Misgivings in Sino-US Relations … the Source of Deadlock?

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 26 May 2015
by Wang Xiang Sui (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Chase Coulson. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
The Correct Understanding of Sino-U.S. Relations Should Come Through the Looking Glass of Global Trends

Have Sino-U.S. relations reached a breaking point? China expert David W. Lampton put forth this very issue in May. It’s a question that has drawn white-hot attention from strategists, and one that many have attempted to answer. The general consensus marks 2010 as the year that tensions between the two sides suddenly and sharply began to mount. Even if Sino-U.S. relations don’t collapse, essential American policy has become increasingly slanted toward viewing China as a threat to America’s leadership role, while elite circles within China, as well as the people at large, view America as the primary obstruction to China’s rise to prominence on the world stage. The positive elements within Sino-U.S. relations have begun to erode, leading to the very real possibility that a head-on confrontation between the two powers may be drawing near.

Judging from the aforementioned, American strategists seemingly have severe misgivings about the development of Sino-U.S. relations, which means, basically, that they've taken a turn for the worse. Those who are truly China-savvy may be small in number, but their opinions should count for much, and their suggestions taken more seriously at the policymaking level. Of course, tall tales hyped by wild embellishment in the media are unavoidable, and much of it finds its roots in The Wall Street Journal, for example, the very telling title of David Shambaugh’s article, “The Coming Chinese Crackup.”

One must admit, American strategists’ worries are not unfounded. Starting from at least the beginning of this year, America has made gradual adjustments to its position of neutrality regarding sovereignty disputes made by China and its surrounding states, and incorporating the Diaoyu Islands into the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty clearly indicate a change in stance, not to mention its interference in the South China Sea dispute. Actually, some American officials have chosen not to go through the media, instead letting their actions speak for them; for example, dispatching additional troops, naval warships and aircraft to China’s border region. Important American think tanks have published reports advocating a change in policy toward China, and new strategies directed at China have been launched that are designed from the ground up to contain China’s burgeoning influence and to no longer help her rise. These actions speak volumes about how the American side has indeed changed its China policy.

Let's face facts: America's change in policy really began with the implementation of the "pivot to Asia." All the recent discourse and action coming from the American side has just been about the actual implementation of the steps involved in this enormous strategic project. American strategist circles and China experts' worries are simply a true reflection of the current state of affairs and future trends inherent in China-U.S. relations. Now that the winds of global trends are blowing, and the banners of American interests are waving, the hearts and minds of China experts are naturally moving right along with them. Writers are familiar with David Lampton and David Shambaugh, have read their works and respect the level of their personal achievements; however, they feel that even the strongest might weaken and the wisest might err, as it were. With regard to such a complicated animal as Sino-U.S. relations, now is not the time to use linear thinking and make any anchoring type judgments. Because if one wants to correctly familiarize oneself with China-U.S. relations and the trends in their development, it’s imperative to free one’s mind from the box of traditional bilateral Sino-U.S. relations and understand them from the perspective of worldwide developmental trends.

America’s “Two Ocean” Strategy; the Formation of an Economic Cartel

Why should we look at this from a worldwide perspective? In short, it’s because we are quickly marching into a pluralized world. For the past 100 years, America was the primary driving force behind a global system, represented by an advanced economy, with an ideological and political system that was very complete, possessing the largest scale financial resources, the strongest military force and the largest number of allies as well. It has wielded the U.S. dollar system and its ability to innovate technologically in the construction and maintenance of a global order, in addition to its wealth of power and experience in administering worldwide affairs.

Entering the 21st century, especially after the global financial crisis, America has entered the early stages of a period of regression and decline. No longer is it the heroic postwar champion of the world, America, or the global hegemon America that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The America of today is showing signs that its power is waning, like an old tiger that is feeble and decrepit but not completely used up. America is exhausting itself trying to prop up its position as the sole global authority, yet simultaneously facing an ever more pluralized world, whose code of conduct calls for the sharing of responsibility and diversification of power. It’s obvious that America hasn’t adapted yet.

Under a “supreme authority” structure that is difficult to sustain, America’s answer is a “two oceans” strategy, which makes North America the center of free trade, through the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, dubbed the TPP, as its two wings; respectively dominating the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. America envisions itself setting up a so-called “high-level economic partnership,” excluding the main bulk of emerging powers and the majority of developing nations, which can only indicate an end to the traditional global system and the acceleration toward pluralism.

