Egypt 2011 = Iran 1979?
Published in El Mundo
(Spain) on 3 February 2011
by Ricard Gonzalez (link to original)
(Spain) on 3 February 2011
by Ricard Gonzalez (link to original)
Translated from
by Esther French.
Edited by Mark DeLucas.
One constant in the coverage of the Egyptian revolution is the search for a comparison with some historical antecedent, to orient a situation that many analysts define as “unknown territory.” The most recurring analogy is the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Is the Egypt of 2011 equal to the Iran of 1979?
Public opinion is divided when it comes to responding to that question. The pessimists believe that history is repeating itself, and that the country will fall into the hands of some radical Muslims, personified by the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, the optimists point out that the principal Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood, has not been behind the mobilizations, and that the Egyptian youths have not succumbed to the siren calls of theocracy.
It’s logical that the question dominates the U.S. media, since Iran represents one of the grand failures of U.S. policy in the past century. The Asiatic country passed in the twinkling of an eye from being one of the two central pillars of Washington’s policy in the ‘60s and ‘70s to being the state most hostile to Washington in the entire region. The other pillar, Saudi Arabia, remains unscathed — at least for the moment.
Curiously, beyond the similarities of terrain between both countries, there is another resemblance: the existence of a Democratic president whose detractors accuse him of being “inexpert and soft” in foreign policy. Back then it was Jimmy Carter; now it is Barack Obama.
In fact, many argue that it was the Iranian Revolution that sunk the Carter presidency. The hostage crisis after the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran coincided with the electoral campaign against Reagan, who lashed his adversary for being incapable of freeing the hundreds of sequestered U.S. citizens. Caution has marked the White House’s reactions, just as it has the majority of the U.S. policy class, independent of ideology. The Republican leaders, like John Boehner, have aligned themselves on this occasion with Obama, or have declined to adopt a convincing position.
Almost all of the politicians that have spoken have highlighted the need to avoid a bloodbath. Few ask for unconditional support for Mubarak. Glenn Beck, who is another story, has not looked for a historical analogy with Iran but with World War I, and this to announce a cataclysmic war after which will be created a grand caliphate that will include half of Europe.
To my knowledge, in the short-term, the chances that a radical Islamic party like Khomeini’s will take control of Egypt are very slight. Compared to Shiite, Sunni Islam is decentralized. There is no messianic leader capable of awakening devotion among the masses, and thus co-opting the revolution. In addition, it has been years since the Muslim Brotherhood abandoned violence, and it does not have at its disposal “brown shirts” capable of taking power.
However, no one doubts that the Brotherhood will play an important role in the political future of the country. If there are elections, surely they will be the first force, but it is difficult for them to obtain the absolute majority. What they would do if they had it is an unknown. Analysts disagree over the movement’s supposed moderation. For the moment, they act with a lot of prudence, conscious that more than the Iran of 1979, if they emerge with the power, Egypt will appear more like the Algeria of 1990.
Public opinion is divided when it comes to responding to that question. The pessimists believe that history is repeating itself, and that the country will fall into the hands of some radical Muslims, personified by the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, the optimists point out that the principal Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood, has not been behind the mobilizations, and that the Egyptian youths have not succumbed to the siren calls of theocracy.
It’s logical that the question dominates the U.S. media, since Iran represents one of the grand failures of U.S. policy in the past century. The Asiatic country passed in the twinkling of an eye from being one of the two central pillars of Washington’s policy in the ‘60s and ‘70s to being the state most hostile to Washington in the entire region. The other pillar, Saudi Arabia, remains unscathed — at least for the moment.
Curiously, beyond the similarities of terrain between both countries, there is another resemblance: the existence of a Democratic president whose detractors accuse him of being “inexpert and soft” in foreign policy. Back then it was Jimmy Carter; now it is Barack Obama.
In fact, many argue that it was the Iranian Revolution that sunk the Carter presidency. The hostage crisis after the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran coincided with the electoral campaign against Reagan, who lashed his adversary for being incapable of freeing the hundreds of sequestered U.S. citizens. Caution has marked the White House’s reactions, just as it has the majority of the U.S. policy class, independent of ideology. The Republican leaders, like John Boehner, have aligned themselves on this occasion with Obama, or have declined to adopt a convincing position.
Almost all of the politicians that have spoken have highlighted the need to avoid a bloodbath. Few ask for unconditional support for Mubarak. Glenn Beck, who is another story, has not looked for a historical analogy with Iran but with World War I, and this to announce a cataclysmic war after which will be created a grand caliphate that will include half of Europe.
To my knowledge, in the short-term, the chances that a radical Islamic party like Khomeini’s will take control of Egypt are very slight. Compared to Shiite, Sunni Islam is decentralized. There is no messianic leader capable of awakening devotion among the masses, and thus co-opting the revolution. In addition, it has been years since the Muslim Brotherhood abandoned violence, and it does not have at its disposal “brown shirts” capable of taking power.
However, no one doubts that the Brotherhood will play an important role in the political future of the country. If there are elections, surely they will be the first force, but it is difficult for them to obtain the absolute majority. What they would do if they had it is an unknown. Analysts disagree over the movement’s supposed moderation. For the moment, they act with a lot of prudence, conscious that more than the Iran of 1979, if they emerge with the power, Egypt will appear more like the Algeria of 1990.
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