it tolerates countries such as Japan and the Philippines challenging the regional security situation, it will not explicitly support the Philippines in any move to nationalize occupied Chinese islands or seize additional territories from China. The U.S. also will not explicitly recognize Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands or assist in the unification of the Korean peninsula. Perpetuating regional hotspots and territorial disputes in such a way that regional countries keep each other in check is an integral part of U.S. strategy.
In addition, the Chinese and U.S. economies are inextricably linked, and the EU is China's largest trading partner and source of technology imports. If violence were to erupt between the U.S. and China, the interests of U.S. multinationals and farmers would suffer, and those of the U.S.' European allies would suffer even more.
Third, gestures of goodwill reduce mutual suspicion.
With the U.S.' return to Asia, tensions have reached unprecedented levels around China's periphery. Chinese think tanks accuse the U.S. of trying to contain China, and anti-American sentiment is on the rise among the Chinese populace. Yet the U.S. claims its presence contributes to Asia's peace and stability.
For the U.S., causing offense to either China's government or its people is no small matter, especially as this could mean angering the 1.3 billion citizens of a rising superpower. The cyber attacks by Chinese netizens on the White House and Pentagon after the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing in Yugoslavia is something the U.S. will not likely forget. U.S. anxiety about cyber security is telling: Once China's people are angered, its government is held hostage to nationalism — a disastrous development for the U.S. and the world.
Hence, the U.S. has invited China's president to visit as a goodwill gesture to dissolve enmity and enhance trust through communication.
Fourth, this marks an effort to manage the crisis through communication and discussion.
Before the U.S.' return to Asia, the region was the scene of peace and prosperity. After the U.S. arrived, tensions rose abruptly. Regardless of whether the U.S. has any real intention of maintaining stability in East Asia, as the world's policeman it has to adopt certain posturing to maintain its international image.
A topic of discussion during President Xi's visit will likely include establishing a standard of conduct agreed upon by both sides and potentially additional countries on how to manage crises jointly in East Asia. Naturally, the outcome of the discussion may largely be the product of a negotiation game based on both sides' strengths and interests. The U.S. may demand that China restrict North Korea's actions by reducing aid to the country; China may demand that the U.S. rein in Japan and the Philippines from making provocations against China in their territorial disputes.
But nothing occurs in isolation. After the U.S. announced President Xi's planned visit, North Korea immediately sent a special envoy to China with the presumed aim of persuading China to increase support to the north and preventing China from making any tradeoffs with the U.S. to North Korea’s detriment.
Fifth, once the U.S. and China reach a compromise, the political situation in Japan may change.
Since the U.S.' return to Asia, Japan has been the vanguard against China in both confrontations. A compromise struck between China and the U.S. would essentially pull the rug out from under Japan, leaving them in an awkward position.
As a not-quite-sovereign nation, Japan's foreign policy is almost entirely subordinate to U.S. direction. Only with the U.S.' tacit approval would it dare to provoke such frequent incidents. If China and the U.S. reach a settlement, not only will Japan's previous efforts have come to naught, but it will also lose big in several areas. Politically, it will have lost ground. On the economic front, its exports to China will take a nosedive. As for foreign policy, after confrontation failed to produce the desired results, Japan will seek to repair relations with China, but this will be more difficult than ever.
After Japan backed down in the first crisis, it did not hesitate to take advantage of every chance to make good with Chinese leaders. When the Chinese leaders showed no interest, Japan's prime minister reportedly met the Chinese premier outside a bathroom in what was ridiculed as "toilet diplomacy." But based on the behavior of the current Abe government, not even toilet diplomacy may have any effect. Thus, if Japan sincerely wants to mend relations with China, the possibility of political change in Japan cannot be ruled out. After all, its is a weak government with a new prime minister every year.
There is a saying in Chinese, "yizhang yichi, wenwu zhidao," which speaks of Zhou dynasty kings Wen and Wu governing with the principle of alternating tension and relaxation. Based on this principle, the calm after each round of tensions in East Asia benefits the people of all countries in East Asia, as well as China and the U.S., perhaps even the whole world. However, it would be wishful thinking to mistake this for world peace. Even now, the next round of tensions may already be brewing.
After the American Revolutionary War was won, U.S. founding father George Washington said, "Do not trust the British until we become their masters."* Today, China should be similarly vigilant.
*Editor’s Note: This quote, accurately translated, could not be verified.