Contradictions in American strategy stem from its wish to take on the two great oceans in its drive to devour Asia, in addition to the fact that in its desire to maximize its own interests — leaving no room for sharing — no one will partner with it, thereby making the “two oceans” strategy difficult to realize. Even if it were implemented, it would be unsustainable. Directing a country in the pursuit of maximizing its own interests is the core contradiction inherent within a capitalist world system, and it has led directly to America’s strategic paradox. A system that does not accommodate a pluralized world cannot possibly adapt to a world of plural systems. The “two oceans” strategy marginalizes Russia, China, India, Brazil and most of the developing world. Regardless of how strong America is, the “two oceans” scheme will, at most, become merely the prelude to a transitional period marking the development of pluralism.

The Deadlock in Sino-U.S. Relations: America’s Insistence on a World that Excludes Pluralism

For an America that has developed from the “supreme hegemon” to the “two oceans” strategy to admit, but not yet truly realize, pluralism, and to acknowledge the equal footing of other nations is indeed difficult to get used to. Having long held onto its supremacy, it is quite natural to feel reluctant to part with it, and America is obviously not prepared emotionally to see other nations as partners of equal status, and as a result, it is apt to regard rapidly developing nations as threats. In spite of the fact that China’s development does not threaten America per se, China’s rise is advancing the course of worldwide plurality, which has shaken up the world order that puts America in a position of dominance. Thus, regardless of how China explains that its development poses no threat, it is difficult not to be seen by America as a direct rival.

Once one is clear on this point, then the source of the deadlock in Sino-U.S. relations is located: Its own admission, yet rejection, of the world’s trend toward pluralism. If America acknowledged the existence of a plural world, only then could it truly accept China’s resurgence, only then could China and the U.S. have an equal foundation for association. Otherwise, the two will be forever locked into conflict and gradually drift apart. The recent provocation by an American spy plane in the South China Sea, along with CNN’s reporting of the matter, clearly indicate both America’s anxieties and arrogance toward China’s rise. The more America tries to exert military pressure on China, the more it will strengthen China’s resolve to resist this threat to her security, and quicken China’s and even the entire East Asian region’s economic, political and security “de-Americanization.”

It’s difficult to swim against the tide; China needs a concentration of strategy if it is to sit by and wait patiently for America to adapt to the trend toward pluralism that is transforming the world. To a China still recovering from the dizzying effects of her rapid industrialization, it’s best not to overestimate her own strength and to define her goal as a member of a pluralist world. Just like Lampton anticipates, America needs to reassess its leadership position in postwar Asia, while China needs to reassess the understanding of her own strength. In this manner it’s quite possible for America and China to achieve long-term harmony in the Asian region. It seems that if Sino-American relations were to follow emerging trends, only then would it be possible to dispel misgivings, reduce antagonism and maintain tranquility.

The author is a professor at Beihang University and is the director of the Center for Strategic Studies


王湘穗:美国对华战略焦虑,症结是什么
2015-05-26


  从世界发展的大趋势来正确认识中美关系

  中美关系已至临界点?自美国著名的知华派学者兰普顿今年5月提出这个问题后,在美国战略学界引起广泛关注,许多人都试图回答这个问题。他们普遍认为,中美关系自2010年开始发生急剧变化。尽管美中关系的根基还没有坍塌,但是美国的主要政策精英日益倾向于把中国看成是美国在全球主导权的一个威胁,而在中国一些精英派别与民众也把美国看作是中国获得应有国际地位的一个障碍。美中关系的一些积极因素受到侵蚀,导致美中可能发生正面冲突的临界点正在接近。

  基于以上判断,美国战略学者对中美关系发展表现出强烈焦虑,这是中美关系中出现的新变化。知华派学者人数虽然不多,他们的看法却值得重视。因为与其他人相比,他们的意见更易被决策层所重视。当然,这其中少不了媒体的渲染,比如沈大伟就澄清说他那篇“中国即将崩溃”文章的标题,就是《华尔街日报》所起。

  应该承认,美国战略学者的担心并不是空穴来风。至少美国今年以来已经逐步调整了在中国与周边国家主权争议中不持立场的做法,明确表明把钓鱼岛纳入《美日安保协议》的范围,并在行动上介入南海主权争端;一些美国官员还通过媒体,发布要在中国周边加强军事部署和派军舰飞机进入的消息;美国重要智库则发布报告,建议调整对华政策,要针对中国出台新的战略,核心是制衡中国影响力的上升,而不是继续助其崛起。这些事实都说明,美国方面的确在调整对华政策。

  实际上,从确立“重返亚太”战略以来,美国对华政策已经开始调整。而美国方面最近的言论和举动,只是落实这一庞大战略的具体步骤。美国战略学界知华派的担忧,是对中美关系现状和未来趋势的真实反应。既然世界大势的风在动、美国利益的幡在动,知华派的心也自然随之在动。笔者与兰普顿和沈大伟先生相识,拜读过他们的著作,很尊重他们的学术素养,只是觉得智者千虑,难免一失:对中美关系这样一个充满复杂性的事物,实在不宜采用线性思维和做出点状式的判断。因为要正确认识中美关系的全局及其发展趋势,必须跳出中美双边的局限,从世界发展的大趋势来把握。

  美国的“两洋战略”,是搞经济合作小圈子

  什么是世界发展大势?概括地说,就是世界正在走向多极化。在过去100年,美国是整个世界体系的主导力量,代表着一种先进的经济体系,有完整的意识形态和政治制度,拥有最大的经济规模、最强的军事力量、最多的盟友,还有强大的美元体系、科技创新能力,建构并维持了一套全球化的秩序,具有丰富的世界治理能力和经验。

  进入21世纪,特别是金融危机之后,美国已进入老态初显的退行期,不再是二战后那个雄冠天下的美国,也不是苏联解体后一超独霸的美国了。如今的美国是形还在、势已衰、力未竭的老老虎。美国勉力支撑着唯一霸权国的地位,却要面对一个日趋多极化的世界。多极化世界的行为准则是分担责任和分享权力。显然,美国对此还不习惯。

  在“一超独霸”的格局难以坚持的情况下,美国的战略设计是“两洋战略”。就是以北美自贸区为中心,以跨大西洋伙伴关系的TTIP和跨太平洋的TPP作为两翼,分别主导大西洋和太平洋。美国设想搞所谓高水平的经济合作小圈子,排斥了主要新兴国家和一大批发展中国家,这也意味着传统全球体系的失效和多极化的加速。

  美国战略的矛盾之处,就在于既想一肩挑两洋通吃亚欧,又想自身利益最大化,然而不分享利益就没有伙伴,“两洋战略”就难以实现,即使实现了也无法持久。主导国家追求自身利益最大化是资本主义世界体系的核心矛盾,也导致了美国战略的悖论。装不下世界多样性的制度体系,没有办法成为适应多极化世界的新制度体系。“两洋战略”把俄罗斯、中国、印度、巴西和大部分发展中国家都排除在外,无论美国如何努力,“两洋格局”最多只能成为向世界多极化发展的一个插曲式过渡阶段。

  中美关系的症结:美国接受还是排斥世界的多极化趋势

  对美国来说,从“一超独霸”向“两洋格局”发展还可以接受,但要真正实现多极化,承认世界其他国家的平等地位,确实是难以适应。长期拥有世界性的霸权容易产生对权力过度依恋的后遗症,美国显然还没有做好把其他国家作为平等伙伴的心理准备,因而容易把快速发展的中国当成是美国的主要威胁。中国崛起推进着世界多极化的进程,尽管中国发展并没有威胁美国本身,却撼动了美国所主导的全球秩序。因此,无论中国如何解释自身发展的无害,都难免被视为美国的竞争对手。

  明白了这一点,就找到了中美关系的症结:接受还是排斥世界的多极化趋势。美国只有承认多极世界,才会真正接受中国的复兴,中美才有了平等相处的基础。不然,就会冲突不断、渐行渐远。最近美国侦察机在南海的挑衅侦察和CNN对此事的报道,恰恰表明美国对中国崛起的焦虑感和霸主式的傲慢。美国越是施加军事压力,就越会增强中国抵御安全威胁的努力,加速中国乃至东亚地区从经济到政治、安全的“脱美化”。

  大势难违,中国要有战略定力,耐心等待美国适应世界多极化趋势的转变。对中国来说,也要克服快速发展产生的速度眩晕,不要高估了自身的能力,确定中国的目标只是当好多极化世界中的一员。就像兰普顿先生所期待的那样,美国要重新思考战后其在亚洲的主导地位,中国要重新校正其对力量的理解,那么美中在亚洲就可能达成长期的和谐。看来中美关系只能顺大势而为,这样做才能消除焦虑,减少对抗,保持淡定。▲(作者是北京航空航天大学教授、战略问题研究中心主任)
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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